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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON FISCAL POLICY AND TAX COMPLIANCE 
By 
ORONDE DIA SMALL 
August 2017 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation comprises three essays that examine critical aspects of fiscal policy and 
explores important determinants of tax compliance in a developing country context. The first 
essay examines the fiscal response to changes in debt-to-GDP for a panel of developing 
countries. Our empirical strategy adopts a dynamic difference generalized methods of moments 
(DGMM) model with forward orthogonal deviation. We find a positive and significant response 
for the primary balance and ‘fiscal effort’ to changes in debt-to-GDP. For the fiscal components, 
we find a positive relationship between debt-to-GDP and general and tax revenues, and a 
negative relationship with primary spending. We also find evidence of nonlinearities, with 
countries making larger increases in the primary balance and fiscal effort at higher levels of debt, 
largely driven by increases in revenues. Higher income countries demonstrate a greater 
propensity to adjust along the revenue margins, compared to lower income countries. This might 
be indicative of systemic revenue mobilization challenges facing the latter.  
The second essay examines the effect of the provision of taxpayer services on filing and 
payment of the corporate income tax (CIT) and general consumption tax (GCT) for large 
taxpayers in Jamaica. We use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits an 
exogenous jump in the intensity of taxpayer service delivery, which occurs when a taxpayer 
reaches gross receipts of J$500 million (US$5.7 million) and is selected into the large taxpayer 
office (LTO). The results indicate null effects for the CIT but positive filing and payment 
compliance effects for the GCT. The contrasting results for the CIT and GCT may be due to the 
relatively weaker legal enforcement framework of the former. The results provide suggestive 
evidence of a complementarity between the strength of the legal enforcement framework of the 
taxing regime and the provision of taxpayer services. 
In the third essay we implement public goods messaging experiments to examine the 
effects on personal income tax (PIT) compliance among self-employed individuals in Jamaica. In 
the first sub-experiment we examine the effect of the standard public goods message on payment 
of quarterly PIT obligations. In the second sub-experiment we focus on payment of PIT arrears 
and expand the message context to include a variant of the standard public goods message – 
which provides additional information on actual spending on key public goods and services. The 
compliance outcomes in sub-experiment two relate to established PIT delinquencies, compared 
to sub-experiment one where there is no legal obligation to comply. We find that the standard 
public goods message had no effect on compliance with quarterly PIT payments in sub-
experiment one. However results from sub-experiment two indicate positive compliance effects 
from the standard and augmented public goods messages on the probability of making a payment 
and the amount of PIT arrears paid after nineteen weeks. Point estimates from the standard and 
augmented public goods messages are not statistically different for any of the outcomes 
examined; suggesting that additional information on public spending allocations does not matter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A primary focus of fiscal policy in developing countries centers on debt management. 
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) point out that the ‘debt intolerance’ that characterizes 
many developing countries implies a heightened sensitivity on the part of creditors, which 
ultimately limits access to credit markets. Access to credit markets is therefore an important 
determinant of fiscal policy in many developing countries. This argument is supported by Albero 
and Montero (2006) who maintain that public debt sustainability accounts for the whole pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America. This is evidenced by countries commitment to fiscal 
consolidation, even during harsh economic times, perhaps as a signal to creditors that debt 
remains a priority. However, notwithstanding the impetus to react, developing countries may be 
limited in the extent to which they are able to do so. These limitations may act on countries 
overall ability to increase primary surpluses in response to growing debt, and can possibly be 
more of a binding constraint on either the revenue or expenditure side of the budget. 
 Understanding the anatomy of the fiscal policy response to debt in developing countries 
is an interesting but largely unexplored question. Existing evidence point to significant revenue 
mobilization challenges across developing countries, which might compromise their ability to 
adjust along the revenue margin.  If countries are so constrained, then strategies to unlock the 
blockages to revenue growth are an obvious priority.  A low level of tax compliance has been 
identified as one impediment to revenue growth across developing countries. In this context 
understanding what are some of the key factors that drive tax compliance in these countries 
becomes particularly important. 
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This dissertation comprises three essays that examine critical issues in fiscal policy and 
tax compliance in developing countries. The first essay examines the relationship between the 
primary balance (revenues less primary expenditure), fiscal effort (tax revenues less primary 
expenditure) and their respective fiscal components – general revenue, tax revenue and primary 
expenditure – with the lagged value of the debt-to-GDP ratio for a panel of developing countries. 
We contribute to the existing literature in several important ways. Firstly, although previous 
studies examine the fiscal response of the primary balance to changes in debt-to-GDP for 
advanced countries, scant attention has been paid to developing countries. Secondly, we go 
further than most previous studies and examine specific margins of response.  In particular we 
examine the response of countries ‘fiscal effort’, defined here as total consolidated central 
government tax revenues less non-interest expenditures. Relative to the primary balance, ‘fiscal 
effort’ does not include grants or other non-tax revenues, and arguably captures a fiscal measure 
that is more closely linked to government fiscal policy discretion. Further we dichotomize the 
fiscal reaction function (FRF) into the general revenue, tax revenue and primary spending 
components and examine each separately. Whereas several studies examine the FRF, very few 
have examined the reaction of these separate components and none have done so for developing 
countries. We also test for nonlinearities across the debt distribution and heterogeneity in the 
fiscal policy response between low / lower-middle income and high / upper-middle income 
countries.  
Theoretical models of debt sustainability predict a positive relationship between primary 
balance and debt. It follows, that the expected relationship between debt-to-GDP and the revenue 
components is positive, and that with primary spending is negative. We test the theoretical 
predictions using data for a panel of 54 developing countries over the period 1990 – 2011. Our 
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empirical strategy adopts a dynamic difference generalized methods of moments (DGMM) 
model with forward orthogonal deviation (FOD) (Arellano & Bover, 1995). We find a positive 
and significant response for the primary balance and ‘fiscal effort’ to changes in debt-to-GDP. 
For the full sample we find evidence that countries adjust along both the revenue and 
expenditure margins at roughly the same rate. This sort of measured adjustment might be 
indicative of deliberate policy on the part of governments, not to engage in asymmetric policy 
changes that could impact negatively on overall economic welfare. We also find suggestive 
evidence on nonlinearities in fiscal response, with countries making larger increases in the 
primary balance and fiscal effort at higher levels of debt, mainly driven by increases in revenues. 
At lower levels of debt countries tend to use spending cuts. Tests for heterogeneity suggests that 
high / upper-middle income countries have a greater propensity to adjust along the revenue and 
tax revenue margins compared to low / lower middle income countries. This might be indicative 
of systemic revenue mobilization challenges facing the latter.  
The second essay complements the first and investigates potential factors that impinge on 
the revenue mobilization capacity of developing countries. In particular we examine the effect of 
the provision of taxpayer services on filing and payment of the corporate income tax (CIT) and 
general consumption tax (GCT) for large taxpayers in Jamaica. Despite the huge dependence of 
developing country governments on large taxpayers for almost all their revenue, very little has 
been done to study the effects of tax administration interventions on compliance for this taxpayer 
segment. Further, the emergence of complementary theories of tax compliance and the adoption 
of administration interventions that seek to leverage non-pecuniary factors have spawned a 
literature that examine the effects of these factors on tax compliance in developing countries. 
However, very few focus on the provision of taxpayer services. This essay attempts to fill these 
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gaps in the literature. Another important contribution of this essay is that we explore the effects 
of taxpayer services conditional on the strength of the legal enforcement framework of the taxing 
regime, to test the relationship between service delivery and enforcement strength. 
We focus on the taxpayer’s decision to file and pay taxes conditional on their reporting 
decision. These are important margins of response particularly in developing countries with 
relatively weak tax administrations that find it difficult to collect reported taxes. The empirical 
strategy adopts a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits an exogenous jump in the 
intensity of taxpayer service delivery, which occurs when a taxpayer reaches gross receipts of 
J$500 million (US$5.7 million) and is selected into the large taxpayer office (LTO). This 
approach compares the compliance behavior of those located just to the right of the threshold – 
who are selected into the LTO, to otherwise similar taxpayers located just the left of the 
threshold – who are marginally not selected into the LTO. Assuming all other key taxpayer 
characteristics transition smoothly across the threshold, the RDD estimates are causal. The 
results indicate null effects for the CIT but positive filing and payment compliance effects for the 
GCT. The contrasting results for the CIT and GCT may be due to the relatively weaker legal 
enforcement framework of the former. The results provide suggestive evidence of a 
complementarity between the strength of the legal enforcement framework of the taxing regime 
and the provision of taxpayer services. 
In the third essay we continue to explore the effect of non-pecuniary factors on tax 
compliance in Jamaica, by examining the role of public goods messages. Compared to the 
second essay, which focuses on large taxpayers and on the CIT and the GCT, this essay focuses 
on the self-employed who are typically small to medium sized, and on the personal income tax 
(PIT). The contribution of this paper is three fold.  Firstly we add to a nascent but growing 
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literature that uses messaging experiments to study casual determinants of tax compliance in 
developing countries (Castro & Scartascini, 2013; Ortega & Sanguinetti, 2013; Pomeranz, 2013; 
Carillo, Pomeranz & Singhal, 2014; Brockmeyer, Hernandez & Kettle, 2016). This is the first in 
an English speaking Latin American Caribbean (LAC) country. Secondly we examine the 
compliance effects of taxpayer knowledge about spending allocations across important public 
goods and services – a proxy for taxpayer agency. Whereas recent studies have examined similar 
questions in a controlled lab environment, we move the analysis into the field. Thirdly the 
compliance outcomes we examine offers an opportunity to compare the effect of public goods 
messages (and non-pecuniary factors more generally) on compliance with a purely voluntary 
obligation – for which there are no penalties for non-compliance, and obligations for which non-
compliance attract significant fines.  
We implement a randomized messaging experiment to examine the effect of public goods 
messages on PIT compliance amongst self-employed individuals in Jamaica. We conduct two 
sub-experiments and examine the effect of the messages on two sets of compliance outcomes. In 
the first sub-experiment we examine the effect of the standard public goods message on payment 
of quarterly PIT obligations. Because there are no penalties for non-payment of quarterly PIT, 
the compliance effects will be free of confounding from enforcement action – a truly zero 
enforcement environment. In this context, the structure of the PIT penalty regime in Jamaica 
provides a unique opportunity to examine the effect of the standard public goods message on 
voluntary compliance. In the second sub-experiment we focus on payment of PIT arrears and 
expand the message context to include an augmented public goods message, which provides 
additional information on actual spending on key public goods and services. Providing 
information on spending allocation can ‘open up the books’ and can elicit trust and arguably 
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provide a sense of agency in the mind of taxpayers. In this sub-experiment the compliance 
outcomes relate to established PIT delinquencies, compared to sub-experiment one where there 
is no legal obligation to comply.  
We find that the standard public goods message had no effect on compliance with 
quarterly PIT payments in sub-experiment one. However results from sub-experiment two 
indicate positive compliance effects for the probability of making a payment and the amount of 
PIT arrears paid, after nineteen weeks. Point estimates from the standard and augmented public 
goods messages are not statistically different for any of the outcomes examined; suggesting that 
additional information on public spending allocations does not matter. Tests for heterogeneity in 
compliance response suggest that compliance gains are driven largely by older taxpayers. Unlike 
previous studies we find only limited evidence of differential compliance response between 
individuals with high and low tax debt.  
The remainder of the dissertation provides a more detailed discussion of each essay. 
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Essay 1: An Examination of the Fiscal Policy Response to Public Debt in Developing 
Countries 
 
Introduction  
Debt sustainability has long been a major concern for governments in both developed and 
developing countries. However government’s capacities to sustain their fiscal accounts differ 
tremendously across the two groupings. There is a large but still emergent literature devoted to 
examining the fiscal reaction functions (FRF) for developed countries. However, much less focus 
has been given to this question in the context of developing countries. This is surprising 
especially since developing countries are likely to face less favorable capital market access 
conditions and are thus much more exposed to fiscal sustainability challenges (Alberola & 
Montero, 2006).
1
 Unlike their more developed counterparts, public debt in developing countries 
has more immediate consequences for the economy. As a group they share a colored history of 
debt crises and subsequent periods of painful economic adjustments. The recurrences of debt 
crises invite a closer enquiry into whether fiscal policies in these countries have been deployed 
responsibly.  
This essay estimates the FRF for a panel of developing countries. The FRF captures 
changes in the primary balance, defined as consolidated central government revenues less non 
interest expenditures, in response to a change in the one period lag debt-to-GDP ratio, after 
controlling for inter alia volatility in economic output and government spending. Additionally, 
we go further than most previous studies and examine specific margins of response.  In particular 
we examine the response of countries ‘fiscal effort’, defined here as total consolidated central 
government tax revenues less non-interest expenditures. Relative to the primary balance, ‘fiscal 
                                                          
1
 Developing countries are generally more susceptible to natural disasters and other economic, social and political 
disturbances that could compromise their ability to remain solvent. 
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effort’ does not include grants or other non-tax revenues, and arguably captures a fiscal measure 
that is more closely linked to government fiscal policy discretion.
2
 Further we dichotomize the 
FRF into the general revenue, tax revenue and primary spending components, and examine each 
separately. Whereas several studies examine the FRF, very few have examined the reaction of 
these separate components and none have done so for developing countries. This is an important 
contribution since it provides a test of how the different sides of the budget are able to adjust in 
response to changes in public debt. Moreover, the estimated elasticities with respect to the debt-
to-GDP ratio can be used to inform appropriate fiscal policy adjustments for the countries 
examined. We also test for nonlinearities in the fiscal policy response conditional on the level of 
debt, and examine heterogeneous responses across low / lower-middle income and high / upper-
middle income countries.  
The results indicate a positive response in the primary balance and ‘fiscal effort’ to 
changes in debt-to-GDP. In general, countries in the full sample appear to adjust along both the 
revenue and expenditure margins. We find some evidence of nonlinearities in the fiscal response 
– countries make larger adjustments in the primary balance and ‘fiscal effort’ at relatively higher 
levels of debt. Interestingly, fiscal adjustments at higher debt levels are driven largely by 
increases in revenues, whereas the tendency is to cut primary spending when debt is relatively 
low. We find that low / lower-middle and high / upper-middle income countries have been 
fiscally responsible – with a generally positive FRF. However compared to low / lower-middle 
income countries, high / upper-middle income countries demonstrate a greater propensity to 
adjust along the general revenue and tax revenue margins. This might be indicative of systemic 
revenue mobilization challenges facing the latter.  
                                                          
2
 The ‘fiscal effort’ measure places a stricter requirement on governments to use internally generated tax revenues to 
sustain debt. 
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Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries  
There is some legitimacy for government’s use of deficit financing to fund critical 
expenditures. The classic Keynesian argument advances that deficit financing to boost aggregate 
demand and employment is not only justified but necessary. This argument is in part based on 
the assumption that there are no intergenerational equity concerns associated with debt 
accumulation, as the burden of public debt is assumed to be borne by the generation that issued 
the debt.
3
 A related argument comes from Barro (1979) who advances a theory of tax smoothing 
as justification for the use of deficit financing to smooth out cyclical fluctuations in output. In 
this context, deficit financing, used as a substitute for distortionary adjustments in tax rates can 
be welfare improving.  
In theory a country can afford to incur debt if, over time it is able to consistently generate 
higher relative growth rates in real economic output or where it is able to consistently generate 
increases in primary surpluses that exceed the interest rate growth rate differential. However, 
there is a limit on the extent to which a country is able to continue to accumulate debt before it 
begins to raise concerns about the sustainability of its fiscal policy. There is some evidence to 
suggest that this debt limit is much lower in developing countries relative to more advanced 
economies. Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) highlight the “debt intolerance” that 
characterizes many developing countries, which heightens sensitivity on the part of creditors 
who may in turn limit access to credit markets. In the extreme case, effective marginal interest 
rates on debt can become infinite and countries can essentially be shut out of the credit market 
altogether (Flood & Marion, 2006; Gosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry & Qureshi, 2011). Access to 
                                                          
3
 This argument has come up against some criticism. Barro (1974) outlined that the issuing of debt within the 
context of a deficit financing program geared toward increasing government expenditures and boosting aggregate 
demand may not have the desired result. He argues that the future taxation implied by the accumulation of debt will 
have offsetting effects on household income and on their propensity to consume. Moreover there are costs associated 
with issuing debt that if incorporated could result in negative overall welfare effects for households. 
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credit markets is therefore an important determinant of fiscal policy in developing countries.
4
 
This argument is supported by Albero and Montero (2006) who argue that public debt 
sustainability accounts for the whole pro-cyclical fiscal policy in Latin America. However, 
notwithstanding the impetus to react, developing countries may be limited in the extent to which 
they are able to do so. 
Theoretical Framework   
Sustainability refers to “… the endurance of systems and processes”. In particular debt 
sustainability is taken to mean the avoidance of default and is achieved where the present value 
of the primary balance is equal to the current debt – where the government’s inter-temporal 
budget constraint (IBC) is satisfied. We adopt a simple theoretical framework advanced by Bohn 
(1998) to model the fiscal response of the primary balance to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
The government’s IBC takes the standard form:  
𝐷𝑡+𝑛   = (1 + 𝑟)
𝑛 ∙ 𝐷𝑡 − ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
𝑛−𝑗𝑛
𝑗=0 ∙ 𝑆𝑡+𝑗      (1) 
Where (D) is the stock of debt and (S) is the primary balance with subscripts denoting the 
corresponding time period for the respective variables. Equation (1) is a simple accounting 
equation that explains the evolution of government debt – as a function of the interest cost and an 
error correction term captured by the primary surplus. For a given interest rate, governments can 
reduce their debt by running sustained primary surpluses.  
Solving for the current stock of debt and taking expectations of future values yield: 
𝐷𝑡 =  (1 + 𝑟)
−𝑛  ∙ 𝐸𝑡  (𝐷𝑡+𝑛)  + ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
−𝑗𝑛
𝑗=0 ∙ 𝐸𝑡(𝑆𝑡+𝑗)    (2) 
                                                          
4
 Lukkezen and Rojas-Romagosa (2012) show that greater uncertainty in developing countries result in lower 
tolerance on the part of creditors which in turn forces these countries to respond much more strongly in an effort to 
stabilize debt. 
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We follow the standard approach in the literature and express equation (2) as a share of 
GDP in equation (3). This normalizes debt across countries and allows for cross country 
analyses. 
𝑑𝑡 =  (
1+𝑔
1+𝑟
)
𝑛
∙ 𝐸𝑡 (𝑑𝑡+𝑛)  + ∑ (
1+𝑔
1+𝑟
)
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=0 ∙ 𝐸𝑡(𝑠𝑡+𝑗)     (3) 
Taking the limit as n →  ∞ leaves us with two key conditions5:  
lim𝑛 →∞ (
1+𝑔
1+𝑟
)
𝑛
∙ 𝐸𝑡 (𝑑𝑡+𝑛) ≤ 0       (4) 
𝑑𝑡 = ∑ (
1+𝑔
1+𝑟
)
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=0 ∙ 𝐸𝑡(𝑠𝑡+𝑗)        (5) 
Equations (4) and (5) give the transversality (no ponzi) condition and the government’s 
inter-temporal budget constraint, respectively. The former assumes that governments cannot hold 
or accumulate debt in perpetuity. A violation of the transversality condition would suggest that 
the government is unable to repay its initial debt, a situation that would cause rational agents to 
withhold credit and therefore serves as a real constraint on government’s debt accumulation 
behavior.
6
  
Comparative statics from equation (5) captures several important relationships. Firstly, 
higher rates of growth in real economic output, sustained over time, can support higher levels of 
debt. Secondly, access to low cost financing can significantly improve governments’ ability to 
sustain higher levels of debt.
7
 Thirdly, higher levels of debt can be sustained if governments can 
                                                          
5
 Equations (4) and (5) assume that GDP grows at a constant rate  𝑔 and thus 𝑦𝑡+𝑛 =  (1 + 𝑔)
𝑛 𝑦𝑡. 
6
 Bohn (2008) argues that there are plausible conditions under which (4) may not have defined limits or may have a 
negative limit, but that such considerations will unnecessarily serve to complicate the analysis. We follow the 
standard approach in the literature and assume that equation (4) holds at equality. 
7
 Whilst low interest costs on sovereign debt can come from simply borrowing at more favorable interest rates, 
another avenue is through seigniorage or inflation. See Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) for a discussion on the use of 
financial repression as a way to avoid having to make real fiscal policy adjustments. 
12 
 
consistently run positive primary balances. Notably, if high debt is associated with higher 
financing costs and lower economic growth rates, the theory implies a need for even larger fiscal 
responses to ensure stabilization. This has prompted a number of studies to suggest that a simple 
positive linear relationship between primary balance and debt-to-GDP might not be sufficient 
(Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry, & Qureshi, 2011) to ensure sustainability. These studies point to 
a need for stricter sustainability criteria, namely that the systematic policy response – the 
coefficient on the primary balance – is greater than the interest rate - growth rate differential (r –
g).  
Whether countries are able to respond in the manner suggested is an open empirical 
question - one we examine in this essay. We might expect fiscally responsible governments to 
make larger adjustments when debt levels are high. However, at higher levels of debt, larger 
increases in the primary balance may be economically, socially and politically difficult – a 
situation Gosh et al. ( 2011) labels ‘fiscal fatigue’. The credibility of the overall fiscal adjustment 
plan therefore hinges on the practicality of the path for the primary balance and governments’ 
ability to always react to increases in debt. How countries react is also important – do they 
increase revenues or cut primary spending. The margin of response adopted can have broader 
economic and welfare implications. For example Krogstrup (2002) points out that tax increases 
in a context of high tax competition can introduce potentially large distortions that compromise 
economic welfare. Additionally, the margin of response may also vary depending on the level of 
debt. For example, if countries are averse to tax increases they might choose spending cuts when 
debt is relatively low and rely on tax hikes as a last resort when debt is relatively high. 
13 
 
Literature Review 
Much of the recent discussion in the literature begins with Bohn (1998) who examined 
the fiscal response to debt for the US using time series methods. He finds that after controlling 
for volatility in output and government spending (due largely to wartime spending), the primary 
balance in the US bore a consistently positive relationship with the debt to-GDP-ratio. However, 
Bohn’s work was focused on the US and so the question of how other governments react to debt 
remained largely unexplored. Subsequently, several studies have applied Bohn’s framework to 
examine the FRF in other countries. Lukkezen and Rojas-Romosagosa (2012) use time series 
analysis to examine the fiscal response to debt for seven OECD countries. They find that the US, 
UK, Netherlands and Belgium responded to growing debt by increasing their primary balance, 
but Spain, Portugal and Iceland did not. They find nonlinearities in the relationship between the 
primary balance and debt-to-GDP going in both directions. The UK and the Netherlands respond 
more strongly – increase their primary balance by more at higher levels of debt. However, Spain, 
Portugal and Iceland struggle make the necessary adjustments, and primary balance actually 
declines at relatively high levels of debt. 
Other studies approach this question using panel data methods. Celasun and Ostry (2006) 
examined the fiscal response for 34 emerging market economies over the period 1990 - 2004 
using limited information maximum likelihood (LILM) and system GMM models. They find a 
positive relationship between primary balance and debt-to-GDP. Gosh et al (2011) examine a 
similar question for a panel of advanced economies over the period 1970 – 2007 and also find 
generally positive responses in the primary balance. They also report nonlinearities in the 
relationship between debt and the primary balance. In particular, they find that the response of 
the primary balance start to decline at debt-to-GDP of about 90 –100 percent and turns negative 
14 
 
as it approaches 150 percent. This finding is counter to Bohn (1998, 2008) who found stronger 
responses at higher levels of debt for the US. Mendoza and Ostry (2008) examine the fiscal 
reaction function for a group of 22 industrial countries (IC) and 33 emerging economies (EE).
8
 
Interestingly this paper offers a direct comparison of the fiscal response for two distinct country 
groupings. They find that IC have higher debt ratios than EE – in line with the debt intolerance 
conjecture (Reinhart, Rogoff & Savastano, 2003). They employ a fixed effects model with errors 
corrected for first order autocorrelation and find a positive relationship between the primary 
balance and debt-to GDP for both IC and EE. They also report that the response among EE was 
much stronger than in IC – a 1 percentage point increase in the debt ratio was associated with 
.036 and 0.02 of a percentage point increase in the primary balance for EE and IC respectively. 
Tests for nonlinearities did not yield significant results for IC but in the case of EE showed a 
weakening in response when debt-to-GDP exceeded 50 percent.
9
 
Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009) expand the analysis to account for effects of fiscal rules 
and level of government decentralization in estimating the response of the primary balance to 
debt-to-GDP ratio for a panel of 27 EU member countries. In general, their results corroborate 
earlier findings of a positive response to debt. They report smaller response magnitudes when the 
debt ratio is greater than 80 percent. Interestingly, they also examine the response of the primary 
spending component of the primary balance and find no significant effect. This result suggests 
that the EU countries studied respond largely through the revenue margin.
10
  
                                                          
8
 Estimates for industrial countries were done using data from 1970 – 2005 and in the case of developing countries 
from 1990-2005. 
9
 One test they did was to split the sample into high and low debt countries and run separate regressions and 
compared the estimated coefficients. They found that for highly indebted EM countries the coefficient on the debt-
to-GDP was not statistically significant. 
10
 They find that the existence of fiscal rules and public spending decentralization has a positive effect on the 
primary balance.  
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In work closely related to this essay, Krogstrup (2002) examines the response of taxes 
and spending to debt-to-GDP for a panel of EU countries. She finds that countries respond along 
both the tax and spending margins, with slightly larger adjustments for the latter. She also finds 
that debt servicing in the context of high capital mobility does not affect countries response 
along the tax margin but that countries respond by significantly reducing spending. These results 
highlight some interesting patterns in fiscal policy response for the EU. Firstly, countries respond 
along both the tax and spending margins and secondly, there is a tendency for larger responses 
along the spending margin, particularly when there is tax competition. Reicher (2013) estimates 
the reaction of different categories of government spending, taxes and transfers to debt-to-GDP 
for a panel of 20 industrial countries. In contrast to Krogstrup (2002), he finds that in general, the 
countries studied increase their primary balance in response to debt and that much of this 
increase comes through higher taxation with much smaller adjustments in government 
spending.
11
  
In sum, the existing literature places inordinate focus on examining the fiscal response 
among industrial countries and countries within the EU. Very few studies go beyond the 
conventional approach and actually disaggregate the fiscal response to better understand the 
anatomy of debt consolidation within these countries. This essay attempts to fill this gap by 
examining the response of the primary balance and its structural components, for a sample of 
developing countries.   
                                                          
11
 Estimates for individual tax measures studied (labor tax rate, capital tax rate and tax as a share of GDP) were all 
positive but in general were imprecisely estimated. 
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Data 
We examine the fiscal response to debt-to-GDP for a panel of 54 developing countries.
12
 
In an attempt to treat with concerns about the short time span over which fiscal policy analyses 
in less developed countries have generally been conducted, we use data over 22 years, from 1990 
to 2011.  
The fiscal variables used in this research are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS) and we use data for the consolidated central government. 
The use of consolidated data reduces the likelihood of double counting of fiscal aggregates 
across the various levels of government within countries. It also mitigates potential 
comparability problems across countries with different governmental structures. The choice of 
the level of governmental aggregation is informed largely by data availability. In developing 
countries, fiscal reporting at the subnational level is generally weak, and so, much of the 
available data are for central government operations. Additionally, because major fiscal policy 
changes are enacted at the central government level in most developing countries we feel that the 
choice of the level aggregation is further justified.
13
 Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 
variables used. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 See Table A.1 in Appendix A for a list of the countries used in this research. 
13
 Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) examine the effect of government spending on growth using a subset of 
countries with both general and central government fiscal data and found similar results. This suggests that the level 
of aggregation may not significantly affect our results. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1990 – 2011 
 
 
For the dependent variables, we examine five measures of fiscal response – primary 
balance, ‘fiscal effort, general revenues, tax revenues and primary spending. Essentially this 
amounts to decomposing the primary balance and ‘fiscal effort’ and examining the response of 
each component. All outcomes examined are expressed as a share of GDP. 
The primary variable of interest is the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio and is taken from the 
IMF historical public debt data base.
14
 Figure 1 shows the trend in general government average 
debt ratios for the countries in the full sample as well as low / lower-middle income countries 
and high / upper-middle income countries, over the period 1990 – 2011. Though the average debt 
ratio displays some variability, countries reduced debt-to-GDP by about 18 percentage points 
over the period. The downward trend in debt-to-GDP appears to be driven largely by low / 
                                                          
14
 Data on debt-to-GDP were compiled by S. M. Ali Abbas, Nazim Belhocine, Asmaa El-Ganainy and Mark Horton 
and measures general government debt-to-GDP. The general government sector includes all government units and 
all non-market nonprofit institutions that are controlled and mainly financed by government units, containing central 
and local governments. It does not include public corporations or quasi-corporations. Whilst the data series aimed to 
capture general government debt, the lack of public debt data at this level in many countries meant that central 
government debt data were used in these instances. For more details see Abbas et al (2010). 
Variables No Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Primary Balance 940 0.033 0.032 -0.131 0.181
Fiscal Effort 953 -0.036 0.056 -0.271 0.083
Central Govt. Revenue 966 0.229 0.077 0.077 0.571
Central Govt. Tax Revenue 978 0.160 0.050 0.048 0.318
Central Govt. Primary Spending 953 0.196 0.077 0.050 0.483
Lag General Govt. Debt / GDP 1105 0.531 0.301 0.010 2.896
Output Gap 1183 -0.003 0.053 -0.462 0.253
Expenditure Gap 972 -0.004 0.062 -0.401 0.315
Income Tax / Total Tax Revenue 992 0.307 0.136 0.000 0.850
Infation Rate 1174 0.629 5.548 -0.060 154.444
Openness 1164 0.771 0.357 0.108 2.204
Net ODI  Share in GDP 1183 0.028 0.042 -0.007 0.261
Government Effectiveness 1042 5.273 4.950 -8.000 10.000
IMF or Fiscal Rule 1166 0.591 0.492 0.000 1.000
Agriculture Share in GDP 1110 0.151 0.107 0.023 0.660
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lower-middle income countries, where the reduction was about 33 percentage points compared to 
11 percentage points for high / upper-middle income countries.  
Figure 1: Debt-to-GDP Ratio, 1990 – 2011 
 
Notes: Figure shows debt dynamics by country grouping over the period 1990-2011. Compiled using data on general 
government debt-to-GDP from S. M. Ali Abbas, Nazim Belhocine, Asmaa El-Ganainy and Mark Horton. 
 
Figures A.1 – A.3 in Appendix A present scatter plots of the various fiscal outcomes 
against debt-to-GDP for the full sample, low / lower-middle and high / upper-middle income 
countries, respectively. The plots show a generally positive correlation between the primary 
balance and fiscal effort with lagged debt-to-GDP for all country groupings. The plots also 
highlight relatively stronger responses for general revenues and tax revenues for upper-middle 
income compared to low / lower-middle income countries; and low / lower-middle income 
countries show a slightly negative relationship between primary spending and debt. These 
relationships are subject to more formal empirical examination below. 
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The set of covariates used include a measure for the output gap, expenditure gap, 
inflation, trade openness, share of agriculture in GDP, share of income tax in total tax revenue, a 
measure of institutional democracy (Polity IV), net overseas development assistance (ODA) as a 
share of GNI
15
, an indicator for whether the country had a fiscal rule and one for if these us an 
existing IMF agreement. A description of all the variables used along with their sources is 
presented in Table A.2 of Appendix A.  
Empirical Strategy 
The estimation strategy adopts a dynamic panel regression approach. We first examine a 
baseline FRF of the form: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑔𝑡+ 𝛽3𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑥′𝑖𝑡 𝛽5 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (6) 
where i indexes the countries in the panel and t the time period over which the analyses are 
conducted.   
The dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 captures the government’s fiscal response and is measured 
along the various margins outlined above. The contemporaneous fiscal response may depend on 
the previous year’s fiscal balance(s) and thus implies the need for a dynamic model. 
Accordingly, all specifications of the model include a lagged dependent variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, that 
captures the dynamic effects of the fiscal adjustment process within countries. The independent 
variable of interest is the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio(𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1). Following the empirical literature 
𝑒𝑡 and 𝑔𝑡  are measures of the government expenditure gap and the real output gap respectively. 
The other controls used are included in 𝑥𝑖𝑡. 
                                                          
15
 This measure captures official aid flows and do not include for example debt forgiveness that is often extended to 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPC). It therefore serves as lower bound of development financing / budgetary 
support that some countries may be able to access.  
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We also test for possible nonlinearities in the relationship between lag debt-to-GDP and 
each fiscal response outcome.  We do this first by fitting a quadratic specification of the baseline 
model. Additionally, we consider an alternative specification of the baseline model in equation 
(6) and estimate linear spline regressions. This is useful since the nature on the nonlinearity may 
not follow a U shape or inverse U shape, but could instead demonstrate a kinked relationship. 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼(𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝐷)                                             
 + 𝛽3 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼(𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 > 𝐷)  +  𝛽4 𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (7) 
Where D is some debt threshold and I (·) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
lagged value of debt is greater than the chosen threshold and zero otherwise. Equation (7) allows 
for one effect for debt ratios less than the specified threshold (D) and another effect when debt is 
greater than the D.
16
 
Estimation of equations (6) and (7) must take into account possible endogeneity of key 
independent variables. In particular, lagged debt-to-GDP may be correlated with unobserved 
time invariant country characteristics captured in 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. As highlighted by Celasun, Debrun and 
Ostry (2006) a country’s debt is an accumulation of previous deficits, if there are unobserved 
factors that causes it to generate large primary surpluses - relatively low levels of debt - this will 
downward bias the estimated coefficient on the debt ratio. A second potential source of 
endogeneity comes from the persistence of policy shocks. For example, a fiscal policy shock in 
the previous period that is persistent – implying that 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 are serially correlated, will 
render the estimates inconsistent since we know that 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 is correlated with that initial 
shock.  
                                                          
16
 We re-estimated equation (7) and include an intercept dummy and got similar results to the baseline specification. 
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To mitigate concerns regarding the possible endogeneity of debt-to-GDP and other key 
covariates we first estimate a fixed effects (FE) panel regression model to control for possible 
time invariant country specific heterogeneity.
17
 However the FE model does not deal with the 
potential endogeneity that comes through the serial correlation of the errors. To mitigate this 
potential source of endogeneity we adopt a dynamic difference generalized methods of moments 
(DGMM) model with forward orthogonal deviation (FOD) (Arellano & Bover, 1995).
18
 The 
DGMM has several features that make it particularly useful in our context. Firstly, it works well 
for panels with a short time dimension - small (T) and a relatively large number of panel units 
(N).
19
 Secondly, DGMM with FOD transforms the data by subtracting the average of all 
available future observations from their contemporaneous values to purge the fixed effects. 
Relative to first difference transformations, this approach minimizes data loss for unbalance 
panels. Thirdly it uses instruments for the potentially endogenous variables that are drawn from 
within the data and thereby circumvents the difficulty of having to find valid external 
instruments. In particular, the DGMM uses the lagged transformation of the potentially 
endogenous variables as instruments. 
Results 
Results for the Full Sample 
Table 2 summarizes the results for the primary balance, from FE and DGMM regression, 
with and without year dummies. The preferred model is the DGMM with year dummies.
20
 FE 
                                                          
17
 The Hausman test for random versus fixed effects rejects the null, in support of a fixed effects specification. 
18
 FOD minimizes data loss in unbalanced panels; and since lagged observations are not used in the transformation 
they are valid instruments. 
19
 Celasun and Kang (2006) advance that if T is relatively large (7 – 8) then the number of instruments generated 
will be huge if unrestricted and can weaken the Sargan and Hansen J tests of instrument validity. 
20
 The inclusion of year dummies in the DGMM model can lead to instrument proliferation which can significantly 
weaken the Hansen-J test of over-identifying restrictions. Notwithstanding, we take comfort that the Hansen-J p-
values from DGMM regressions without year dummies suggest that collectively the instruments are valid. 
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estimates (columns 1-2) suggest that a one percentage point increase in lagged debt-to-GDP is 
associated with a 0.026 and 0.022 percentage point increase in the primary balance, for 
regressions with and without time dummies, respectively. DGMM estimates (columns 3-4) are a 
little larger, with coefficient estimates of 0.043 and 0.034, with and without time dummies, 
respectively.  
Table 2: Results for Primary Balance 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the primary balance expressed as a share of GDP. Results are for Fixed Effects (FE) 
and difference GMM (DGMM) regressions using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of 
the potentially endogenous variables. Arellano-Bond AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial 
correlation in the errors. Hansen J (p-value) suggests that our instruments are valid. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Additionally the coefficient estimates in both DGMM regressions with and without year dummies are qualitatively 
similar for all outcomes examined.  
 
FE FE DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.499*** 0.466*** 0.588*** 0.559***
(0.0378) (0.0418) (0.0786) (0.0723)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0262*** 0.0219*** 0.0429*** 0.0337***
(0.00600) (0.00623) (0.0119) (0.0102)
Output Gap 0.0883*** 0.0577** 0.0893*** 0.0598**
(0.0229) (0.0254) (0.0226) (0.0233)
Expenditure Gap -0.0333* -0.0297* -0.0197 -0.0206
(0.0170) (0.0157) (0.0182) (0.0190)
Inflation 0.00112*** 0.000784** 0.000872*** 0.000656**
(0.000216) (0.000338) (0.000224) (0.000303)
Trade Openness 0.0126 0.00596 0.0121 0.00446
(0.0111) (0.00926) (0.0111) (0.00881)
Share of Agriculture in GDP 0.0767** 0.0403 0.0330 0.0241
(0.0359) (0.0469) (0.0410) (0.0455)
Share - Income Tax -0.0293 -0.0145 -0.0260 -0.0142
(0.0180) (0.0159) (0.0183) (0.0154)
Polity IV -0.00120*** -0.00106*** -0.00102*** -0.000951***
(0.000339) (0.000338) (0.000345) (0.000317)
Constant -0.00272 0.00999
(0.0114) (0.0118)
Observations 632 632 588 588
R-squared 0.437 0.494
No. Countries 44 44 43 43
AR(2) (p-value) 0.129 0.261
Hansen J (p-value) 0.340 0.994
Year Dummy no yes no yes
Primary Balance
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We find similar results for fiscal effort, but with slightly smaller coefficient estimates, 
presented in Table 3. FE estimates (columns 1-2) suggest that a one percentage point increase in 
lagged debt-to-GDP is associated with a 0.019 and 0.015 percentage point increase in the fiscal 
effort, for regressions with and without time dummies respectively. Like the primary balance, 
DGMM estimates (columns 3-4) are larger, with coefficient estimates of 0.036 and 0.023, with 
and without time dummies, respectively.  
Table 3: Results for the Fiscal Effort 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is fiscal effort - defined as tax revenues minus primary spending, and is expressed as a 
share of GDP. Results are for Fixed Effects (FE) and difference GMM (DGMM) regressions using forward 
orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995). To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, 
GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of the potentially endogenous variables. Arellano-Bond 
AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. Hansen J (p-value) suggests that our 
instruments are valid. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
FE FE DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.497*** 0.482*** 0.547*** 0.545***
(0.0937) (0.0981) (0.133) (0.148)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0193*** 0.0152** 0.0360*** 0.0226**
(0.00622) (0.00681) (0.0126) (0.0109)
Output Gap 0.103*** 0.0618* 0.107*** 0.0610**
(0.0265) (0.0323) (0.0249) (0.0296)
Expenditure Gap -0.0329** -0.0320** -0.0190 -0.0258
(0.0144) (0.0138) (0.0144) (0.0160)
Inflation -0.000705** -0.00112*** -0.000725** -0.00104***
(0.000291) (0.000332) (0.000301) (0.000390)
Trade Openness 0.0106 0.00494 0.0110 0.00493
(0.0146) (0.0120) (0.0149) (0.0113)
Share of Agriculture in GDP 0.177*** 0.0951 0.133* 0.0774
(0.0604) (0.0575) (0.0715) (0.0564)
Share - Income Tax 0.0314 0.0519 0.0321 0.0490
(0.0304) (0.0314) (0.0301) (0.0309)
Polity IV -0.000794** -0.000624* -0.000697* -0.000574*
(0.000366) (0.000310) (0.000400) (0.000299)
Constant -0.0678*** -0.0567***
(0.0207) (0.0202)
Observations 632 632 588 588
R-squared 0.427 0.480
No. Countries 44 44 43 43
AR(2) (p-value) 0.165 0.234
Hansen J (p-value) 0.302 0.999
Year Dummy no yes no yes
Fiscal Effort
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In general, the results are indicative of responsible fiscal policy for the sampled countries. 
The response of the primary balance and the fiscal effort, however, do not tell us the margins 
along which fiscal policy adjustments are made – whether countries tend to rely more heavily on 
revenue increases or spending cuts, or both. Table 4 summarizes results for the fiscal 
components from DGMM regressions. Both revenue outcomes have a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with lag debt-to-GDP. A one percentage point increase in lag debt-to-
GDP is associated with an increase of between 0.022 – 0.027 (columns 1-2) percentage points in 
total revenues, for regressions with and without year dummies, respectively. This compares to 
the results for tax revenues, with slightly smaller coefficient estimates of 0.017 and 0.014 
(columns 3-4) percentage points. Results for primary spending indicate a negative and 
statistically significant relationship in the order of -0.022 and -0.013 percentage points with and 
without year dummies respectively. 
The results suggest that countries adjust along both the revenue and expenditure margins. 
Baldacci et al. (2014) rationalizes these findings, arguing that fiscal adjustments along both tax 
and spending margins when debt is high and credit constraints are about binding can be more 
favorable for economic growth post consolidation. This is plausible if individuals have 
diminishing marginal utility in net private income and public spending, then spreading the 
adjustments across the tax and expenditure margin can minimize welfare loss. 
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Table 4: Results for Fiscal Components 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are general revenue, tax revenue and primary spending, all expressed a share of GDP. 
Results are for DGMM regressions using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995). To 
minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of 
the potentially endogenous variables. Arellano-Bond AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial 
correlation in the errors. Hansen J (p-value) suggests that our instruments are valid. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
For the controls, we discuss results for the preferred model only. The estimated 
coefficient for the output gap is positive and statistically significant in the primary balance and 
fiscal effort regressions only. Additionally, it bears a positive correlation with total revenues and 
tax revenues and is negatively correlated with primary spending - though not statistically 
significant for any. This provides suggestive evidence of countercyclical fiscal policy in the 
sampled countries, which is counter to previous literature that finds generally pro-cyclical fiscal 
reactions in developing countries.
21
 The expenditure gap is found to be negatively correlated 
with all outcomes except primary spending. As expected higher spending relative to trend is 
                                                          
21
 Celasun et al. (2006) point out that this result should be interpreted with caution as it may be driven by 
deteriorating fiscal outturns which are natural consequence of economic slowdowns and recessions. 
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.609*** 0.479*** 0.542*** 0.554*** 0.597*** 0.685***
(0.126) (0.163) (0.111) (0.0967) (0.102) (0.0753)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0220** 0.0272** 0.0174** 0.0143** -0.0222** -0.0127*
(0.0104) (0.0131) (0.00764) (0.00602) (0.0107) (0.00698)
Output Gap 0.0452* 0.0296 0.0558*** 0.0232 -0.0477* -0.0215
(0.0264) (0.0343) (0.0200) (0.0216) (0.0256) (0.0274)
Expenditure Gap -0.00194 0.0143 0.00826 0.0139 0.0206 0.0291*
(0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0168) (0.0169)
Inflation 0.000549 0.000568 -0.00108*** -0.00117** -0.000233 -1.79e-06
(0.000563) (0.000642) (0.000391) (0.000485) (0.000483) (0.000457)
Trade Openness 0.0230** 0.0190 0.0235*** 0.0155** 0.0107 0.00830
(0.0111) (0.0121) (0.00875) (0.00761) (0.0137) (0.0102)
Share of Agriculture in GDP -0.100** -0.0654 -0.0134 0.00293 -0.141*** -0.0784*
(0.0466) (0.0632) (0.0314) (0.0337) (0.0494) (0.0407)
Share - Income Tax -0.0360 -0.0415 0.0250 0.0217 -0.0101 -0.0269
(0.0318) (0.0337) (0.0191) (0.0164) (0.0284) (0.0272)
Polity IV -0.000501 -0.000589 -0.000114 -0.000136 0.000547 0.000407
(0.000352) (0.000473) (0.000338) (0.000324) (0.000377) (0.000333)
Observations 612 612 611 611 588 588
No. Countries 43 43 43 43 43 43
AR(2) (p-value) 0.740 0.518 0.540 0.664 0.977 0.892
Hansen J (p-value) 0.486 0.980 0.443 0.998 0.328 1
Year Dummy no yes no yes no yes
Total Revenue Tax Revenue Primary Spending
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positively and statistically significantly correlated with the primary spending. Inflation is 
positively and significantly correlated with the primary balance, but negatively correlated with 
fiscal effort and tax revenues. However the point estimate is small and suggests a relatively 
insignificant economic relationship. Trade openness is not found to significantly affect the 
primary balance, fiscal effort or primary spending, but is positively correlated with revenues, and 
particularly with tax revenues. The share of agriculture in GDP is negatively and statistically 
significantly correlated with primary spending. The coefficients on our measure of institutional 
democracy (Polity IV) in the primary balance and fiscal effort regressions are negative - 
suggesting that more democratic countries are less fiscally responsible than more democratic 
countries.  
Non Linear Fiscal Reaction  
We also test for potential nonlinearities in the fiscal response and report our results in 
Table 5. We do this first by fitting a quadratic regression of the baseline model and secondly by 
estimating separate spline regressions with knots at debt-to-GDP ratios of 50 and 90 percent.
22
 
Results for the primary balance are presented in columns 1-3. For the quadratic model (column 
1) the coefficient on lag debt-to-GDP though negative is statistically insignificant and the 
coefficient on the quadratic term is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that 
countries in the sample respond more strongly through increases in the primary balance at higher 
levels of debt. Results from spline regressions (columns 2 and 3) confirm these findings with 
insignificant effects at debt ratios below the specified knots and positive and statistically 
significant coefficients for debt ratios above the knots. However, this evidence is suggestive at 
                                                          
22
 The knots were chosen based on findings from previous literature that identified nonlinearities in the relationship 
the primary balance at debt ratios of 50 and 90 percent of GDP (Celasun et al., 2006; Mondoza and Ostry, 2007; 
Gosh et al., 2011). 
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best, since Wald tests for equality of slope coefficients above and below the knots fail to reject 
the null of equality of coefficients. We find qualitatively similar results for the fiscal effort 
(columns 4-6) – negative correlation at relatively low levels of debt and positive correlations at 
relatively high levels of debt. However, the lack of statistical significance for the key variables of 
interest is not suggestive of a nonlinear relationship. 
Results for the fiscal components are particularly interesting. For total revenues (columns 
7 - 9) we find null effects in the quadratic model. However, for the spline regressions, we find a 
negative but statistically insignificant response (-0.089) when debt-to-GDP is below 50 percent, 
and a positive and statistically significant response (0.045) above 50 percent. Wald tests reject 
the null hypothesis of equal slopes on either side of the knot – suggesting that countries increase 
total revenues more aggressively when debt is above 50 percent of GDP compared to when debt 
is below 50 percent of GDP. Point estimates display a similar pattern at the 90 percent knot, 
except here the Wald test fails to detect statistically significant differences in the estimated 
coefficients on either side of the ‘knot’.  
The nonlinearities are more pronounced for tax revenues (column 10). Results from the 
quadratic model indicate a negative and statistically significant relationship with lag debt-to-
GDP but a positive and highly significant relationship with the quadratic term. Results from the 
50 percent spline regression indicate a negative though statistically insignificant response (-
0.046) when debt is below 50 percent of GDP, but a positive and statistically significant response 
(0.024) when debt is above 50 percent of GDP. In regressions that use a debt knot at 90 percent 
of GDP, we find similar results - a negative though statistically insignificant response (-0.010) 
when debt is below 90 percent of GDP, but a positive and statistically significant response 
(0.027) when debt is above 90 percent of GDP. Wald tests confirm that the slope coefficients on 
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either side of the knots are statically different. For primary spending we find no significant effect 
in either the quadratic or 90 percent spline specification, but find evidence of a kinked 
relationship at debt-to-GDP of 50 percent. In particular, the results in (column 14) indicate a 
negative and statistically significant response (-0.123) when the debt ratio is below 50 percent 
and a positive though statistically insignificant response when debt is above 50 percent of GDP.  
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Table 5: Results for Non Linear Fiscal Response 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are primary balance, ‘fiscal effort’, general revenue, tax revenue and primary spending, all expressed a share of GDP. Results are for 
DGMM regressions using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, 
GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of the potentially endogenous variables. Hansen J (p-values) are implausibly large suggesting 
weakened diagnostics from instrument proliferation. In regression that exclude year dummies the Hansen J (p-values) are in normal ranges and suggest that our 
instruments are collectively valid. Arellano-Bond AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Quardratic Spline 50% Spline 90% Quardratic Spline 50% Spline 90% Quardratic Spline 50% Spline 90% Quardratic Spline 50% Spline 90% Quardratic Spline 50% Spline 90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.589*** 0.536*** 0.543*** 0.608*** 0.571*** 0.579*** 0.413** 0.429*** 0.440*** 0.529*** 0.468*** 0.494*** 0.731*** 0.661*** 0.669***
(0.0801) (0.0735) (0.0745) (0.168) (0.144) (0.154) (0.190) (0.153) (0.159) (0.0941) (0.102) (0.0976) (0.0890) (0.0810) (0.0767)
Lag Debt/GDP -0.0134 -0.0428 -0.00240 -0.0281* -0.0381
(0.0246) (0.0435) (0.0369) (0.0157) (0.0269)
Lag Debt/GDP Squared 0.0188* 0.0166 0.0154 0.0185*** 0.00883
(0.0102) (0.0144) (0.0134) (0.00508) (0.00927)
Debt/GDP below 50% -0.00987 -0.0148 -0.0892 -0.0462 -0.123**
(0.0544) (0.0685) (0.0679) (0.0376) (0.0516)
Debt/GDP above 50% 0.0409*** 0.000745 0.0454*** 0.0236*** 0.00209
(0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0175) (0.00811) (0.0102)
Debt/GDP below 90% 0.00177 -0.0386 0.00242 -0.00969 -0.0238
(0.0205) (0.0387) (0.0236) (0.0138) (0.0196)
Debt/GDP above 90% 0.0503*** 0.0171 0.0401* 0.0271*** -0.00915
(0.0159) (0.0156) (0.0211) (0.00844) (0.0114)
Output Gap 0.0520** 0.0571** 0.0544** 0.0503 0.0576 0.0481 0.0204 0.00924 0.0218 0.0181 0.0133 0.0162 -0.0122 -0.0454 -0.0285
(0.0245) (0.0253) (0.0230) (0.0496) (0.0446) (0.0452) (0.0345) (0.0395) (0.0355) (0.0210) (0.0240) (0.0226) (0.0317) (0.0327) (0.0282)
Expenditure Gap -0.0295* -0.0208 -0.0261 -0.0603*** -0.0510*** -0.0558*** 0.0153 0.0226 0.0142 0.0108 0.0191 0.0143 0.0230 0.0338** 0.0291*
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0167) (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0148) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0146) (0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0176) (0.0167) (0.0167)
Inflation 0.000770** 0.000704** 0.000875*** -0.00250*** -0.00253*** -0.00232*** 0.000543 0.000655 0.000757 -0.00110** -0.00129*** -0.00112** 0.000293 2.78e-05 6.06e-05
(0.000326) (0.000276) (0.000278) (0.000615) (0.000385) (0.000472) (0.000823) (0.000582) (0.000616) (0.000535) (0.000433) (0.000451) (0.000350) (0.000426) (0.000476)
Trade Openness 0.00550 0.00684 0.00534 -0.000668 -0.00127 -0.00171 0.0195 0.0243* 0.0199 0.0161** 0.0182** 0.0158** 0.00965 0.0116 0.00765
(0.00874) (0.00917) (0.00812) (0.0142) (0.0146) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0144) (0.0123) (0.00687) (0.00740) (0.00716) (0.0121) (0.0167) (0.0110)
Agriculture/GDP 0.0520 0.0448 0.0508 0.187** 0.172** 0.196** -0.0631 -0.00322 -0.0376 0.0340 0.0436 0.0338 -0.0434 -0.0274 -0.0694
(0.0480) (0.0517) (0.0462) (0.0947) (0.0848) (0.0872) (0.0692) (0.0701) (0.0573) (0.0349) (0.0377) (0.0336) (0.0451) (0.0557) (0.0439)
Share  - Income Tax -0.0183 -0.0221 -0.0229 0.0844 0.0738*** 0.0666** 0.0120 -0.0620* -0.0489 0.0285 0.0154 0.0179 -0.0831* -0.0448 -0.0290
(0.0547) (0.0181) (0.0153) (0.0995) (0.0243) (0.0259) (0.0591) (0.0371) (0.0346) (0.0500) (0.0183) (0.0173) (0.0502) (0.0330) (0.0286)
Polity IV -0.000984*** -0.000975*** -0.00101*** -0.000376 -0.000358 -0.000400 -0.000576 -0.000610 -0.000601 -0.000177 -0.000142 -0.000140 0.000275 0.000443 0.000441
(0.000295) (0.000264) (0.000291) (0.000346) (0.000326) (0.000293) (0.000560) (0.000458) (0.000484) (0.000353) (0.000326) (0.000336) (0.000332) (0.000414) (0.000339)
Observations 588 590 590 588 590 590 612 614 614 611 613 613 588 590 590
No of Countries 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
AR 2 (p-value) 0.415 0.236 0.258 0.136 0.099 0.095 0.239 0.432 0.388 0.550 0.836 0.865 0.839 0.846 0.934
Hnasen J (p-value) 0.981 0.990 0.981 0.995 0.999 0.998 0.979 0.999 0.971 0.995 0.995 0.996 1 1 1
Wald Test (p-value) 0.411 0.115 0.837 0.261 0.078 0.298 0.099 0.045 0.021 0.582
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Primary Balance Fiscal Effort Total Revenue Tax Revenue Primary Expenditure 
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Overall, our results highlight the existence of nonlinearities in the fiscal response among 
the sampled countries. Though the evidence for the fiscal aggregates – primary balance and 
fiscal effort are at best suggestive, we find more convincing evidence for the fiscal components. 
In particular each fiscal component demonstrates a kinked relationship with debt-to-GDP at 50 
percent. In particular countries rely on expenditure cuts when debt is below 50 percent and 
revenue increases when debt inches above 50 percent. Use of spending cuts as a first line of 
attack is not surprising if governments have ‘fat to cut’ and if raising taxes may be less popular 
politically. For example, as an initial policy response governments may prefer to cut spending if 
tax increases may prove to be more salient to citizens and could jeopardize its chances of 
reelection. There are also economic efficiency arguments that can explain the delayed use of tax 
increases until debt ratios have situated at relatively high levels as pointed out by previous 
studies (Krogstrup, 2002; Alesina & Ardagna, 2009). Further, distributional issues associated 
with tax increases in developing countries may influence the fiscal response dynamics. For 
example, Peralta-Alva et al. (2016) suggests that increasing the VAT – which is a huge revenue 
earner for many developing countries – can be extremely regressive and can lead to increases in 
poverty and inequality in developing countries. To the extent that these costs are significant, 
governments may choose to delay tax increases, opting instead to cut spending.   
Heterogeneous Effects  
We split the sample into high / upper-middle income and low / lower-middle income 
countries to examine potential differences in the fiscal reactions across country groupings.
23
 
Previous research (Gavin & Perotti, 2003; Reinhart, Rogoff & Savastano, 2003; Flood & 
                                                          
23
 Ghana, Ethiopia, Honduras and Suriname are beneficiaries under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative. If debt relief significantly influences fiscal policy in these counties then this could potentially bias the 
results. Notably however our results are robust to the exclusion of these countries from the sample. 
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Marion, 2006) advance that relative to industrial countries, developing countries face less 
friendly credit market access opportunities that may exert significant influence on their fiscal 
policy stance. For example, developing countries may have to place much more weight on debt 
stabilizing fiscal policy compared to more advanced economies. If low income developing 
countries face less favorable credit market access opportunities relative to higher income 
developing countries, then fiscal policy in the former may be more sensitive to debt stabilization 
considerations. However, if there are more severe revenue mobilization challenges and if it is 
more difficult to cut non debt spending in lower income developing countries, then these ‘fiscal 
frictions’ might mitigate their ability to respond to debt.24 
Results for low / lower-middle income countries are presented in Table 6. We find that 
lag debt-to-GDP is positively correlated with the primary balance (0.026) and fiscal effort 
(0.014), but only statistically significant for the latter. Coefficient estimates for the total revenue, 
tax revenue and primary spending are not found to be significantly correlated with lag debt-to-
GDP in low / lower-middle income countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 The tax/GDP ratio for low and lower – middle income countries in the sample is roughly 5 percentage points less 
than middle income countries.  
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Table 6: Results for the Fiscal Response for Low and Lower Middle Income Countries 
 
Note: Dependent variables are expressed as a share of GDP. Results are for difference GMM regressions using 
forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995). To minimize the problem of instrument 
proliferation, GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of the potentially endogenous variables. 
Arellano-Bond AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. Hansen J (p-values) 
are implausibly large suggesting weakened diagnostics from instrument proliferation. In regression that exclude year 
dummies the Hansen J (p-values) are in normal ranges and suggest that our instruments are collectively valid. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Results for upper-middle income countries are presented in Table 7 and provide an 
interesting contrast to that found in the case of low / low-middle income countries. Lag debt-to-
GDP is positively correlated with the primary balance (0.030) and fiscal effort (0.015), but is 
statistically significant for the former only. Additionally, the results indicate that high / upper-
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lag Dependent Variable 0.597*** 0.729*** 0.648*** 0.430*** 0.683***
(0.111) (0.0816) (0.101) (0.155) (0.0725)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0265 0.0142** 0.0472 -0.0138 -0.00952
(0.0178) (0.00581) (0.0302) (0.0148) (0.0186)
Output Gap 0.00822 -0.0177 0.0677 -0.00208 0.0586*
(0.0350) (0.0237) (0.0451) (0.0299) (0.0346)
Expenditure Gap -0.0264** -0.0129 -0.000344 -0.00492 0.00499
(0.0116) (0.00996) (0.0209) (0.00692) (0.0180)
Inflation -0.0306** 7.77e-05 -0.108*** -0.0551*** -0.0680***
(0.0149) (0.0139) (0.0314) (0.0150) (0.0190)
Trade Openness 0.0361* 0.00107 0.0803*** 0.0597*** 0.0497***
(0.0190) (0.0151) (0.0209) (0.0109) (0.0169)
Share of Agriculture in GDP 0.0490 0.105* -0.0385 0.0736 -0.105
(0.0652) (0.0575) (0.0636) (0.0522) (0.0651)
Share - Income Tax -0.0140 0.0527* -0.0426 0.0160 -0.0360*
(0.0246) (0.0270) (0.0453) (0.0230) (0.0187)
Polity IV -0.00133*** -0.000664** -0.000607* 9.60e-05 0.000789**
(0.000434) (0.000313) (0.000350) (0.000270) (0.000402)
Constant
Observations 202 202 220 219 202
No. Countries 17 17 17 17 17
AR(2) (p-value) 0.671 0.682 0.717 0.872 0.794
Hansen J (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Primary Balance Fiscal Effort Total Revenue Tax Revenue Primary Spending
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middle income countries respond to debt by making significant adjustments in total revenue 
(0.024) and tax revenue (0.017) but not in primary spending.
25
  
Table 7: Results for the Fiscal Response for High and Upper Middle Income Countries 
 
Notes: Dependent variables are expressed as a share of GDP. Results are for difference GMM regressions using 
forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Relative to first difference transformations, FOD 
minimizes data loss in unbalanced panels; and since lagged observations are not used in the transformation they are 
valid instruments. We treat the lag dependent variable and the lag debt-to-GDP as potentially endogenous. Hansen J 
(p-values) are implausibly large suggesting weakened diagnostics from instrument proliferation. In regression that 
exclude year dummies the Hansen J (p-values) are in normal ranges and suggest that our instruments are collectively 
valid. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
The results suggest that both low / lower-middle income and high / upper middle income 
countries are fiscally responsible, with positive and statistically significant adjustments in the 
fiscal effort or primary balance. However, whereas low / lower-middle income countries do not 
                                                          
25
 The Hansen J p-values in all the country subsample regressions are inflated due to instrument proliferation. As a 
result we are unable to definitively test the validity of the instruments for the sub-sample analyses, particularly in the 
regressions for low and lower-middle countries. 
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.477*** 0.351* 0.410** 0.591*** 0.520***
(0.0680) (0.188) (0.169) (0.103) (0.127)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0298*** 0.0155 0.0235*** 0.0169*** -0.00771
(0.00700) (0.0124) (0.00484) (0.00391) (0.00732)
Output Gap 0.0749** 0.100** -0.00842 0.0133 -0.0750**
(0.0303) (0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0267) (0.0346)
Expenditure Gap -0.0261 -0.0444* 0.0230 0.0111 0.0445*
(0.0266) (0.0255) (0.0317) (0.0309) (0.0269)
Inflation 0.000894*** -0.00126*** 0.000936* -0.000889** 1.09e-05
(0.000281) (0.000477) (0.000518) (0.000377) (0.000357)
Trade Openness -0.00923 -0.000774 -0.00791 0.00130 -0.00100
(0.00919) (0.0167) (0.00954) (0.00726) (0.0119)
Share of Agriculture in GDP 0.0366 0.131 -0.103 -0.0356 -0.126**
(0.0776) (0.0925) (0.0706) (0.0431) (0.0587)
Share - Income Tax -0.0171 0.0489 -0.0305 0.0179 -0.0178
(0.0213) (0.0415) (0.0351) (0.0190) (0.0353)
Polity IV -0.000719 -0.000215 -0.00131 -0.000597 -0.000426
(0.000522) (0.000444) (0.000822) (0.000534) (0.000445)
Constant
Observations 386 386 392 392 386
No. Countries 26 26 26 26 26
AR(2) (p-value) 0.244 0.078 0.810 0.970 0.963
Hansen J (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Primary Balance Fiscal Effort Total Revenue Tax Revenue Primary Spending
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significantly adjust on the revenue or spending margins, high / upper-middle income countries 
adjust mainly by increasing revenues. These results might suggest greater ability on the part of 
high / upper middle income countries to increases revenues in response to growing debt, and 
perhaps an inability on the part of low / lower-middle income countries to do the same.  
Sensitivity Analysis  
We test the robustness of the baseline results using alternative specifications of the 
DGMM regression model. To do this we simply add covariates to the model and also experiment 
with different combinations of covariates to see if this would significantly change the coefficient 
estimates from the baseline results. We systematically add the following controls; net ODI/GNI, 
a dummy for whether the country had a fiscal rule and a dummy for whether the country had an 
IMF agreement in place in regressions for each fiscal outcome. The results presented in Tables 
A.3 – A.7 of Appendix A suggest that the baseline estimates are robust to the inclusion of the 
additional covariates. 
We also vary the sample over time to check whether the baseline results are robust across 
different time periods. First, we focus on observations between 1990 and 2008 to exclude years 
post the great recession. Though developing countries are argued to have been somewhat 
‘sheltered’ from the major effects from the great recession, it is likely that creditors would have 
become much more cautious thereby influencing countries ability to access credit. Additionally, 
the governments in developing countries themselves may have assessed the potential risks from 
the recession and implemented policies to mitigate same. Excluding these years could potentially 
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avoid confounding from effects related to the great recession. Additionally, we examine 
observations over a shorter time period between 1990 and 2000.
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Results for the primary balance and fiscal effort for the baseline (1990 – 2011) and the 
two sub-periods are presented in Table A.8 of Appendix A.  In general, the results for both 
outcomes are robust to the contraction of the sample period. The estimated coefficients, however, 
get progressively larger as we move from the longest sample period to the shortest sample 
period. Table A.9 present results for total revenues, tax revenues and primary spending. These 
results are also robust to contraction of the sample period and we find similar patterns in the size 
of the estimated coefficients across the various sub periods. 
Conclusion  
This essay makes several contributions to a literature that examines countries fiscal 
response to debt. Firstly, our analysis focuses on developing countries – a group that had 
previously received scant attention in the literature. Secondly, the few studies that examine the 
fiscal reaction function for developing countries did so over a relatively limited time span. Our 
analysis utilized an expanded time series relative these earlier studies. We also point out a 
serious omission in the literature – by emphasizing the importance of including ‘fiscal effort’ as 
a key indicator in debt sustainability analysis. We are also the first to decompose key 
components of the primary balance and examine the specific margins of response for developing 
countries. 
We find that, in general, developing countries are fiscally responsible as evidenced by the 
positive and significant response in the primary balance and ‘fiscal effort’ to debt-to-GDP. For 
                                                          
26
 We also test for long run effects using a distributed lagged model but found no significance beyond the first 
period lag. However the results from this model may be dubious because of multicollinearity of the lagged debt 
ratios and thus we do not report the results from these regressions. 
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the full sample we find evidence that countries adjust along both the revenue and expenditure 
margins at roughly the same rate. This sort of measured adjustment might be indicative of 
deliberate policy on the part of governments, not to engage in asymmetric policy changes that 
could impact negatively on overall economic welfare. We also find evidence of nonlinearities, 
particularly for the fiscal components, with larger increases in revenues when debt is relatively 
high and larger reductions in primary spending when debt is relatively low. The pattern of 
responses across the various margins suggests that countries delay tax or general revenue 
increases until debt is relatively high and cut spending when debt is relatively low. The 
adjustment decision might be driven by several factors. For example, political economy 
arguments point to the relative unpopularity of tax increases compared to some expenditure cuts. 
Countries might therefore be encouraged to use spending cuts as their first ‘line of attack’ and 
resort to tax increases when the debt problem becomes more acute. There are also economic 
arguments – taxes may be more distortionary than spending cuts and is thus relegated as a 
secondary option to stabilize debt.  
 We find that both low / lower-middle income and high / upper-middle income countries 
have been fiscally responsible – with positive correlations between debt and fiscal effort primary 
surplus, respectively. However, high / upper-middle income countries demonstrate a greater 
propensity to adjust along the revenue and tax revenue margins highlighting an important 
difference in the fiscal reaction across the two groups of countries. The relatively strong response 
in general revenues and tax revenues for high / upper middle income countries and the lack 
thereof for low / lower-middle income countries might be indicative of systemic revenue 
mobilization challenges facing the latter. One obvious implication of this is that these countries 
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must strengthen their revenue generating capacity in order to better sustain their debt. This is 
particularly true for countries with relatively high levels of debt.  
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Essay 2: The Effect of Taxpayer Service Provision on Tax Compliance for Large 
Taxpayers in Jamaica 
 
Introduction 
The fiscal landscape across developing countries is characterized by significant revenue 
mobilization challenges, stemming from inter alia critically low levels of tax compliance. In 
exploring the potential causes of low tax compliance in developing and transition economies, 
Alm and Martinez – Vazquez (2003) attribute much of the effects to weak fiscal institutions. 
They stress that the role of tax administration surpasses merely securing revenues for the state 
and must also include ensuring taxpayer satisfaction, equity and social welfare. These arguments 
are in line with more recent views that highlight the need for a balance between enforcement and 
more facilitatory approaches, grounded in a commitment to an implicit ‘psychological’ contract 
between the taxpayer and the tax administration (Feld & Frey, 2002; Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl, 
2008).
27
  
 The thrust of recent tax administration reforms across countries aim at increasing both 
enforced and voluntary compliance within the context of an overarching risk based approach.  In 
particular, tax administrations recognize the importance of tax morale or non-pecuniary factors 
in determining taxpayer compliance and have sought to complement traditional enforcement 
strategies with a softer approach – such as the provision taxpayer services. Additionally, to 
mitigate risk exposure, tax administrations have sought to adopt a more strategic focus on 
individuals and firms that pose the greatest risk to revenue collections – example large taxpayers. 
                                                          
27
 Kirchler (2007) argues that the cops and robbers approach to tax administration fuels distrust and adversarial 
tendencies between the tax administration and the taxpayer, but a service - client approach can encourage greater 
cooperation and improve voluntary compliance. 
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This essay examines the effect of the provision of taxpayer services – through the Large 
Taxpayer Office (LTO), on the timeliness and completeness of filing and payment of the 
corporate income tax (CIT) and general consumption tax (GCT) for large taxpayers in Jamaica. 
We focus on the taxpayer’s decision to file and pay taxes conditional on reporting positive tax 
liabilities. These are important margins of response particularly in developing countries with 
relatively weak tax administrations that find it difficult to collect reported taxes. Moreover, 
where tax administration resources are limited, and where the outcomes of expensive audits are 
uncertain, it may be more prudent to focus on collecting pledged taxes.  
The empirical strategy exploits quasi-experimental variation in the intensity of service 
delivery for taxpayers selected into the LTO. A key criterion for selection into the LTO is having 
gross receipts greater than or equal to an arbitrary threshold of J$500 million (US$5.7 million).
28
 
We use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits the discrete jump in the probability 
of selection at the threshold. This approach compares the compliance behavior of those located 
just to the right of the threshold – who are selected into the LTO; to otherwise similar taxpayers 
located just the left of the threshold – who are marginally not selected into the LTO. Assuming 
all other key taxpayer characteristics transition smoothly across the threshold, the RDD estimates 
are causal.   
This essay relates to a growing literature that use experimental and quasi-experimental 
approaches to examine the effect of enforcement and tax morale factors on tax compliance for 
developing countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region (Carillo, Pomeranz, & 
Singhal, 2014; Ortega & Scartascini, 2015; Castro & Scartascini, 2013; Pomeranz, 2013). This is 
the first for an English speaking Caribbean country. This paper also links closely to literature that 
                                                          
28
 The US dollar conversion was done using a 4 year (2009 – 2012) average annual exchange rate of $87.35 JMD to 
$1 USD using data from the Bank of Jamaica. 
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examines taxpayers’ behavioral response to discontinuities in the tax structure. Whereas some 
studies examine behavioral responses to notches or kinks in the tax rate structure (Saez, 2010; 
Keleven & Waseem 2012), others leverage exogenous changes in monitoring and enforcement 
intensity that occur around some revenue threshold (Almunia & Rodriguez, 2014; Sanchez, 
2013). This paper relates most closely with this second strand of literature, but instead of an 
‘enforcement notch’ we examine compliance response to changes in the intensity of taxpayer 
service delivery. 
First evidence of the compliance effects of taxpayer services come from a handful of lab 
and field experiments (Alm, Chetty, Jone & McKee, 2011; Mckee, Siladke & Vossler, 2011; 
Vossler & Mckee, 2013; Kosonen & Ropponen, 2015) and focus on taxpayer information 
services. These studies find generally positive effects on filing and reporting compliance but also 
report limits on the impact of taxpayer information services. Mckee et al. (2011) find that post 
audit, subjects are less likely to request information assistance and are more likely to evade. 
Kosonen and Ropponen (2013) find that taxpayer information services are ineffective in boosting 
compliance for relatively more complex aspects of the VAT law in Finland. In this paper we go 
beyond examining the effect of taxpayer information services and examine the effects of a range 
of taxpayer services. We also explore the effects of these services, conditional on the strength of 
the legal enforcement framework of the taxing regime, to test the relationship between service 
delivery and enforcement strength. 
We find that taxpayer service provision did not significantly improve filing or payment 
compliance for the CIT, but had generally positive compliance effects for the GCT.  Taxpayers 
are (22 pp) less likely to file GCT returns late and also reduce the number of days late that 
returns are filed by about 14 days. Taxpayers are also (17 pp) less likely to pay GCT late and 
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reduce the number of days late that payments are made by about 247 days. The amount of GCT 
and the share of reported GCT paid on time increases by about J$4 million and 27 percent 
respectively. We attribute the null effects for the CIT and positive compliance effects for the 
GCT to the relatively stronger legal enforcement framework of the latter. We take this as 
suggestive evidence of a complementarity in the relationship between the strength of the legal 
enforcement framework of the taxing regime and the provision of taxpayer services. We also 
find heterogeneous effects in the case of the GCT, with positive compliance response for non-
financial sector taxpayers and non-importers but null effects for financial sector taxpayers and 
importers. We attribute this to possible substitutability between taxpayer service provision and 
external enforcement mechanisms such as industry oversight bodies and tax compliance 
requirements to receive import licenses. 
The results highlight a possible limitation in the use of taxpayer services to drive 
compliance in the absence of a robust legal enforcement framework. One implication of this 
finding is that tax administration and tax policy reforms must be balanced in its focus on 
enforcement and the ‘softer approach’ in order to improve compliance among large taxpayers. 
The results also point to scope for the use of external enforcement mechanisms to substitute for 
expensive tax administration interventions such as service provision. 
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Background  
The Corporate Income Tax and the General Consumption Tax 
The CIT rate for tax years 2009 – 2012 was 33.33 percent and applied to firms’ reported 
profits. The GCT is a value added tax (VAT) and was applied at standard rates of 16.5 and 17.5 
percent over the sample period.
29
 The CIT and GCT are huge contributors to the overall tax 
revenue, accounting for about 11 and 17 percent to total tax collections respectively.
30
 Jamaica’s 
tax administration machinery has long been criticized as weak and inefficient. An obvious 
consequence of this is low tax compliance. In 2011 filing and payment compliance for the CIT – 
measured as whether the taxpayer filed and paid on time – were 40 and 53 percent respectively. 
In the same year, for the GCT, 83 percent of taxpayers filed on time and 88 percent paid on time.  
One likely explanation for the sizeable difference in compliance rates for the CIT relative 
to the GCT is the stronger legal enforcement framework of the latter. The penalty structure 
across the two taxes presents an interesting contrast. Failure to file CIT on time attracts a fine of 
J$5,000 (US$57) and interest of 40 percent per annum is charged against outstanding CIT 
liability. On the other hand, failure to file GCT on time attracts a fine of J$2,000 (US$23) or 15 
percent of the tax due and payable, whichever is larger. Interest of 2.5 percent compounded 
monthly is charged against the sum of outstanding GCT liabilities, penalties and surcharges. For 
large taxpayers, this structure implies higher penalties and interest for delinquents under the GCT 
relative to the CIT, with the difference between the two increasing in the amount of unpaid tax 
liabilities as shown in Figure B.1 of Appendix B. One obvious implication of this is that (larger) 
taxpayers have a clear incentive to be more compliant with the GCT than the CIT as evidenced 
                                                          
29
 From May 2005 – December 2009 the standard GCT rate was 16.5 percent. The standard GCT rate was 
temporarily increased to 17.5 percent in January 2010 before being lowered to 16.5 percent in June 2012. 
30
 In this research we focus on the local and not the international component of GCT. GCT’s total (local and 
international) contribution to tax collections averaged about 31 percent over the last six fiscal years.  
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by the compliance patterns in Figure B.2 in Appendix B. Panel A shows much lower rates of late 
filing and payment for the GCT relative to the CIT. Panel B shows larger amounts of CIT paid 
on time but a larger share of reported GCT paid on time. The compliance patterns across taxes 
appear to be driven largely by key features of the legal enforcement framework. Comparing the 
compliance effects of the LTO across the CIT and GCT provides an opportunity to examine the 
potential effect of taxpayer service provision in a weak and strong enforcement context 
respectively. 
The Large Taxpayer Office 
Like most developing countries, the tax regime in Jamaica is characterized by extremely 
high dependence on a few large taxpayers for revenue. In 2011 the top 1 percent of taxpayers 
accounted for 82 percent and 66 percent of reported CIT and GCT respectively.
31
  This 
dependence exposes the government to an extremely high level of risk from non-compliance of 
few taxpayers, and provides impetus for the tax administration to boost compliance efforts in 
general, but particularly for large taxpayers. To manage this risk, TAJ established the LTO in 
April 2009. Taxpayers are assigned to the LTO if they meet any of three criteria. The first and 
principal criterion is if annual gross receipts are greater than or equal to J$500 million (US$5.7 
million). Secondly, if the total annual taxes paid is greater than or equal to J$50 million.
32
 
Thirdly, if related to a primary LTO client through for example common ownership, a subsidiary 
or branch.  
                                                          
31
 We use reported taxes instead of actual tax payments because the payment data provided by TAJ does not 
adequately identify specific payment components and therefore potentially comingles principal tax payments with 
penalties and interest. 
32
 In general taxpayers who pay at least $50 million in taxes are large and most likely will gross more than $500 
million in sales / gross receipts annually. 
44 
 
An important feature of the LTO is its central focus on service provision. Its stated 
mission is “to promote voluntary compliance and enhance revenue collection by providing 
exemplary specialized service to the large taxpayer population through a team of highly 
motivated and results oriented professionals”. At the core of the LTO operations are client 
relationship managers (CRM). These positions were specially created to channel specialized 
services to large taxpayers. Once selected to the LTO each taxpayer is assigned a CRM who will 
serve as the main point of contact with the tax administration. The CRM will introduce and 
provide or facilitate the provision of the range of services offered by the LTO. These services 
include but are not limited to, the provision of tax advice, processing of tax compliance 
certificates, stamping of documents, tax seminars and workshops, filing and payment reminders, 
filing and payment facilitation, registration and reconciliation of tax accounts.
33
 Although some 
of these services are available to the general taxpayer population at the various tax offices or 
through the customer care center, we argue that there is a significant increase in the intensity and 
efficiency of service delivery for LTO taxpayers.
34
 Moreover the ‘one-on-one’ between LTO 
clients and CRM guarantees more efficient and convenient service delivery.  
Theory 
The standard economic model of tax evasion is outlined by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) (AS) – an adaptation of Becker’s (1968) economics of crime approach – and models 
individuals’ tax compliance behavior as a rational decision. Their model predicts that higher 
levels of evasion are associated with low detection probabilities and low pecuniary costs if 
                                                          
33
 CRM’s also help to facilitate audits carried out by TAJ’s auditors. Their main role here is to ensure that the audit 
process is smooth and not overly disruptive for the taxpayer’s normal business operations. 
34
 Interviews with CRM’s from the LTO confirm that the level of services offered to LTO clients is superior to that 
available regularly through the tax offices and call centers. They also point out that there are clear benefits to the 
taxpayers from the one-on-one interaction with the CRM which are derived not only through access to services but 
also the development of good relations. 
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caught.  The theoretical predictions of the AS model however have been criticized as inadequate 
in explaining observed patterns of tax compliance across countries. Complementary theories of 
tax compliance attempt to overcome some of the shortcomings of the standard approach and 
posit that non-pecuniary or tax morale factors play an important role in explaining taxpayer 
behavior (Luttmer & Singhal, 2014). 
Whereas the standard theory models taxpayers reporting decision, more recent work 
examine taxpayers payment decision conditional on income being declared, or on established tax 
liabilities (Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe & Valev, 2014; Perez-Truglia & Troiano, 2015), a question 
much more closely related to this research. We adopt a simple model of payment compliance 
advanced by Hallsworth et al. (2014). We assume a two period model where taxpayers earn 
income (𝑌𝑖
𝐺) – drawn from an i.i.d. probability distribution f (𝑌𝑖
𝐺) – in period one and none in 
period two.
35
 The taxpayer is required to pay taxes on reported income at some rate (t) and the 
tax liability is given by:
 36
 
𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ∗ max [0, 𝑌𝑖
𝐺]    (8) 
We take reported income 𝑌𝑖
𝐺as given, but the taxpayer must decide whether to pay taxes 
in period one (x=1) or period two (x=2). We model the taxpayer’s payment decision as a 
function of the real interest rate, compliance costs and a moral or psychic cost from non-
compliance. The payment decision is made to maximize after tax income (𝑌𝑖
𝑁) based on the 
following: 
                                                          
35
 We take reported income as given and our model focuses solely on the decision to pay, conditional on reporting 
some positive tax liability. 
36
 The model assumes that the decisions to file and pay taxes are made simultaneously. TAJ confirms that taxpayers 
typically file and pay (at least some portion) taxes at the same time. 
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𝑌𝑖
𝑁 = {
𝑌𝑖
𝐺 − 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖        𝑖𝑓  𝑥 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑌𝑖
𝐺 − 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖  ≥ 0
𝑌𝑖
𝐺 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑇𝑖 − 𝑀𝑖 −  (1 + 𝛼)𝑇𝑖    𝑖𝑓𝑥 = 2 𝑜𝑟 𝑌𝑖
𝐺 − 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐶 𝑖   < 0
         (9) 
From equation (9), taxpayer (i) faces compliance cost (𝐶 𝑖 > 0) in the first period but not 
in the second. This is a simplifying but rationalize-able assumption. For example it is plausible 
that compliance costs in period one are higher simply because taxpayers have to expend 
considerably more effort to complete filing and payment by a stipulated deadline.
37
 The 
compliance cost in period one is juxtaposed against the costs and benefits from delaying payment 
until period two. Delaying payment means that the taxpayer can benefit from interest earned (r) 
on taxes not paid in period one. However the taxpayer also faces a penalty of 𝛼, that is 
proportional to the amount of tax owed and which takes values [0, 1]. Lastly, we assume that 
non-compliance in period one is associated with a moral cost (𝑀𝑖 > 0) incurred in period two, 
and is induced by the provision of taxpayer services. 
The taxpayer will pay in period one if the value of doing so exceeds that of delaying until 
period two. The payment decision is therefore captured by the following condition: 
                   𝑌𝑖
𝐺 − 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖   >  𝑌𝑖
𝐺 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑇𝑖 − 𝑀𝑖 −  (1 + 𝛼)𝑇𝑖    (10) 
From equation (10), the compliance effects of the LTO come through several channels. 
The first is through lower compliance costs. If taxpayer services that clarify complex or 
ambiguous tax laws and that facilitate speedy and convenient filing and payment of taxes can 
significantly reduce compliance costs (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) in period one, taxpayers 
may be encouraged to pay on time. The second is through a behavioral channel. In addition to 
                                                          
37
 Complexities in the tax law can impose huge compliance costs – in terms of time and money – as taxpayers 
struggle to accurately calculate their taxes in order to file and pay by the due date. The numerous requests for filing 
extensions received by the TAJ may be an indication of the relatively large compliance costs incurred when trying to 
comply with the stipulated filing deadline.  In the second period compliance costs are arguably lower since there is 
no longer an effective time deadline by which to comply in order to avoid penalties. 
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the services provided, closer interaction between the tax administration and taxpayers within a 
customer centric context can improve taxpayers’ perception of the tax administration. This can 
increase the moral or psychic costs of delaying payment – crowd in tax morale – and induce 
higher levels of (voluntary) compliance (Feld & Frey, 2002). Notwithstanding the predictions of 
the theoretical model, the impact on compliance is an open empirical question. 
Data and Empirical Strategy 
Data  
We use administrative data for the CIT and the GCT for 2009-2012.
38
 We restrict our 
baseline sample to taxpayers with reported gross receipts of between J$100 million (US$ 1.1 
million) and J$1 billion (US$11.4 million) who reported positive tax liabilities. The resulting 
sample sizes are 2,432 for the CIT and 34,764 for the GCT. From tax returns, we collect data on 
filing date, gross receipts and reported tax liabilities. From the payments data we collect 
information on the payment date and the amount paid. Using these data, we construct our 
outcome measures for filing and payment compliance. For filing compliance we examine two 
outcomes. The first is captured by a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if a taxpayer filed late 
and 0 if filed on time.
39
 The second is the number of days a return is late. Essentially these 
measures together capture filing compliance along an extensive margin – whether a taxpayer 
filed late or not; and an intensive margin – how late was the taxpayer in filing.  
                                                          
38
 We examine compliance responses for taxpayers (firms) that file and pay the “company income tax final return” 
on form ITO2. We do not consider corporate tax returns filed on forms ITO3 and ITO4 which are the designated 
forms for “unincorporated bodies other than life assurance companies” and “life assurance companies” respectively. 
For the GCT we focus on the standard GCT return and do not include the quick return or returns for special tourism 
activities. 
39
 For the CIT, taxpayers are required to file their final or annual return by March 15 following the year of 
assessment. If this date falls on a weekend, we record as late, if the taxpayer filed after the first business day of the 
following week. This is consistent with the practice of the tax administration. 
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For payment compliance we examine two sets of outcomes - in total four outcome 
variables. The first two captures the timeliness of payments and are measured the same way we 
measured filing compliance above. In the second set we examine two additional payment 
outcomes - the amount of taxes paid on time and the share of reported taxes paid on time. 
Because the payment data gives aggregate amounts received from taxpayers, we are unable to 
identify specific payment components, i.e. whether amounts paid are solely taxes or a 
combination of taxes and other charges and penalties. By restricting the analysis to payments 
made on or before the due date – we are arguably better able to capture taxpayers ‘real’ 
compliance response since payments made after the due date with respect to a particular filing 
period are more likely to include amounts for penalties, interest and audit assessments. As such, 
the amount of taxes paid on time and the share of reported taxes paid on time are arguably better 
measures of taxpayers’ response to the services provided through the  LTO, in relation to their 
contemporaneous tax liabilities. 
We identify LTO clients using the client listing provided by TAJ. Treatment is indicated 
using a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if the taxpayer appears on the client list and 0 
otherwise.
40
 Other data on taxpayer characteristic such as age, number of employees, economic 
sector and other financial data are from the tax returns and the tax registry databases. Tables 8(a) 
and 8(b) provide summary statistics for data used for the CIT and GCT analysis respectively.  
 
 
                                                          
40
 The client listing provided was for taxpayers in the LTO as at 2013. We were unable to get a list for each of the 
years 2009 – 2012 from TAJ and so we are not able to tell when a particular taxpayer came onto the register. The 
analysis therefore assumes taxpayers listed on the client register in 2013 were clients for each of the years used in 
the analyses. If the LTO was effective in encouraging compliance then this could potentially bias our estimates 
downward. We re-estimate the model using only those taxpayers listed as LTO parent companies as our treatment 
group since it is most likely that the larger parent companies would have been on the client listing since its 
inception. The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline, with slightly larger coefficients. 
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Table 8: Summary Statistics, CIT & GCT 
Table 8 (a): Summary Statistics for the CIT 
 
Notes: Tax return data are for taxpayers with reported gross receipts between J$100 million and J$1 billion who 
report positive tax liabilities for tax years 2009 – 2012. Payment data are for tax years 2009 – 2011 as data for 2012 
were unavailable. 
 
Table 8 (b): Summary Statistics for the GCT 
 
Notes: Data are for taxpayers with reported gross receipts between J$100 million and J$1 billion, who report 
positive tax liabilities between May 2009 and December 31, 2012. We capture data starting roughly two months 
after the establishment of the LTO in April 2009. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
LTO (Treatment) 2,432 0.17 0.37
Gross receipts annual (J$ Millions) 2,432 307.00 209.00
Filed late 2,394 0.37 0.48
No. days filed late 2,394 38.59 96.79
Paid late 1,800 0.54 0.50
No. days paid late 1,800 289.21 468.69
CIT Paid (J$ millions) 1,800 3.57 13.90
Share CIT paid on time 1,800 0.45 0.53
Estimated CIT Paid (J$ millions) 2,432 2.76 11.00
CIT Reported (J$ millions) 2,432 3.26 8.26
Financial Sector 2,432 0.05 0.21
Number of Employees 2,124 48.34 90.51
Age 2,432 10.55 4.40
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
LTO (Treatment) 34,764 0.22 0.42
Gross receipts annual (J$ Millons) 34,764 296 203
Filed late 34,739 0.06 0.23
No. days filed late 34,739 3.76 35.32
Paid late 34,764 0.10 0.30
No. days paid late 34,764 78.73 349.59
GCT Paid (J$ Millions) 34,764 1.22588 2.73232
Share GCT paid on time 34,762 0.90 0.74
Tax Arrears (J$ millions) 34,734 -0.009 0.775
Financial Sector 34,764 0.07 0.26
Age 33,951 8.72 1.98
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Empirical Analysis 
The empirical strategy adopts a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits 
an exogenous jump in the intensity of taxpayer service delivery that occurs when a taxpayer 
reaches gross receipts of J$500 million (US$5.7 million) and is selected into the large taxpayer 
office (LTO). Despite being the primary criteria, as explained above, the gross receipts threshold 
is not the sole selection criteria. Together with the other criteria and the operationalization of the 
selection process, selection into the LTO is non-deterministic at the threshold. Rather the 
probability of being selected (treated) is represented by:  
𝑃[𝑇𝑖 = 1| 𝑆𝑖] {
𝑔1(𝑆𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖   ≥   𝑆0
𝑔0(𝑆𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖  <   𝑆0
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑔1(𝑆𝑖) ≠  𝑔0(𝑆𝑖)     (11) 
The running variable 𝑆𝑖 and the probability of treatment are related as follows: 
𝑃[𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 1 | 𝑆𝑖] =  𝑔0(𝑆𝑖) + [𝑔𝐼(𝑆𝑖) −  𝑔0(𝑆𝑖)]𝐷𝑖                                 (12) 
Where 𝐷𝑖 = 1(𝑆𝑖   ≥   𝑆0) 
Estimation of the local average treatment effect (LATE) in a fuzzy RDD can be modeled 
by a two stage (2SLS) approach as set out in the following model: 
 First Stage:    
𝐸 [𝑇𝑖 = 1] = α0 +  α1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + α2 ƒ (𝑠𝑖,𝑡) +  α3ƒ (𝑠𝑖,𝑡) ∗ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                   (13) 
Where the running variable ( 𝑠𝑖,𝑡), is the gross receipts of taxpayer i at time t, centered at the 
threshold value.
41
  
                                                          
41
 We follow the literature and center gross receipts around the threshold [𝑠𝑖 = (𝑆𝑖 – J$500M)]. This ensures that the 
treatment effect at the threshold can be read from the coefficient on the treatment indicator in models that include 
interaction terms. 
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Second Stage: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = β0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝐼,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑓(𝑠𝑖,𝑡)̃ + 𝛽3𝑓(𝑠𝑖,𝑡)̃ ∗ 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (14) 
The first stage regression estimates the probability of treatment using the firm’s location 
relative to the gross receipts threshold 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and the interaction with gross receipts as instruments. 
ƒ (𝑠𝑖,𝑡) is a flexible polynomial function to account for possible nonlinearities in the relationship 
between the outcome variables and the running variable. Our baseline model adopts a linear 
specification. The second stage uses the fitted values from the first stage to estimate the local 
average treatment effect (LATE) on the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 – which captures the various 
measures of tax compliance outlined above. The LATE is given by β1. In alternative 
specifications of the model we include key taxpayer characteristics as controls in 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and year 
dummies 𝜏𝑡to test for robustness.  
We first examine the validity of the RDD. Panels A and B in Figure 2 show regression 
discontinuity plots of the probability of treatment under the LTO for the CIT and GCT samples 
respectively.  The plots fit local linear regressions on either side of the threshold with local 
sample averages of the outcome variable – in this case the probability of treatment, within bins 
of the running variable – in this case gross receipts (centered at J$500 million). Both figures 
show a discontinuous increase in treatment probability at the gross receipts threshold, suggesting 
the RDD is valid. 
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Figure 2: Test of Identification - First Stage RDD 
Panel (a): Discontinuity in Treatment Probability for the CIT 
 
Panel (b): Discontinuity in Treatment Probability for the GCT 
 
 
Another key identifying assumption of the RDD is that taxpayers are not able to perfectly 
manipulate reported gross receipts; either to locate below the threshold to avoid selection or 
above the threshold to invite selection. We argue that because the gross receipts threshold is not 
the sole factor used in assigning taxpayers – the others being whether a taxpayer is related to an 
LTO client and if total taxes paid is greater than or equal to J$50 million , then manipulation by 
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misreporting gross receipts become less viable. If taxpayers significantly manipulate reported 
gross receipts in order to avoid or invite treatment we expect to see bunching around the 
threshold. We test for structural breaks in the density of reported gross receipts by first 
examining simple histogram density plots for the CIT and GCT samples in Figure B.3 in 
Appendix B. More formally we adopt Mcrary (2008) density manipulation test for the respective 
samples presented in Figure B.4. Both tests show no evidence of bunching or manipulation of the 
running variable.  
In other tests we examine the existence of discontinuities at other plausible points along 
the gross receipts distribution – ‘placebo thresholds’, based on TAJ’s segmentation of the 
taxpayer population. Figure B.5 in Appendix B present the results for test for discontinuities at 
placebo thresholds at J$100 million (US$1.1 million) and J$1 billion (US$ 11.4 million). The 
RD plots indicate that treatment probability does not exhibit a discontinuity at either of the 
placebo thresholds. Further tests of the credibility of the RDD examine the transition of other 
covariates across the gross receipts threshold in Figures B.6 and B.7 in Appendix B. This is to 
assuage concerns that other factors might also be changing discontinuously around the threshold 
that could impact the compliance outcomes we examine. In general, the plots for both the CIT 
and GCT samples show taxpayer characteristics transitioning smoothly across the threshold, 
except for an indicator for taxpayers in the financial sector.
42
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 The confidence intervals on the RD plot for the financial sector indicator are large and suggest that the 
discontinuity observed is not statistically significant. We run regressions excluding financial sector taxpayers to test 
for potential bias, for both the CIT and GCT sample. The results are similar to the baseline model.  
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Results 
Filing Compliance for the CIT 
RD plots presented in Figure 3 show a reduction in the probability of late filing and the 
number of days late that CIT returns are filed. However the estimates are imprecise, and calls 
into question their statistical significance.  
Figure 3: Effect of the LTO on Timely Filing of the CIT 
 
Notes: Panel A shows RD plots for the probability of late filing and panel B shows RD plots for the number of days 
late that returns are filed. Bandwidths are chosen to approximate the optimal (IK) bandwidth for the respective 
outcomes.  RD Plots done using IMSE – evenly spaced (ES) method with spacing estimators proposed by Calonico 
et al. (2014b). The approach fits linear regressions that approximate the conditional mean of the outcome variables 
to the left and right of the cut off. 
 
Table 9 presents estimates of the LATE from 2SLS regressions, using data within ranges 
of gross receipts that correspond with the optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2009) (IK).
43
 Panel A shows a reduction in the probability of late filing by about 
90 percentage points (Column 1) and Panel B shows a reduction in the number of days late that 
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 Baseline results from 2SLS regressions using the optimal IK bandwidth are reported for all compliance outcomes 
examined. Results for alternative bandwidths (+/- J$20 million) are presented in the results tables for the respective 
outcomes as robustness checks. 
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returns are filed by 190 days (column 1). However the effects are imprecisely estimated and in 
both cases are statistically insignificant.
44
  
Table 9: Effect of the LTO on Timely Filing of the CIT 
 
Note: This table presents estimates for filing compliance for the CIT. The dependent variable in Panel A is an 
indicator equal 1 if the taxpayer filed late and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Panel B captures the number 
of days after the due date that taxpayers file a CIT return. The results presented in columns 1-2 are for the optimal 
bandwidth as proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), with and without controls respectively. Columns 3-4 
present results for a smaller bandwidth (IK – J$20 million) and columns 5-6 for a larger bandwidth (IK + J$20 
million). Controls include the ‘age’ of the taxpayer, the amount of estimated CIT paid, reported CIT and a dummy 
that capture whether or not the taxpayer operates in the financial sector. Regressions adopt a linear specification. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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 We also examine the filing response for a larger sample of taxpayers, which include all taxpayers with gross 
receipts between J$100 million and J$1 billion who filed a tax return for the period of analysis, which therefore 
includes those that reported zero tax liabilities. The results in Table B.1 in Appendix B indicate no significant effects 
on filing compliance. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Probability of Filing Late
LTO -0.904 -0.315 -0.843 -0.0722 -0.916 -0.435
(1.241) (0.835) (1.519) (0.990) (1.059) (0.737)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 240 240 220 220 260 260
Observations 938 837 823 732 1,038 927
Year Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Panel B - Number of Days Filed Late
LTO -190.2 -125.7 -209.1 -126.0 -165.0 -118.6
(188.1) (137.0) (219.5) (152.1) (157.9) (121.9)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 286 286 266 266 306 306
Observations 1,179 1,063 1,063 952 1,307 1,178
Year Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Filing Compliance
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Payment Compliance for the CIT 
We examine payment compliance for the CIT for tax years 2009 to 2011.
45
 RD plots in 
Figure 4 show a reduction in the probability of late payment in panel A but no effect for the 
number of days late that CIT is paid in panel B.  The share of reported CIT paid and the amount 
of CIT paid on time are higher just right of the threshold, as shown in panels C and D 
respectively.  
Figure 4: Effect of the LTO on Timely Payment of the CIT 
 
Note: Bandwidths are chosen to approximate the optimal (IK) bandwidth for the respective outcomes.  RD Plots 
done using the default IMSE – evenly spaced (ES) method with spacing estimators Calonico et al. (2014b). The 
approach fits linear regression curves that approximate the conditional means of the outcome variable to the left and 
right of the cut off.    
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 CIT payments data for tax year 2012 were not available.  
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
-300 -150 0 150 300
Gross Receipts (centered)
Sample average within bin Polynomial fit of order 1
A. Probability of Paying Late
1
0
0 1
5
02
0
0 2
5
03
0
03
5
0
-400 -200 0 200 400
Gross Receipts (centered)
Sample average within bin Polynomial fit of order 1
B. Number of Days Paid Late
.2
.4
.6
.8
-350 -175 0 175 350
Gross Receipts (centered)
Sample average within bin Polynomial fit of order 1
C. Share of Reported CIT Paid on Time
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
-400 -200 0 200 400
Grodd Receipts (centered)
Sample average within bin Polynomial fit of order 1
D. Amount of CIT Paid on Time
57 
 
The directional effects from the RD plots are again re-enforced by the LATE estimates in 
Table 10, but again, are statistically insignificant. The null effects hold for alternative bandwidth 
choices and model specifications. Interestingly the point estimates from 2SLS are large and may 
suggest significant economic gains in compliance. However the lack of statistical significance 
does not allow for any clear determination of the effects of the LTO on CIT compliance 
outcomes examined. 
Table 10: Effect of the LTO on Payment Compliance for the CIT 
 
Note: This table presents estimates for payment compliance – timeliness of payments, for the CIT. The dependent 
variables in panels A-D are: the probability of paying late, the number of days late GCT is paid, the amount of GCT 
paid on time (in millions J$) and the share of reported GCT paid on time. The results presented in columns 1-2 are 
for the optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), with and without controls respectively. 
Columns 3-4 present results for a smaller bandwidth (IK – J$20 million) and columns 5-6 for a larger bandwidth (IK 
+ J$20 million). Controls include the ‘age’ of the taxpayer, the amount of estimated CIT paid, reported CIT and a 
dummy that capture whether or not the taxpayer operates in the financial sector. Regressions adopt a linear 
specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Probability of Paying Late
LTO -0.805 -0.704 -0.797 -0.657 -0.783 -0.723
(0.891) (0.767) (0.966) (0.811) (0.810) (0.714)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 290 290 270 270 310 310
Observations 874 797 793 720 972 890
Year Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Panel B - Number of Days Paid Late
LTO -77.79 -127.3 -90.51 -147.5 -64.15 -106.6
(305.7) (282.1) (318.0) (292.0) (294.7) (273.1)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 477 477 457 457 497 496
Observations 1,793 1,603 1,786 1,598 1,799 1,608
Year Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Panel C - Share of Reported  CIT Paid on Time
LTO 1.007 0.970 1.076 1.020 0.945 0.921
(0.870) (0.795) (0.971) (0.883) (0.780) (0.724)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 337 337 317 317 357 357
Observations 1,166 1,064 1,016 928 1,301 1,181
Year Dummy no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Panel D  - Amount Paid on Time
LTO 8.466 3.865 8.408 3.926 8.508 3.815
(13.22) (5.190) (13.61) (5.302) (12.91) (5.105)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 542 542 522 522 562 562
Observations 1,800 1,609 1,800 1,609 1,800 1,609
Year Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Payment Compliance (Timeliness)
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Filing Compliance for the GCT 
Figure 5 presents RD plots of the effect of the LTO on filing compliance for the GCT. 
Panel A shows a discontinuous drop in the probability that taxpayers file late and panel B shows 
a drop in the number of days late that GCT returns are filed. Relative to the CIT, the figures 
show a more distinct separation in compliance behavior around the threshold and are more 
efficiently estimated. 
Figure 5: Effect of the LTO on Timely Filing of the GCT  
 
Note: Bandwidths are chosen to approximate the optimal (IK) bandwidth for the respective outcomes.  RD Plots 
done using the default IMSE – evenly spaced (ES) method with spacing estimators Calonico et al. (2014b). The 
approach fits linear regression curves that approximate the conditional means of the outcome variable to the left and 
right of the cut off.    
 
Table 11 presents estimates of the LATE for both filing compliance outcomes. The 
results in Panel A indicate a 22 percentage point reduction (column 1) in the probability of late 
filing. The results in Panel B suggest that taxpayers reduce the number of days late they file GCT 
returns by 14 days (column 1). Results are robust to the inclusion of controls and for larger and 
smaller bandwidth choices.  In general the results suggest that taxpayers respond along both the 
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extensive margin – whether GCT returns are filed on time or not, and the intensive margin – how 
late GCT returns are filed.   
Table 11: Effect of the LTO on Timely Filing of the GCT 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates for filing compliance for the GCT. The dependent variable in Panel A is an 
indicator equal 1 if the taxpayer filed late and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Panel B captures the number 
of days after the due date that taxpayers file a GCT return. The results presented in columns 1-2 are for the optimal 
bandwidth as proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), with and without controls respectively. Columns 3-4 
present results for a smaller bandwidth (IK – J$20 million) and columns 5-6 for a larger bandwidth (IK + J$20 
million).  Controls include the ‘age’ of the taxpayer, amount of GCT arrears / credits and a dummy that capture 
whether or not the taxpayer operates in the financial sector. Regressions adopt a linear specification. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Payment Compliance for the GCT 
Results for payment compliance for the GCT are graphed in Figure 6. Panels A and B 
show a discontinuous drop in the probability of paying late and the number of days late that 
taxpayers pay, respectively. Panels C and D show increases in the share of GCT and amount of 
GCT paid on time. We supplement these results with estimates from 2SLS regressions. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Probability of Filing Late
LTO -0.222** -0.195** -0.190** -0.162* -0.156*** -0.150***
(0.0883) (0.0822) (0.0902) (0.0865) (0.0482) (0.0471)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 125 125 105 105 145 145
Observations 6,026 5,849 4,934 4,786 13,345 12,977
Year-Month Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Panel B - Number of Days Late
LTO -14.44** -15.02*** -14.18** -14.53** -15.60*** -16.34***
(5.629) (5.654) (5.823) (5.792) (5.519) (5.581)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 238 238 218 218 258 258
Observations 12,790 12,433 11,190 10,879 14,385 13,985
Year-Month Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Filing Compliance
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Figure 6: Effect of the LTO on Payment Compliance for the GCT 
 
Note: Bandwidths are chosen to approximate the optimal (IK) bandwidth for the respective outcomes.  RD Plots 
done using the default IMSE – evenly spaced (ES) method with spacing estimators Calonico et al. (2014b). The 
approach fits linear regression curves that approximate the conditional means of the outcome variable to the left and 
right of the cut off.    
 
Table 12 gives the LATE for payment compliance for the GCT. Results in panel A 
(column 1) indicates a 17 percentage point reduction in the probability of paying late and panel B 
suggests a reduction in the number of days late by 247 days. Taxpayers’ ‘money response’ is 
captured in panels C and D, and show an increase in the amount of GCT paid on time by about 
J$4 million and an increase in the share paid on time by roughly 27 percent. Results are robust to 
the inclusion of controls and alternative bandwidths. As in the case of filing, results for payment 
compliance suggest that taxpayers respond along both the extensive margin and intensive 
margins.   
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Table 12: Effect of the LTO on Payment Compliance for the GCT 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates for payment compliance for the GCT. The dependent variables in panels A-D 
are: the probability of paying late, the number of days late GCT is paid, the amount of GCT paid on time (in 
millions J$) and the share of reported GCT paid on time. The results presented in columns 1-2 are for the optimal 
bandwidth as proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), with and without controls respectively. Columns 3-4 
present results for a smaller bandwidth (IK – J$20 million) and columns 5-6 for a larger bandwidth (IK + J$20 
million). Controls include the ‘age’ of the taxpayer, amount of GCT arrears / credits and a dummy that capture 
whether or not the taxpayer operates in the financial sector. Regressions adopt a linear specification. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
A contrast of the results for the CIT and GCT can offer insight into the potential for non-
pecuniary factors more generally and taxpayer services is particular, to influence tax compliance 
in weak and stronger legal enforcement contexts. The null effects for the CIT and the positive 
compliance effects for the GCT provide suggestive evidence of a complementarity in the 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Probability of Paying Late
LTO -0.174* -0.150* -0.173* -0.141 -0.191** -0.175**
(0.0893) (0.0826) (0.0995) (0.0928) (0.0812) (0.0751)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 157 157 137 137 177 177
Observations 7,691 7,475 6,644 6,451 8,660 8,420
Year-Month Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Panel B - Number of Days Late
LTO -247.0*** -229.4*** -261.2*** -242.1*** -239.2*** -223.8***
(49.23) (48.79) (53.07) (52.01) (45.89) (46.01)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions)
Observations 25,693 25,040 22,631 22,036 29,547 28,809
Year-Month Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Panel C - Share of Reported  GCT Paid on Time
LTO 0.266** 0.193* 0.275* 0.200* 0.280*** 0.216**
(0.131) (0.106) (0.154) (0.121) (0.108) (0.0993)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 166 166 146 146 186 186
Observations 8,081 7,852 7,117 6,916 9,204 8,948
Year-Month Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Panel D - Amount of GCT Paid on Time
LTO 4.415*** 3.540*** 5.044*** 3.999*** 3.994*** 3.231***
(0.830) (0.696) (0.997) (0.810) (0.740) (0.634)
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 207 207 187 187 227 227
Observations 10,350 10,061 9,276 9,019 11,864 11,531
Year-Month Dummies no yes no yes no yes
Controls no yes no yes no yes
Payment Compliance (Timeliness)
62 
 
relationship between the strength of the legal enforcement framework of the taxing regime and 
the provision of taxpayer services. To strengthen the case for comparability of compliance 
outcomes across the two tax types, we address possible confounding coming from heterogeneity 
across taxpayers in the CIT and GCT samples, by restricting the analysis to only taxpayers who 
file both CIT and GCT. We present results on filing and payment responses for this subsample in 
Table B.2 in Appendix B. The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline results using the 
optimal IK bandwidths – suggesting that a taxpayer responds more positively to the provision of 
services for the GCT – which has the stronger enforcement.  
Comparability of the compliance outcomes may still be confounded by important 
differences in the structure of the taxes themselves. However we argue that the margins of 
response examined – timeliness of filing and payment conditional on reporting – are more 
comparably relative to other compliance outcomes typically studied such as reporting behavior. 
Still it can be argued, for example, that complexities of the CIT are more likely to cause delays in 
filing and payment compared to the GCT. But we show in panel B of Figure B.2 in Appendix B 
that even taxpayers who file and pay both taxes on time are still more compliant with the GCT – 
pay a larger share of reported tax liability. This reinforces our argument that the observed 
compliance behaviors across taxes are driven primarily by differences in the enforcement 
context, and mitigates concerns about confounding from sample selection and heterogeneity 
across taxes.  
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Heterogeneous Effects 
Next we test for heterogeneous effects for the GCT. We focus on the GCT since the lax 
enforcement framework of the CIT will tend to nullify the potentially positive compliance effects 
of the LTO.
46
 The compliance effects of the LTO can be very different across economic sectors 
for a number of reasons.
47
 Differences in the business and regulatory environment across 
economic sectors that impose varied compliance requirements on firms can differentially affect 
taxpayer’s compliance behavior. For example firms in the financial sector are already relatively 
heavily regulated to ensure they are ‘fit and proper’ and therefore may not be significantly 
impacted by the services provided through the LTO, compared to non-financial firms. A similar 
argument can be made for importing versus non-importing taxpayers, where the former require a 
tax compliance certification (TCC) in order to carry out its core business.
48
 We examine 
differences in the compliance response across financial and non-financial sector taxpayers as 
well as importing and non-importing taxpayers. 
Results for filing and payment compliance outcomes for financial and non-financial 
sector taxpayers are reported in Table B.3 of Appendix B. The results for financial sector 
taxpayers are reported in Panel A and indicate insignificant effects for all filing and payment 
compliance outcomes examined. The opposite is true for non-financial sector taxpayers, reported 
in Panel B, where we find significant improvements in all compliance outcomes examined. We 
find significant reductions in the probability of late filing (-0.17); the number of days late that 
GCT returns are filed (-15 days); the probability of paying late (-0.145); and the number of days 
                                                          
46
 Test for heterogeneity in compliance response for the CIT data yielded null results for all compliance outcomes. 
47
 Studies that examine reporting behavior for the VAT for example point out that firms that sell directly to end 
users or consumers may be more likely to evade than firms who sell to other firms (Almunia & Rodriguez 2014; 
Pomeranz, 2013).   
48
 We define importers as taxpayers for whom imports account for at least 20 percent of total supplies. The results 
are similar if we use higher qualification thresholds.   
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late that GCT is paid (-258 days). We also find significant gains in the amount of GCT paid on 
time (J$2.4 million) and the share of reported GCT paid on time (16 percent). Comparing 
importing and non-importing taxpayers, we a find a similar dynamic. The results presented in 
Table B.4 in Appendix B suggests that the compliance behavior of importers is not significantly 
impacted by the LTO, but for non-importers there are significant improvements in all the 
compliance outcomes examined. Estimates of the LATE for non-importers are qualitatively 
similar to that of non-financial taxpayers. These results suggest that compliance mechanisms – 
external to the tax administration, example using regulatory and other oversight bodies to ensure 
compliance or requiring TCC’s to conduct certain business activities, are viable options to boost 
compliance.
49
 In the context of this research, these external compliance mechanisms appear to 
act as substitutes for the provision of taxpayer services. 
Conclusion 
This essay examined the effect taxpayer service delivery through the LTO, on filing and 
payment of CIT and GCT for large taxpayers in Jamaica. We find generally positive compliance 
effects on filing and payment for the GCT but no effect for the CIT. A contrast of the results 
provides suggestive evidence of a complementarity in the relationship between the strength of 
the legal enforcement framework of the tax regime and the provision of taxpayer services. We 
argue that the relatively lax legal enforcement framework of the CIT moderates the potentially 
positive compliance effects of service provision. On the other hand, the stronger legal 
enforcement framework of the GCT complements the provision taxpayer services resulting in 
significant improvements in filing and payment. The null effects for the CIT raises doubts about 
the ability of tax morale factors and taxpayer services more specifically, by themselves, to 
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 The results presented in Tables 8 and 9 are from regressions using the optimal bandwidth (IK) only. The results 
are generally robust to adjustment in the bandwidth and the inclusion of controls. 
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significantly improve filing and payment compliance in developing countries. We also examined 
heterogeneous effects for key economic sectors and activities, and find improvements in filing 
and payment compliance for the GCT for taxpayers in the non-financial sector and for non-
importers, but null effects for financial sector taxpayers and importers. Strict regulations of 
financial sector firms and TCC requirements for importers appear to be driving these results, and 
highlight the substitutability between external compliance mechanisms and the provision of 
taxpayer services.  
The results have important implications for tax policy and tax administration in 
developing countries. The first points to limitations in the adoption of a softer approach to tax 
administration that attempts to encourage tax compliance by leveraging tax moral factors in a 
context of major enforcement deficiencies - example weak legal framework and corruption. Our 
results suggest that a strong(er) legal enforcement framework is required if non-pecuniary factors 
such as the provision of taxpayer services are to be effective in improving compliance. In the 
context of Jamaica, strengthening of the income tax law to remove or significantly limit 
opportunities for taxpayers to delay filing and payment of taxes could make the services 
provided by the LTO more valuable and could translate to improvements in compliance. 
Secondly, alternative compliance features, for example the use of strong regulatory or oversight 
bodies and requiring TCC’s to conduct key business activities, are important drivers of tax 
compliance and can potentially serve as substitutes for other enforcement and non-pecuniary tax 
compliance programs carried on by the TAJ. Utilizing these ‘compliance agents’ could provide a 
low cost solution an already resource strapped tax administration in many developing countries.  
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Essay 3: The Effect of Public Goods Messaging on Personal Income Tax Compliance 
among the Self-Employed: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Jamaica 
 
Introduction 
Developing countries struggle to collect sufficient revenues to finance spending on 
important public services such as health, education, security, among others. This is evidenced by 
the relatively low tax-to-GDP ratios in these countries compared to their more advanced 
counterparts. The low tax effort in developing countries can be explained, partially, by low levels 
of tax compliance. Part of the problem stems from weak enforcement capacity, but other factors 
include perceptions of procedural fairness, existence of a non-compliance social norm and weak 
social and political institutions (Bird & Martinez-Vazquez, 2008; Besley & Persson, 2014). In 
light of this, to boost compliance, tax administrations are increasingly seeking to complement 
traditional enforcement approaches with those that leverage tax morale factors – such as social 
norm and public goods appeal. These complementary approaches are particularly important in 
developing countries where enforcement capacity is weak.  
This essay implements a randomized messaging experiment to examine the effect of 
public goods messages on personal income tax (PIT) compliance among self-employed 
individuals in Jamaica. Traditionally, researchers use public goods messages to nudge behavioral 
nodes – aimed at eliciting tax compliance through reciprocity with respect to public service 
delivery. However, the effectiveness of these messages hinge on their ability to ‘re-couple’ in the 
mind of the taxpayer, the benefits of public goods and services provided by the government, with 
the amount of taxes paid to the government (Lamberton, De Neve, & Norton, 2014). Linked to 
the literature on charitable giving, is the view that knowledge - for example about the charity’s 
67 
 
activities and beneficiaries; and individual’s ability to choose which charity to donate to, can 
increase generosity. Extending this thought to the tax compliance context, knowing how public 
spending is allocated and being able to influence spending allocation can build trust and provide 
taxpayer agency, ultimately leading to improvements in tax compliance (Djawadi & Fahr, 2013; 
Lamberton et.al; 2014). 
We conduct two sub-experiments and examine the effect of pubic goods messages on two 
sets of compliance outcomes. In the first sub-experiment we examine the effect of the standard 
public goods message on payment of quarterly PIT obligations. Because there are no penalties 
for non-payment of quarterly PIT, the compliance effects will be free of confounding from 
enforcement action – a truly zero enforcement environment. In this context, the structure of the 
PIT penalty regime in Jamaica provides a unique opportunity to examine the effect of the 
standard public goods message on voluntary compliance. In the second sub-experiment we focus 
on payment of PIT arrears and expand the message context to include an augmented public 
goods message – which provides additional information on actual spending on key public goods 
and services. Providing information on spending allocation can ‘open up the books’, can elicit 
trust and arguably provide a sense of agency in the mind of taxpayers. In this sub-experiment the 
compliance outcomes relate to established PIT delinquencies, compared to sub-experiment one 
where there is no legal obligation to comply. Further, by augmenting the message content we 
broaden the scope of the analysis, in line with previous studies (Kirchler et al. 2008; Djawadi et 
al., 2013 Lamberton et al., 2014), to examine the incremental compliance effect of knowledge of 
government spending allocation. 
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We find that the standard public goods message had no effect on compliance with 
quarterly PIT payments in sub-experiment one. However results from sub-experiment two 
indicate positive effects, from both the standard and augmented messages, on the probability of 
making a payment and the amount of PIT arrears paid after nineteen weeks. However, point 
estimates from the standard and augmented public goods messages are not statistically different 
for any of the outcomes examined; suggesting that additional information on public spending 
allocations does not matter. Tests for heterogeneity in compliance response suggest that 
compliance gains are driven largely by older taxpayers. Unlike previous studies we find only 
limited evidence of differential compliance response between individuals with high and low tax 
debt. 
Background  
PIT applies to income above a tax exempt threshold. The PIT threshold was increased to 
J$1,000,272 effective July 1, 2016, up from J$592,800 in the previous year, making the effective 
threshold J$796,536 for tax year 2016. For the period under study, PIT rates are 25 percent on 
income above the threshold, with a top marginal rate of 30 percent for income above J$6 
million.
50
 Like most countries, the PIT in Jamaica can be characterized into two separate 
regimes. Most PIT revenue come from pay as you earn (PAYE) individuals and are withheld at 
source by employers. Individuals who earn only PAYE income are not required to file an income 
tax return and it is estimated that there were just fewer than 450,000 such individuals in the tax 
net in 2015. The second category of PIT revenue come from self-employed individuals, who are 
required to self-report earnings to the tax administration when they file their income tax each 
year. Based on data from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) the employed labor force 
                                                          
50
 The marginal PIT rate was increased to 30 percent for incomes at or above J$6 million, effective July 1, 2016. 
69 
 
was estimated at roughly 1.1 million persons in January 2015, suggesting that there are 
approximately 650,000 self-employed individuals.  
Jamaica’s tax-to-GDP ratio averaged about 26 percent between 2000 and 2014. This is 
about 5 percentage points higher than the average for middle and upper middle income countries. 
The relatively creditable tax-to-GDP ratio may underplay the revenue mobilization challenges in 
Jamaica, compared to similarly situated economies. Notably, the critical issue has more to do 
with the distribution of the tax burden – who are called to bear the brunt? In a context of 
reasonably high tax ratios but where one segment of the tax population is made to bear the brunt 
of the burden, issues of economic inefficiencies and distributional inequities are even more 
pronounced. There is a long standing concern that the tax system places an inordinate burden on 
the PAYE employee. PAYE revenues were about J$72 billion or 55 percent of total income and 
profit tax revenues in FY 2015/16. This compares to PIT collected from the self-employed of 
about J$4 billion or 3.5 percent of total income and profit taxes.
51
 This imbalance is due at least 
in part to higher levels of tax evasion among the self-employed since they not only have greater 
opportunities to cheat (Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner , Pedersen, & Saez, 2011) but perhaps also 
operate within a context where information or knowledge about how to cheat is more pervasive 
(Paetzold & Winner, 2014).
52
  
The self-employed are required to file estimated PIT returns during the first quarter of the 
current tax year, and make quarterly payments by March, 15, June, 15, September 15 and 
December 15. However, nonpayment of quarterly PIT does not attract a penalty and thus 
compliance is totally voluntary. In the absence of any formal punishment for non-compliance, 
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 Data on PIT from the self-employed includes PIT collected from pensioners, in which case the burden carried by 
the self-employed may be even smaller. 
52
 PAYE taxpayers who earn other income are required to file income tax returns in respect of this income. 
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TAJ may need to leverage tax moral or non-pecuniary factors more generally – in an effort to 
boost compliance with quarterly payments. Annual returns and final PIT payments are due by 
March 15 of the following tax year. TAJ has long lamented the low levels of compliance among 
self-employed. Only 15 percent of registered self-employed taxpayers filed a tax return for tax 
year 2015, and only about half of these actually filed on time. With regards to payments, less 
than 1 percent of registered taxpayers paid any PIT in 2015. Principal PIT arrears were 
approximately 2.7 billion in April, 2016 or 57 percent of total projected PIT from the self-
employed in fiscal year 2016/17.
53
 Compared to quarterly payment obligations, the requirement 
to file and pay PIT, by the annual deadline, attracts a penalty.
54
 Using non-pecuniary 
interventions could boost compliance where they are complementary to already established 
enforcement mechanisms. 
Literature Review 
The seminal work on tax compliance is due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Their 
model predicts that tax evasion rates fall as the probability of detection and the degree of 
punishment increases. Many authors have attempted to empirically validate the AS model, with 
varying success. A common finding is that the standard model predicts far too little compliance 
compared to that observed around the world (Torgler, 2004). However, the AS framework 
performs much better among individuals with self-reported income (Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner , 
Pedersen, & Saez, 2011) where estimates of evasion come closer to the models predictions. 
Complementary theories of tax compliance attempt to overcome some of the shortcomings of the 
AS approach. In particular, these theories posit that non-pecuniary or tax morale factors as well 
                                                          
53
 This figure includes amounts filed on returns but not paid, audit assessments and estimated assessments done by 
TAJ, but does not include interest and penalty balances. Total PIT arrears inclusive of interest a penalties are 
estimated at about J$6 billion as at April 2016. 
54
 Failure to file attract a penalty of J$5,000 or up to 12 months in prison and nonpayment attracts interest of 40 
percent annually. 
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as individuals subjective audit probabilities play an important role in explaining taxpayer 
behavior (Luttmer & Singhal, 2014) 
Empirical work examining the determinants of tax compliance is still evolving. More 
recent studies that adopt quasi-experimental and experimental approaches in an attempt to 
uncover causal factors have emerged as the benchmark in the field. Blumenthal et al. (2001) find 
in the case of Minnesota that informing of the underlying tax compliance social norm as well as 
the range of public services financed by taxes has no effect on taxpayer’s reported income or tax 
liability. Similarly, Torgler (2004, 2012) field experiment in Switzerland leveraged the 
importance of taxes to finance local public goods as well as the democratic freedom enjoyed by 
citizens, but found that such moral appeals had no impact on timely filing and payment of taxes, 
nor did it impact compliance as captured by reported income and claims for tax credits. These 
findings are in line with the narrative in much of the recent literature, which suggests that moral 
suasion may be less effective in encouraging compliance relative to enforcement factors. 
 However, (Bott, Cappelen, Sorensen, & Tungodden, 2014) find evidence in support of 
moral suasion – both social norm and public goods appeals, as an important determinant of 
compliance in Norway. Their experiment implements both an enforcement and moral appeal 
treatment, and finds that both had a significant and positive effect (of similar magnitude) on the 
reporting of foreign income. Interestingly they find that moral suasion impacted the intensive 
margin – people reported more foreign income, and the enforcement treatment impacted the 
extensive margin – more people reported having foreign income. A particularly interesting 
finding comes from Del Carpio (2013) who reports large and significant improvements in 
property tax compliance in Peru, from social norm messages, but null effects from enforcement 
messages. Interestingly she also finds evidence of possible crowd out of the pure morale effects 
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in treatments that interact both the social norm and enforcement messages – with estimated 
coefficient on the interacted messages being smaller than that on pure norm message. Notably, 
the  effect of the social norm messages were largest during the period after increased municipal 
enforcement activity – arguably suggestive evidence of a complementarity in the compliance 
relationship between norm messaging and municipal enforcement action. More evidence on the 
positive compliance effects of moral suasion come from Hallsworth et.al. (2014). They find 
positive and significant compliance effects on payment of tax debts, from social norm and public 
goods messages in the UK. They advance that framing messages to increase moral cost can 
reduce procrastination and therefore increase tax payment – which in the case of the UK 
experiment resulted in an additional £3 million being collected within 23-days.  
Recent lab experiments push beyond the standard public goods treatment and examine 
the effect of taxpayer knowledge about spending allocations and ability to allocate spending 
across key public goods and services, on tax compliance.
55
  Djawadi and Fahr (2013) and 
Lamberton et al., (2014) find that providing information on public expenditures and allowing 
taxpayers to choose how their taxes are allocated significantly improves compliance. Both 
studies find larger compliance effects for the latter. Interestingly, Djawadi and Farh (2013) report 
that the positive compliance effects hold only when enforcement is weak – suggesting that these 
interventions may be substitutes for enforcement. 
The contribution of this paper is three fold.  Firstly we add to a nascent but growing 
literature that uses messaging experiments to study casual determinants of tax compliance in 
developing countries (Del Carpio, 2013; Castro & Scartascini, 2013; Ortega & Sanguinetti, 
2013; Pomeranz, 2013; Carillo et al., 2014; Brockmeyer et al., 2016). This is the first in an 
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 Evidence from research on charitable giving suggest that persons are more willing to give if they know who the 
beneficiaries are (Cryder et al., 2013; Bohnet & Frey, 1999) 
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English speaking Latin American Caribbean (LAC) country. Secondly our enquiry into the 
potential effects of tax knowledge (as a proxy for taxpayer agency) on compliance outcomes 
moves what has so far been examined in the context of control lab environments, into the field. 
Thirdly the compliance outcomes we examine offers an opportunity to compare the effect of 
public goods messages (and non-pecuniary factors more generally) on compliance with a purely 
voluntary obligation – for which there are no penalties for non-compliance, and obligations for 
which non-compliance attract significant fines. Such a comparison might inform the nature of the 
relationship between the messages and the enforcement strength of the tax regimes.  
Data and Experimental Design 
Data  
We use administrative data for over 100,000 registered self-employed individuals (as at 
July 18, 2016) in Jamaica.
56
 From the universe of registered self-employed taxpayers we select 
our experimental sample of 17,073 ‘active’ taxpayers – defined as any person who either filed an 
annual income tax return for tax year 2015, an estimated return for the current tax year (2016) or 
who show up as having PIT arrears. The experimental sample for sub-experiment one comprise 
3,368 active taxpayers with reported statutory income greater than the current effective tax 
exempt threshold of J$796,536 for tax years 2015 and 2016, but with PIT arrears less than 
J$20,000. The experimental sample for sub-experiment two comprise some 13,695 active 
taxpayers with PIT arrears greater than or equal to J$20,000.
57
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 All data are provided by TAJ. To maintain confidentiality, individual’s taxpayer registration numbers (TRN) were 
replaced by a system generated ‘customer key’ that is used to identify him or her throughout the experiment. 
57
 In the context of this experiment, TAJ’s priority was to improve payments of outstanding PIT arrears. 
Consequently the sample for sub-experiment two was selected first and the remaining taxpayers who met the sample 
selection criteria for sub-experiment one were selected into that sub-experiment. Taxpayers were either selected into 
sub-experiment one or two, none were selected for both.  
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From the tax returns we have information on reported income, statutory income and 
amount of PIT filed for 2015 and 2016.
58
 Data on PIT payments are from the payments ledger 
and cover all PIT payments made for 2016. Data on PIT arrears and a risk ranking for each 
taxpayer are from the compliance management dataset. Data on taxpayer characteristics such as 
age, sex, marital status and occupation are from the taxpayer registration number (TRN) 
database. Table 13 presents summary statistics for experimental samples from sub-experiments 
one and two. 
Table 13: Summary Statistics Sub experiment One and Two 
 
 
Experiment Design  
We conduct two sub-experiments and examine the effect of pubic goods messages on two 
sets of compliance outcomes. Letters with salient messages were crafted in cooperation with the 
TAJ’s communications team along with other members of TAJ’s management team. All letters 
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 Data for 2016 are from estimated PIT returns filed. Final PIT returns for 2016 are due March 15, 2017.  
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev.
IIT Paid Third Qrt (Dummy) 3,368 0.29 0.45
Amount of IIT Paid Third Qrt 3,368 54,641.44 237,476.30
IIT Paid Fourth Qrt (Dummy) 3,368 0.29 0.45
Amount of IIT Paid Fourth Qrt 3,368 55,890.92 240,320.30
Public Goods Message (stndPG) 3,368 0.724 0.447
Statutory Income 3,368 3,836,010.000 6,681,613.000
Risk 3,368 1.698 0.489
Age 3,368 51.269 13.831
Single 3,368 0.458 0.498
Male 3,368 0.607 0.489
Email 3,368 0.315 0.464
PIT Arrears 3,368 736.077 2,982.757
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev.
IIT Arrears Paid (Dummy) 13,695 0.08 0.28
Amount of PIT Arrears Paid 13,695 7,541.452 68,347.160
Public Goods Message (stndPG) 13,695 0.210 0.408
Public Goods & Spending Information (augmPG) 13,695 0.208 0.406
Risk 13,695 1.868 0.364
Age 13,695 48.180 12.087
Single 13,694 0.682 0.466
Male 13,695 0.730 0.444
Email 13,695 0.038 0.190
PIT Arrears 13,695 250,817.600 1,307,900.000
Panel A: Sub-experiment One
Panel B: Sub-experiment Two
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were done on official TAJ letter head and sent in official Government of Jamaica envelopes 
using standard mail. Unlike previous studies that use registered mail, the use of standard mail is 
fitting to Jamaica’s context as taxpayers are less likely to accept letters from the tax 
administration if sent through registered mail. This highlights a major challenge for TAJ, where 
effective communication, through letters is compromised because of low delivery rates.
59
 
Consequently, critical to this experiment is our ability to identify letters that were returned and 
not delivered to the taxpayer. To make it easy to identify returned mail relating to this 
experiment, envelopes were specially marked with a red outline of the Jamaican flag.
60
 Table C.1 
in Appendix C outlines the timeline for the experiment. 
Sub-experiment One: Effect of Public Goods Messaging on Third and Fourth Quarter PIT 
Payments. 
In sub-experiment one we examine the impact of the standard public goods message on 
individuals’ payment of quarterly PIT obligations. Quarterly PIT payments are due on March, 
15, June, 15, September 15 and December 15 of the current tax year. Letters were mailed 
between August 3 and 5, 2016 and thus were targeted at influencing payments for the third and 
fourth quarters.
61
 The salient message highlights the importance of taxes as a source of funding 
for important public services such as health care, education, security, among others. 
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 In recent years TAJ has rolled out an e-service platform geared toward facilitating ‘real time’ interaction with the 
taxpayer and provide convenient filing and payment options. TAJ has also increased its presence on social media, 
and has an active presence of Face Book and Twitter. 
60
 Figure C.1 in Appendix C shows the envelope in which the letters were sent. 
61
It is estimated to take between 3 – 5 workings days for the letters to be delivered. Individuals are expected to 
receive these letters by the latest August 12, 2016 – one month before the September 15 deadline to make third 
quarter payments. 
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Standard Public Goods Message (stndPG) - Treatment One (T1): 
“Paying your taxes provide the funding necessary to pay for important public services such as 
health care, education, national security and other important services. If all self-employed 
individuals pay their income tax liabilities in full, this could provide funding to significantly 
increase spending in these important areas.” 
The letter also reminded taxpayers to file and pay their income tax – both quarterly and 
annual obligations; the deadlines by which these actions must be taken; and a call to action or 
statement encouraging taxpayers to honor their obligation on time and in full. Information about 
where taxes can be filed and paid, and contact information – TAJ’s website and customer care 
help line in case there are questions or comments – were also included as standard text in all 
letters sent as a part of the experiment. Figure C.2 in Appendix C gives a sample of the letter 
used in this sub-experiment. 
The sample for sub-experiment one comprised individuals who in either tax year 2015 or 
2016 – based on estimated returns, reported statutory income greater than the effective annual 
tax exempt threshold of J$796,536, but with PIT arrears less than J$20,000.
62
 Individuals 
meeting the selection criteria (N = 3,368) were randomly selected into a treatment group (n = 
2439) to receive a letter, and a control group (n = 929) that did not received a letter.
63
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 We use the effective tax exempt threshold for tax year 2016 as the selection criteria for the experimental sample. 
63
 The larger sample size for the treatment group was chosen to compensate for the expected low delivery rate of 
letters. In the end however the delivery rate was much higher than expected. This might be on account of the fact 
that the taxpayers in this sub-experiment are particularly active and current.    
77 
 
Sub-experiment Two: Effect of Public Goods Messaging on Payment of Personal Income 
Tax Arrears 
In sub-experiment two, individuals are randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups 
that receive either the standard public goods message (T2) or an augmented public goods 
message (T3), or a control group that receives no letter.
64
 These letters are targeted at individuals 
with tax arrears and were mailed between August 12
th
 and 19
th
.
65
 All letters notify the taxpayer 
that he or she is “… among a group of taxpayers identified as having outstanding income tax 
liabilities” and urge taxpayers to “… pay all outstanding income tax liabilities” if they have not 
already done so.
66
 The salient message sent to those assigned to T2 is similar to T1 from sub-
experiment one – but targets payment of tax arrears. 
Standard Public Goods Message (stndPG) - Treatment Two (T2): 
“Paying your taxes provide the funding necessary to pay for important public services such as 
health care, education, national security and other important services. If all self-employed 
individuals pay their income tax liabilities in full, this could provide funding to significantly 
increase spending in these important areas”. 
Those assigned to T3 received a similar message, with the experimental variation coming 
from the inclusion of a sentence that provides information about the actual allocation of public 
                                                          
64
 Individuals selected for sub-experiment one were not included in this sub-experiment. 
65
 The length of time taken to mail these letters was as a result of a ‘breakdown’ in the machine used to stamp and 
mark the envelopes in which the letters were to be sent. About half of the letters sent in the sub-experiment had be 
sent to the central post office for stamping before being mailed off which resulted in some delays.  
66
 TAJ was careful in not stating how much the taxpayer owed since there may be questions about the accuracy of 
the figure due to system updating issues for example.  
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spending in the important areas of health, education and national security during the previous 
year.
67
 The salient message sent to individuals in T3 reads:
68
 
Augmented Public Goods Message (augmPG) - Treatment Three (T3): 
“Paying your taxes provide the funding necessary to pay for important public services such as 
health care, education, national security and other important services. Last year the Government 
spent approximately J$54 billion on health, J$90 billion on education and J$57 billion on 
national security.  If all self-employed individuals pay their income tax liabilities in full, this 
could provide funding to significantly increase spending in these important areas.” 
The sample of individuals (n = 13,695) used in this sub-experiment are those with 
outstanding income tax liabilities on record of over J$20,000 but less than J$50 million.
69
 
Individuals meeting these criteria were randomly selected into the respective treatment and 
control groups. About 2,882 individuals were selected in treatment group (T2), 2,854 into 
treatment group (T3) and 7,959 were assigned to the control group.  
Randomization Balance 
To assess the validity of the experimental design we examine the balance of key taxpayer 
characteristics across the treatment and control groups for sub-experiments one and two. These 
characteristics include declared statutory income, amount of PIT arrears, risk rating (assigned by 
TAJ), whether the taxpayer has an email address on file, gender, marital status and age. Table 14 
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 The information on government spending in the various areas are factual and are published in the estimates of 
expenditure accompanying the budget for the current fiscal year 2016/2017. 
68
 Figures C.3 and C.4 in the Appendix show the complete text for the letters sent to taxpayers in T2 and T3. 
69
 The cutoff of J$20,000 was chosen arbitrarily, but represents a non-trivial amount for the tax administration. We 
restrict the sample to tax arrears less than J$50 million to mitigate potential bias from taxpayers located in the 
extreme tails of the distribution of tax arrears. 
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shows the mean covariate balance across the treatment and control group for sub- experiment 
one. Column 3 shows the difference between mean values of key taxpayer characteristics. The p 
values in column 4 suggests that relative to the control group, taxpayers in the treatment group 
are less likely to have an email address on file (p= 0.027), but are balanced across all other 
characteristics.  
Table 14: Covariate Balance for Sub-experiment One 
 
Notes:  Table shows the mean covariate balance for key taxpayer characteristics for sub-experiment one. Column 3 
shows the difference in means for the treatment and control group and column 5 gives the associated p-values from 
the standard Wald test. 
Covariate balance across the treatment and control groups for sub-experiment two is 
reported in Table 14. Columns 4 and 6 show the difference in means between the control group 
and T2 and T3, respectively.  Relative to the control group, taxpayers in T2 are younger (p = 
0.08) and taxpayers in T3 are more likely to be female (p = 0.05), but are balance across all other 
characteristics. Comparing the two treatments, taxpayers in T3 are younger relative to those in 
T2. We control for any imbalance in taxpayer characteristics by including them as covariates in 
our regression model. Notably however, the samples are balanced across all other 
characteristics.
70
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 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution for the continuous control variables reinforce the mean 
comparison in all cases except when comparing PIT arrears in T2 with the control group, in sub-experiment two. 
Treatment (T1) Control (T1) T1 - C1 P- value
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Statutory Income (J$ millions) 3.652 3.906 -0.254 0.326
Email 0.304 0.343 -0.039 0.027
Male 0.613 0.590 0.023 0.213
Single 0.500 0.474 0.026 0.248
Risk Rating 1.695 1.706 -0.011 0.568
Age 51.449 50.797 0.652 0.222
Observations 2,439 929
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Table 15: Covariate Balance for Sub-experiment Two 
 
Notes:  Table shows the mean covariate balance for key taxpayer characteristics for sub-experiment two. Columns 4 
and 6 show the difference in means between the control group and the standard and augmented public goods 
treatment groups respectively. Columns 5 and 7 give the associated p-values from the standard Wald test. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
We examine payment compliance effects along an extensive and intensive margin, for 
both sub-experiments. We estimate the extensive margin treatment effects using the following 
probit model. 
(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦𝑖=1 |𝑇; 𝑋𝑖) =  𝜙 (𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽2 + 𝜖𝑖)   (15) 
For sub-experiment one, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable set equal to one if the 
taxpayer made her third or fourth quarter payment by the stipulated deadline. For experiment 
two, the dependent variable equals one if the taxpayer paid any portion of his tax arrears by 
December 31 – roughly nineteen weeks after the estimated delivery date for the last batch of 
letters.  
Next we estimate the treatment effects for the continuous outcomes. Our continuous 
outcome variable from sub-experiment one is the amount of PIT paid in the third and fourth 
quarter. In sub-experiment two we examine the effects on the amount of PIT arrears paid. Our 
baseline estimates are done using the following ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Covariates Treatment (T2) Treatment (T3) Control (C2) T2 - C2 p(value) T3 - C2 p(value) T2- T3 p(value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Income Tax Arrears J$ 239,309.00 272,517.60 247,203.50 -7,894.50 0.77 25,314.10 0.40 -33,208.60 0.32
Statutory Income J$ 26,942.00 27,874.07 23,330.95 3,611.05 0.35 4,543.12 0.21 -932.07 0.57
Email 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.66 0.01 0.13
Male 0.74 0.71 0.73 0.00 0.75 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06
Single 0.67 0.68 0.69 -0.02 0.08 0.00 0.79 -0.02 0.22
Risk Rating 1.87 1.87 1.87 0.00 0.77 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.81
Age 48.20 48.05 48.22 -0.02 0.93 -0.17 0.52 0.15 0.64
Observations 2,882.00 2,854.00 7,959.00
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𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽2 +  𝜖𝑖     (16) 
The treatment indicators (𝑇) correspond to the respective pubic goods messages sent to 
individuals in each sub-experiment and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of controls which include declared 
statutory income, PIT arrears, risk rating (assigned by TAJ), whether the taxpayer has an email 
address on file, gender, marital status and age. 
Results 
Sub-experiment One 
We begin by estimating treatment effects for payment of third and fourth quarter 
obligations for tax year 2016. Figure 7 shows the payment rate for taxpayers in the treatment and 
control group for each quarter.
71
 Payment rates are low in the first quarter, increase sharply in the 
second and levels off in the third and fourth quarters. In general the payment rates for the 
treatment and control group are similar pre and post treatment. – suggesting the treatment had no 
effect. Figure 8 shows average quarterly PIT payments for the treatment and control group 
before and after treatment. Average quarterly PIT payments for the treatment group are always 
larger than the control, with the largest differences showing up in the second and third quarters, 
with some convergence by the fourth quarter.
72
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 The payment data does not link PIT paid to a specific quarter, but rather payments are linked to the year of 
assessment. The data however does provide a payment date and we assume that payments received within a 
particular quarter are intended for that quarter’s liabilities. 
72
 The pre-treatment difference between the treatment and control groups are not statistically significant.  
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Figure 7: PIT Payment Rates by Quarter 
 
Notes: Figure shows PIT payment rates for each quarter in tax year 2016. Quarterly payments are due March 15, 
June 15, September 15 and December 15 of the tax year. The payment rate captures the proportion of sampled 
taxpayers in the treatment and control groups that made a payment during each quarter. Payments data are not 
specific to the quarter and so in calculating the payment rate we assume that payments made within a particular 
quarter are intended for that quarter. 
Figure 8: Average PIT Payment by Quarter 
 
Notes: Figure shows average PIT payments (J$) for the treatment and control group for each quarter in tax year 
2016. Quarterly payments are due March 15, June 15, September 15 and December 15 of the tax year. Payments 
data are not specific to the quarter and so we assume that payments received within a particular quarter are intended 
for that quarter. 
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Table 16 reports estimates for the probability of third (columns 1-4) and fourth (columns 
5-8) quarter payments. Results from both probit and linear probability models indicate positive 
but statistically insignificant effects in the third quarter and negative but insignificant effects in 
the fourth quarter. Results are robust to the inclusion of controls and alterative specifications of 
the underlying regression.  
Table 16: Probability of Making Quarterly PIT Payments 
 
Notes: Columns 1-4 in the table present estimates of the probability of making third quarter payments (September, 
15) from linear probability and probit models and columns 5-8 present estimates for the fourth (December, 15) 
quarter. Coefficient estimates from probit regressions give the marginal effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 17 present results for the amount of PIT paid in each quarter. We present results 
from OLS regressions of the treatment on the outcome variable – in levels, as well for an 
appropriate transformation of the outcome variable. Because the outcome variable, the amount of 
PIT paid, is ‘zero-inflated’, we present estimates of the treatment effects using an inverse 
hyperbolic sign (IHS) transformation. The IHS is an alternative to the log transformation, with 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public Goods 0.0110 0.0149 .0110707  0.0162 -0.00543 -0.00111 -0.0054 -0.0004
(0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0175)
Risk Rating -0.127*** -0.1285*** -0.0716*** -0.0722***
(0.0163) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0159)
Age 0.00134** 0.0014** 0.000238 0.00031
(0.000665) (0.0007) (0.000677) (0.0007)
Single -0.0266 -0.0283 -0.0213 -0.0218
(0.0182) (0.0190) (0.0184) (0.0190)
Male 0.0279* 0.0293* 0.0248 0.0256
(0.0158) (0.0165) (0.0160) (0.0164)
Email 0.187*** 0.1842*** 0.159*** 0.1550***
(0.0174) (0.0167) (0.0174) (0.0165)
Constant 0.284*** 0.365*** 0.290*** 0.340***
(0.0148) (0.0507) (0.0149) (0.0508)
Observations 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368
LPM Probit 
Probability of Payment - Fourth Quarter
LPM Probit 
Probability of Payment - Third Quarter
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the advantage that it is well defined over zero.
73
 Columns 1-4 and 5-8 give results for PIT 
payments for the third and fourth quarters respectively. Similar to the extensive margin effects 
above, the treatment effects are statistically insignificant in both specifications for both quarters. 
Table 17: Amount of Quarterly PIT Paid 
 
Notes: Columns 1-4 and 5-6 in the table present estimates for the amounts of PIT arrears paid and its inverse 
hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation, for the third and fourth quarters respectively. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
Sub-experiment Two 
Figure 9 graphs the cumulative payment rate for PIT arrears, six weeks pre-treatment and 
nineteen weeks post treatment.
74
 Pre-treatment payment rates are roughly the same for the 
treatment and control groups. The figure shows a small divergence between the control and 
treatment groups one week prior to the estimated delivery date for the last batch of letters. This is 
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 The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS) takes the form 𝑠𝑖𝑛−1(𝑦) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦 + (𝑦2 + 1)1/2). See 
Burbidge et. al. (1988) for a more detailed discussion on the IHS transformation.  
74
 The estimated delivery date for the last batch of letters for sub experiment two is August 26. The pre-treatment 
period runs from the date that the initial data were pulled (July 18) to the date of delivery of the last batch of letters 
(August 26). The post treatment period runs from the estimated delivery date to December 31, when payments data 
were provided. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Public Goods (stndPG) 6,662 5,916 0.102 0.144 1,989 1,036 -0.0842 -0.0382
(7,493) (7,334) (0.210) (0.205) (8,062) (7,917) (0.210) (0.206)
Risk Rating -30,734*** -1.536*** -22,827** -0.922***
(10,357) (0.199) (11,384) (0.199)
Age 819.5*** 0.0181** 446.8* 0.00613
(263.7) (0.00795) (252.6) (0.00808)
Single -4,817 -0.335 -12,455 -0.288
(8,356) (0.219) (8,140) (0.221)
Male 17,533** 0.409** 19,721** 0.373*
(8,199) (0.188) (8,240) (0.190)
Email 17,173** 2.204*** 9,253 1.885***
(7,354) (0.209) (7,416) (0.209)
PIT Arrears -2.281*** -1.71e-06 -2.280*** 3.01e-05
(0.419) (2.86e-05) (0.458) (2.98e-05)
Constant 49,817*** 48,378* 3.399*** 4.263*** 54,450*** 63,499** 3.446*** 3.955***
(5,322) (25,875) (0.179) (0.607) (6,145) (26,431) (0.179) (0.609)
Observations 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368
Third Quarter Fourth Quarter
Amount Paid IHS TransAmount Paid IHS Trans
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likely due to treatment effects from letters sent in the first batch which would have been 
delivered to some taxpayers one week prior to the estimated delivery of the last batch of letters.  
In the week immediately after delivery of the last batch of letters, there is a noticeable increase in 
the payment rate for both treatment groups, relative to the control group. This difference 
increases progressively from the second week onward – suggesting material treatment effects. 
Notably however, payment rates for the standard and augmented public goods treatments are not 
statistically different, suggesting non-differential effects from having knowledge of public 
spending allocations. 
Figure 9: Payment Rate for PIT Arrears 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative payment rate for PIT arrears, 6 weeks before and 19 weeks after the estimated 
delivery date for the last batch of letters. The shorter pre-treatment period captures the time frame between the date 
of data extraction by TAJ and the estimated date of delivery of the last batch of letters. Payment rates are calculated 
as the cumulative share of persons in the respective groups that made a payment by each of the weeks highlighted. 
The red dashed line indicates the estimated date of delivery for the last batch of letters – experiment start date.  
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Figure 10 plots the cumulative average payments of PIT arrears for the treatment and 
control groups. Cumulative average PIT payments for the treatment and control groups are 
roughly the same for each of the six weeks prior to the start of the experiment– indicated by the 
dashed red line. Relative to the control group, cumulative payments for both treatment groups 
begin to pick up in the first week post-treatment. The gap between the control and treatment 
groups continues to widen through week ten before stabilizing. In general the non-parametric 
estimates suggest that both public goods messages resulted in an increase in the average amount 
of PIT paid relative to the control group, and that the increase took place gradually over time, 
then slowed during the latter weeks. As in the analysis of payment rates above, the treatment 
effects for the standard and augmented public goods messages are not statistically different. 
Figure 10: Cumulative Payment for PIT Arrears per Person 
 
Notes: The figure shows cumulative average payment of PIT arrears per person for the treatment and control groups 
6 weeks prior and 19 weeks after the estimated delivery date for the last batch of letters. The red dashed line 
indicates the estimated date of delivery for the last batch of letters – the experiment start date. Relative to the control 
group, average cumulative payments post treatment are higher for both treatment groups. However average 
cumulative payments rates do not differ across the two treatments. 
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We supplement the graphical analysis with more robust estimates from equations (15) 
and (16). We examine taxpayer’s response at roughly nineteen weeks post treatment. Table 18 
present results for the probability of payment of PIT arrears – an extensive margin response. 
LPM results (column 1) suggest that the standard and augmented public goods messages 
increased the probability of payment by 2.7 and 2.4 percentage points respectively. Probit results 
are similar, and indicate a 2.6 and 2.3 (column 3) percentage point increase in payment from the 
standard and augmented public goods messages respectively. Results are robust to the inclusion 
of controls. 
Table 18: Effect of Public Goods Messages on Probability of Payment of PIT Arrears 
 
Notes: Table presents results for the effect of the standard and augmented public goods message on the probability 
of payment of PIT arrears after 19 weeks. Columns 1-2 present results from LPM estimates and columns 3-4 present 
results from probit regressions (marginal effects). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Goods 0.0265*** 0.0249*** 0.0258*** 0.0237***
(0.00630) (0.00622) (0.0058) (0.0057)
Public Goods & Spending Information 0.0236*** 0.0238*** 0.0233*** 0.0230***
(0.00626) (0.00618) (0.0059) (0.0058)
Risk 0.0195*** 0.0186***
(0.00661) (0.0068)
Age -0.000210 -0.0003
(0.000217) (0.0002)
Single -0.0206*** -0.0200***
(0.00594) (0.0056)
Male -0.00269 -0.0023
(0.00547) (0.0053)
Email 0.202*** 0.1229***
(0.0199) (0.0091)
PIT Arrears -6.68e-10 -7.15e-10
(1.42e-09) 1.32e-09
Constant 0.0731*** 0.0556***
(0.00292) (0.0188)
Observations 13,695 13,694 13,695 13,694
Wald (T1 = T2) p-value 0.7142 0.8907 0.7142 0.9151
Probability of Payment
LPM Probit 
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Table 19 summarizes results for the amount of PIT arrears paid – an intensive margin 
response. Results in column 1 indicate that the standard public good message increase the 
amount of PIT arrears paid by J$2, 590 (US$20). Point estimates for the augmented public goods 
message are qualitatively similar but are not statistically significant. Results are robust to the 
inclusion of controls (column 2). Similar to sub-experiment one we present alternative estimates 
of the treatment effects using the IHS transformation of the outcome variable. Results in column 
3-4 indicate that relative to the control group, the standard and augmented public goods 
messages increase payment of PIT arrears by 29 and 25 percent respectively.  
Table 19: Effect of Public Goods Messages on Payment of PIT Arrears 
 
Notes: Table presents results for the effect of the standard and augmented public goods messages on payment of PIT 
arrears after 19 weeks. Columns 1-2 present results for the amount of PIT arrears paid and columns 3-4 present 
results for the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of the amounts paid. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Goods (stndPG) 2,836* 2,590* 0.290*** 0.271***
(1,526) (1,515) (0.0699) (0.0688)
Public Goods & Spending Info (augmPG) 2,267 2,166 0.245*** 0.247***
(1,734) (1,720) (0.0690) (0.0682)
Risk 4,751*** 0.253***
(1,614) (0.0738)
Age 26.32 -0.00162
(64.19) (0.00241)
Single -6,203*** -0.257***
(1,564) (0.0663)
Male -2,173 -0.0318
(1,490) (0.0609)
Email 28,045*** 2.343***
(5,732) (0.232)
PIT Arrears 0.00384*** 7.62e-09
(0.00139) (1.93e-08)
Constant 6,472*** 194.3 0.803*** 0.521**
(654.9) (4,807) (0.0324) (0.210)
Observations 13,695 13,694 13,695 13,694
Wald (stndPG = augmPG) p-value 0.7879 0.8396 0.6043 0.7784
Payment of PIT Arrears
Amount Paid IHS Transformation
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Relative to the standard public goods message, including information about public 
spending allocation does not have a differential effect on compliance. This is true for all 
outcomes examined and holds across different estimation strategies. This might suggest that self-
employed individuals in Jamaica are less sensitive to public spending allocation decisions, but 
rather may be content with government’s financing of general public services. Another potential 
explanation for this result is that the treatment may not have been strong enough to isolate the 
significance of spending in any one area, thus mitigating potentially positive compliance effects 
from increased transparency or taxpayer agency. 
Effect of Treatment on the Treated (TOT) for Sub-experiment One and Two 
The above estimates give the intent to treat (ITT) effect of the messages. These are 
arguably lower bound since they estimate compliance effects for taxpayers selected to receive a 
particular treatment without regard for whether they were actually treated. Because letters sent 
by the tax authority have a less than perfect delivery rate, we refine the baseline estimates above 
by accounting for undelivered mailings. We estimate the effect of treatment on the treated (TOT) 
using a two stage least squares (2SLS) approach. In the first stage we estimate the likelihood of 
actually receiving a letter conditional on being selected for treatment, and use the fitted values 
from the first stage to estimate the TOT effect in the second stage.  
Tables 20 and 21 present TOT estimates for sub-experiments one and two respectively. 
As in the baseline, all the outcomes examined in sub-experiment one are statistically 
insignificant. Results for sub-experiment two indicate that relative to the control group the 
standard and augmented public goods message increase the probability of payment by 3.5 and 
3.2 percentage points respectively (column 1). The standard public goods message increase the 
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amount of PIT arrears paid by J$3,781 (US$29) (column 3), but again the effect of the 
augmented message though positive is statistically insignificant. Results from the IHS 
transformation indicate increases of about 39 and 33 percent for the standard and augmented 
public goods messages respectively (column 5). The TOT estimates are slightly larger than the 
ITT estimates above and arguably more accurately capture the treatment effects.  
Table 20: TOT Effect of Public Goods Message on Quarterly PIT Payment 
 
Notes: Table summarizes treatment on the treated (TOT) estimates from 2SLS IV regressions, for the full model 
which includes controls. Columns 1-3 report results for the third quarter and gives results for the probability of 
payment (LPM), the amount paid and the IHS of the amounts paid. Columns 4-6 report results for the same 
outcomes for the fourth quarter. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Payment Prob Amount Paid IHS Trans Payment Prob Amount Paid IHS Trans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public Goods (stndPG) 0.0167 6,593 0.160 -0.00117 1,155 0.160
(0.0189) (8,163) (0.228) (0.0191) (8,812) (0.228)
Risk Rating -0.128*** -30,743*** -1.536*** -0.0750*** -22,829** -1.536***
(0.0163) (10,346) (0.198) (0.0163) (11,373) (0.198)
Age 0.00130* 804.5*** 0.0177** 0.000249 444.1* 0.0177**
(0.000665) (261.8) (0.00795) (0.000677) (255.4) (0.00795)
Single -0.0267 -4,804 -0.335 -0.0216 -12,452 -0.335
(0.0182) (8,344) (0.219) (0.0184) (8,128) (0.219)
Male 0.0278* 17,484** 0.408** 0.0250 19,713** 0.408**
(0.0158) (8,191) (0.188) (0.0159) (8,222) (0.188)
Email 0.187*** 17,185** 2.204*** 0.160*** 9,255 2.204***
(0.0174) (7,343) (0.208) (0.0174) (7,404) (0.208)
PIT Arrears 1.34e-06 -2.266*** -1.32e-06 4.18e-06 -2.277*** -1.32e-06
(2.53e-06) (0.417) (2.85e-05) (2.65e-06) (0.456) (2.85e-05)
Constant 0.368*** 49,161* 4.282*** 0.342*** 63,636** 4.282***
(0.0501) (25,899) (0.599) (0.0502) (26,434) (0.599)
Observations 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368
Third Quarter Fourth Quarter
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Table 21: TOT Effect of Public Goods Message on Payment of PIT Arrears 
 
Notes: Table summarizes treatment on the treated (TOT) estimates from 2SLS IV regressions. Columns 1-2 report 
results on the probability of payment from linear probability models (LPM), columns 3-4 present results for the 
amount of PIT arrears paid in levels and columns 5-6 present results for the IHS transformation of the amounts paid. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
  
Robustness and Heterogeneity 
In addition to conditioning on taxpayer characteristics we conduct two additional 
sensitivity tests for sub-experiment two.
75
 We do this by examining treatment effects overtime 
and by varying the ‘start date’ of the experiment and running a placebo test. Whether treatment 
effects are contemporaneous, whether they take hold over time or whether they dissipate over 
time is important for the tax administration. We examine variation in ‘short term’ treatment 
effects for the standard and augmented public good messages from sub-experiment two in Figure 
11.  
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 Sensitivity tests for sub-experiment one confirm the null results from the baseline.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public Goods (stndPG) 0.0353*** 0.0332*** 3,781* 3,454* 0.386*** 0.362***
(0.00838) (0.00828) (2,034) (2,019) (0.0930) (0.0916)
Public Goods & Spending Info (augmPG) 0.0318*** 0.0321*** 3,059 2,923 0.330*** 0.334***
(0.00843) (0.00833) (2,339) (2,320) (0.0930) (0.0919)
Risk 0.0204*** 4,836*** 0.262***
(0.00660) (1,609) (0.0737)
Age -0.000250 22.50 -0.00204
(0.000216) (64.50) (0.00240)
Single -0.0202*** -6,158*** -0.252***
(0.00593) (1,566) (0.0662)
Male -0.00220 -2,127 -0.0267
(0.00547) (1,499) (0.0609)
Email 0.201*** 27,904*** 2.327***
(0.0198) (5,741) (0.231)
PIT Arrears -8.69e-10 0.00382*** 5.49e-09
(1.41e-09) (0.00138) (1.92e-08)
Constant 0.0731*** 0.0553*** 6,472*** 165.6 0.803*** 0.518**
(0.00292) (0.0188) (654.8) (4,804) (0.0324) (0.209)
Observations 13,695 13,694 13,695 13,694 13,695 13,694
Wald (T1 = T2) p-value 0.7430 0.9203 0.7993 0.8502 0.6301 0.8060
Prob of Payment IHS TransformationAmount Paid
Amount of IIT Arrears Paid
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Figure 11: Coefficient Estimates of Treatment Effects over Time 
 
Notes: Figures plot point estimates of treatment effects (TOT), with confidence intervals. The outcome variables are 
the payment rate, amount of PIT arrears paid and an IHS transformation of the amount paid. The outcome variables 
capture the cumulative payments by week from, week 1 to 19. Figures A – C show TOT effects from the standard 
public goods message (stndPG) and Figures D – F show TOT effects from the augmented public goods message 
(augmPG) for the same set of outcomes. All, except the coefficient on the amount of PIT arrears paid from the 
augmPG message are statistically significant starting from week 4 onwards.  
 
Payment rates increase more sharply over the first 6 to 10 weeks post treatment and then 
stabilize over the ensuing weeks. The amount of PIT arrears paid follows a similar, but less 
distinct pattern. Point estimates from the IHS transformation show similar patterns, except we 
see a spike in the second week post treatment. This may be explained by a huge inflow of 
payments from both treatment groups relative to the control group by the second week post 
treatment, which was never replicated during the ensuing weeks. In general the sign and 
trajectory of the point estimates for the outcomes we examine are consistent with robust 
treatment effects over the post treatment period. 
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As an additional robustness test we examine treatment effects based on a placebo 
experiment start date, 6 weeks before the actual start date of the experiment, and examine 
compliance outcomes by the actual start date.
76
 We compare these results with estimates of 
treatment effects 6 weeks after the actual start date. If the compliance outcomes identified above 
are due to the actual treatments, then the results from the placebo test should show null effects. 
The results in Table 22 confirms this, showing null treatment effects for all outcomes examined 6 
weeks prior to the actual start date of the experiment, but positive and statistically significant 
effects for the payment rate and the IHS transformation 6 weeks after the actual start date, further 
validating our baseline results.  
Table 22: Placebo Test – Payment of PIT Arrears Six Weeks Before and After Experiment 
 
Notes: Table presents estimates of compliance effects six (6) weeks before and after the experimental start date, for 
comparison purposes. Columns 1-3 show null effects for all outcomes in the pre -treatment period but positive and 
statically significant effects on payment probability and the IHS transformed variable in the post treatment period. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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 We do not have data on PIT arrears prior to the July 18, 2016 – when the initial data were provided, and so are 
unable to run the placebo test for a longer pre-treatment period. 
Payment Prob Amount IHS Payment Prob Amount IHS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public Goods 0.00681 -1,893 0.0699 0.0225*** 2,142 0.241***
(0.00513) (2,175) (0.0556) (0.00607) (1,353) (0.0657)
Public Goods & Spending Information 0.00489 -1,868 0.0531 0.0275*** 1,471 0.284***
(0.00512) (2,211) (0.0559) (0.00628) (1,149) (0.0676)
Risk 0.0147*** 2,333*** 0.175*** 0.00930* 1,429 0.121**
(0.00394) (695.8) (0.0420) (0.00492) (1,007) (0.0540)
Age 3.49e-05 -49.76 0.000551 2.55e-05 19.14 0.000695
(0.000138) (63.62) (0.00152) (0.000163) (35.18) (0.00176)
Single -0.00671* -1,013** -0.0862** -0.00588 -3,398*** -0.0883*
(0.00378) (500.4) (0.0411) (0.00427) (814.7) (0.0468)
Male 0.00250 1,408 0.0297 -0.00446 -608.8 -0.0501
(0.00337) (1,142) (0.0368) (0.00405) (911.3) (0.0441)
Email 0.110*** 7,755*** 1.235*** 0.121*** 11,442*** 1.384***
(0.0152) (2,055) (0.172) (0.0162) (3,539) (0.185)
PIT Arrears 1.57e-09 0.00115** 2.54e-08 9.12e-10 0.00188** 2.23e-08
(1.41e-09) (0.000509) (1.72e-08) (1.22e-09) (0.000731) (1.68e-08)
Constant -0.00159 529.1 -0.0529 0.0180 678.0 0.146
(0.0112) (2,781) (0.120) (0.0142) (2,657) (0.155)
Observations 13,694 13,694 13,694 13,694 13,694 13,694
Wald (T1 = T2) p-value 0.7608 0.9742 0.8062 0.5228 0.6817 0.6128
Six Weeks Prior to Treatment Six Weeks Post Treatment 
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If messages impact taxpayers differentially, and given that such communication strategies 
can be costly to the tax administration, efficiency dictates that communications target taxpayers 
who are most likely to respond. We examine heterogeneity in treatment effect by age and level 
of tax arrears. There is some evidence that younger taxpayers are less compliant (Andreoni, Erard 
& Feinstein, 1998). Several hypotheses have been proffered to explain the relative non-compliance of 
youngsters, and include lack of tax knowledge, perception that paying taxes offer no benefit, more 
risk loving and rebellious.
77
The tendency for older taxpayers to be more compliant is explained 
by an “ageing out effect”. Larger tax debtors are also believed to be less likely to comply – since 
larger debt stock implies a penchant for non-compliant behavior.  
Table 23 presents results for taxpayers below and above 35 years old.
78
 Younger 
taxpayers did not respond to either treatment (columns 1-3) and that the positive compliance 
effects are driven by older taxpayers. The standard and augmented public goods messages 
increase the probability of payment by 3.9 and 3.2 percentage points (column 4), and the amount 
of PIT arrears paid by 43 and 34 percent (column 6) respectively. Only the standard public goods 
message had a significant effect, increasing the amount of PIT arrears paid, by J$3, 951 (US$31) 
(column 5).  
 
 
 
                                                          
77
 See Braithwaite, Smart and Reinhardt (2006) for a discussion on the age related determinants of tax compliance. 
78
 The age cut off captures the population cohort labeled as ‘millennials’. In general the results are similar if we use 
the median age as the cut-off. 
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Table 23: Impact of Public Goods Messages on Payment of PIT Arrears by Age Cohort 
 
Notes: Table presents results for payment compliance outcomes by age cohort. Columns 1-3 present results for 
taxpayers 35 years or younger and columns 4-6 present results for taxpayers older than 35 years. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 24 summarizes results for taxpayers with high and low PIT arrears.
79
 Columns 1 – 
3 present results for taxpayers with low PIT arrears and suggest that the standard and augmented 
public goods messages increase payment probability by 2.4 and 3.4 percentage points 
respectively. Results using the IHS transformation of the outcome variable indicate an increase 
in PIT paid by 25 and 35 percent respectively. However, results for the levels regression indicate 
an increase of J$1, 328 (US$10) from the augmented public goods message only. Results in 
columns 4 – 6 indicate positive compliance effects for the probability of payment and the IHS 
transformation, for the standard pubic good message only.  
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 We define low PIT arrears as being at or below J$86, 046, and high as amounts in excess of this threshold. The 
cut off corresponds with the 75
th
 percentile of the PIT arrears distribution.  
Prob of Paying Amount Paid IHS Transformation Prob of Paying Amount Paid IHS Transformation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public Goods (stndPG) -0.00495 264.5 -0.0565 0.0390*** 3,951* 0.426***
(0.0220) (1,912) (0.239) (0.00893) (2,314) (0.0991)
Public Goods & Spending Info (augmPG) 0.0274 12,554 0.267 0.0323*** 1,293 0.338***
(0.0245) (10,250) (0.265) (0.00882) (2,102) (0.0977)
Risk -0.00673 4,445 -0.0604 0.0227*** 4,790*** 0.290***
(0.0227) (3,273) (0.254) (0.00688) (1,763) (0.0768)
Age -0.00120 -913.4 -0.00810 -0.000192 50.14 -0.00122
(0.00221) (1,303) (0.0241) (0.000257) (71.80) (0.00288)
Single 0.00738 -131.4 0.0615 -0.0208*** -6,243*** -0.260***
(0.0298) (3,207) (0.332) (0.00607) (1,624) (0.0677)
Male -0.0131 -235.0 -0.156 -0.00118 -2,635 -0.0139
(0.0152) (2,933) (0.166) (0.00589) (1,681) (0.0658)
Email 0.105** 14,369* 1.262** 0.212*** 29,571*** 2.450***
(0.0524) (8,393) (0.605) (0.0213) (6,389) (0.249)
PIT Arrears 6.72e-09 0.00473 1.15e-07 -1.24e-09 0.00379*** 5.18e-10
(1.03e-08) (0.00365) (1.38e-07) (1.42e-09) (0.00142) (1.92e-08)
Constant 0.129 23,486 1.238 0.0461** -720.5 0.400*
(0.0865) (39,102) (0.960) (0.0210) (5,735) (0.234)
Observations 2,068 2,068 2,068 11,626 11,626 11,626
Wald (stndPG = augmPG) p-value 0.2540 0.2357 0.2915 0.5482 0.3388 0.4775
Age <= 35 years old Age > 35 years old 
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Table 24: Effect of Public Goods Messages on Payment of PIT Arrears, by Level of PIT Arrears 
 
Notes: Table presents results for payment compliance outcomes by level of PIT arrears. Columns 1-3 present results 
for taxpayers with PIT arrears less than or equal to the 75
th
 percentile and columns 4-6 present results for those with 
PIT arrears greater than the 75
th
 percentile. The 75
th
 percentile of the PIT arrears distribution corresponds with 
arrears of J$86,045. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Cost Benefit Analysis 
We conduct a simple cost benefit analysis to assess the effectiveness of the messaging 
campaign. We focus on sub-experiment two, since the compliance effects in sub-experiment one 
were not statistically significant. Table C.2 highlight the main costs of the experiment, which 
include the cost of materials (paper, envelopes, toner, ink and glue), postage and labor. The total 
cost for sub experiment two is estimated at J$1.2 million (US$9,302). The cost of materials and 
stamps amounted to approximately J$1.1 million (US$8,527), roughly ninety percent of total 
cost. The experiment was ‘projectized’ by TAJ and eight staff members were ‘employed’ to 
print, stack and mail letters over seven days, from August 12 – 19. Total labor costs are 
estimated at approximately J$119 thousand (US$922) or roughly ten percent of total costs. These 
are direct costs and do not take into account, for example, work done by staff to provide data 
Prob of Paying Amount Paid IHS Transformation Prob of Paying Amount Paid IHS Transformation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public Goods (stndPG) 0.0241*** 1,092 0.252** 0.0538*** 8,045 0.600***
(0.00923) (787.4) (0.0977) (0.0173) (6,800) (0.206)
Public Goods & Spending Info (augmPG) 0.0338*** 1,328* 0.345*** 0.0264 6,321 0.281
(0.00954) (775.5) (0.101) (0.0169) (8,272) (0.202)
Risk -0.00986 -385.6 -0.103 0.0816*** 15,991*** 1.005***
(0.00844) (953.8) (0.0905) (0.0109) (4,336) (0.130)
Age -0.000410* 0.591 -0.00418 -0.000357 -139.0 -0.00390
(0.000245) (22.95) (0.00263) (0.000456) (242.3) (0.00542)
Single -0.0105 -879.3 -0.115 -0.0344*** -14,947*** -0.449***
(0.00662) (682.3) (0.0710) (0.0124) (5,034) (0.147)
Male -0.00717 -1,170* -0.0872 0.0160 -4,003 0.191
(0.00609) (635.6) (0.0649) (0.0118) (5,400) (0.143)
Email 0.174*** 11,241*** 1.883*** 0.195*** 34,408*** 2.347***
(0.0271) (3,131) (0.298) (0.0293) (11,163) (0.355)
PIT Arrears -2.79e-07 0.0645*** -1.32e-06 -7.28e-09*** 0.00176 -8.03e-08***
(1.87e-07) (0.0193) (2.02e-06) (1.53e-09) (0.00131) (1.97e-08)
Constant 0.122*** 1,528 1.219*** -0.0305 4,553 -0.429
(0.0248) (2,943) (0.268) (0.0332) (15,531) (0.393)
Observations 10,272 10,272 10,272 3,422 3,422 3,422
Wald (stndPG = augmPG) p-value 0.4073 0.8180 0.4507 0.1952 0.8595 0.2047
IIT Arrears <= 75th Percentile IIT Arrears > 75th Percentile
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support or costs associated with dealing with increased call traffic to the customer care help line. 
Table C.3 gives estimates of the costs and revenue gains from the standard and augmented public 
goods treatments. Average cost per letter is estimated at approximately J$205 (US$1.60). 
Estimated costs of sending letters to taxpayers selected to receive the standard public goods 
message is approximately J$590,352 (US$4,576) and the similar costs associated for the 
augmented public goods message is approximately J$584,824 (US$4,534). 
Using our most conservative estimates, the standard public goods message increased 
payment of PIT arrears by an average of approximately J$2,590 (US$20). The total increase in 
revenue from this treatment is estimated at J$7.4 million (US$57,364); more than 12 times the 
cost of sending the standard public goods messages and about 6 times the cost of the entire sub-
experiment. The additional revenue from the standard message is less than 0.1 percent of 
outstanding PIT arrears. If we assume the effects from the standard message apply across the 
entire sample, potential revenue gains are estimated at J$35 million (US$271,317), barely 0.5 
percent of total PIT arrears. These results suggest that even though the additional revenues 
generated are not significant in nominal terms or as a share of total PIT arrears, when compared 
to the costs of sending the letters, the messages are still very cost effective. 
Conclusion 
This essay examined the effect of public goods messaging on PIT compliance with 
contemporaneous quarterly payment obligations and payment of PIT arrears. We extend the 
literature that uses messaging to elicit behavioral responses for taxpayers in developing countries 
by examining the incremental compliance effects of an augmented public goods message. The 
augmented message provided additional information to taxpayers which outlined actual spending 
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on key public services in the previous year. This was designed to improve their perception of 
transparency of government, to build trust and to induce a sense of taxpayer agency – their 
ability to influence how public resources are spent.  
The messages had no effect on quarterly payments, for which there are no penalties for 
non-compliance, but increased payment of PIT arrears. Taxpayers receiving the standard public 
goods message are more likely to make a payment and pay larger amounts of outstanding PIT 
arrears relative to the control group. In general these results are in line with findings from essay 
two, which suggests the possibility of a complementarity in the relationship between the 
enforcement strength of the taxing regime and non-pecuniary factors. Relative to the standard 
public goods message, including information about public spending allocation did not have a 
differential effect on compliance. We find some evidence of heterogeneity, with older taxpayers 
responding to both the standard and augmented public goods messages, but no effect on younger 
taxpayers. We find only limited heterogeneous effects between high and low tax debtors – low 
tax debtors respond to both messages but high debtors respond only to the standard public goods 
message. 
Our results point to the usefulness of public goods messaging to encourage payment of 
PIT arrears – an obligation that attracts penalties and interest, but also to the ineptness at 
encouraging compliance with quarterly payments – an obligation that is totally voluntary and 
attracts no penalty for non-compliance. One implication of this result is that to improve 
compliance with quarterly payments, in addition to non-pecuniary strategies, the tax 
administration should impose and enforce pecuniary penalties for non-compliance. This could 
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possibly be generalized to other instances where the tax administration is considering using non-
pecuniary measures to boost compliance in a zero enforcement environment.  
The results also provide guidance on who may be more likely to respond to these 
messages and also what variant of the message is likely to be most effective. Another important 
policy implication from our results is that messaging or communication strategies targeted at 
older cohorts may be more effective at boosting payments of tax arrears, compared to younger 
cohorts. Greater efforts are needed to engage younger cohorts in order to improve compliance. 
This may involve using new communication technologies – such as different delivery 
mechanisms and social media engagement. An alternative might be to structure compliance 
programs which target enforcement toward the young. These results are particularly useful for 
developing countries with limited resources to adequately police taxpayers. Utilizing simple and 
relatively cheap but effective communication strategies, targeted at taxpayers who are most 
likely to respond can provide a significant boost to revenues. Additionally, including these types 
of messaging in the compliance arsenal can potentially allow for more efficient deployment of 
scarce tax administration resources and can significantly boost operational efficiency within the 
tax administration.  
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation comprises three essays that examine critical aspects of fiscal policy and 
explores important determinants of tax compliance in a developing country context. We move 
from examining the fiscal response to changes in debt-to-GDP for developing countries in the 
first essay, to exploring possible determinants of tax compliance in Jamaica – a key factor that 
impacts a country’s ability to make the necessary fiscal adjustments, in essays two and three. 
These essays make significant contributions to their respective literatures. In the first 
essay we highlight an omission in the literature, where the tendency has been to focus on the 
relationship between the primary balance and debt-to-GDP in more advance economies. We 
attempt to plug this gap first by broadening this discussion to include developing countries. 
Further, we examine the relationship between a country’s debt-to-GDP and its ‘fiscal effort’ – a 
variable we argue is much more closely aligned to the fiscal policy discretion of governments. 
Next we dichotomize the fiscal reaction function (FRF) into its general revenue, tax revenue and 
primary spending components and examine each separately.  
Essays two and three examine key factors that influence tax compliance in a developing 
country context. We are the first to employ quasi-experimental and experimental approaches to 
examine the effects of taxpayer services and public goods messaging on tax compliance in an 
English speaking LAC developing country. We examine compliance for a range of outcomes, for 
different tax types and across the large, medium and small taxpayer segments. Further we vary 
the enforcement strength of the taxing regime and examine the interaction with non-pecuniary 
factors, to determine the relationship between the two.  
We find that developing countries increase their primary balance and ‘fiscal effort’ in 
response to debt and that these policy adjustments are done along both the revenue and 
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expenditure margins. We also find some suggestive evidence that countries make larger 
adjustments at higher levels of debt relative to lower levels of debt. We find more convincing 
evidence of a nonlinear response for the fiscal components. In particular, the countries examined, 
increase revenues when debt is ‘high’ but cut spending when debt is ‘low’. Tests for 
heterogeneity in fiscal response suggest that whereas higher and upper-middle income countries 
make significant adjustments along the revenue margin, low and lower-middle countries do not 
This may be suggestive of revenue mobilization challenges facing the latter. 
Low levels of tax compliance is at least one reason some developing countries find it 
difficult to grow revenues. Our results from the second and third essays suggest that non 
pecuniary factors such as the provision of tax payer services and public goods messaging can 
potentially improve compliance in developing countries. In the context of Jamaica, taxpayer 
services improved compliance among large taxpayers, for the GCT but not the CIT. Public goods 
messaging were only effective in boosting payments of PIT arrears but not for quarterly PIT 
obligations. Notably, the positive compliance effects were for outcomes where the legal 
enforcement context was stronger relative to those outcomes where enforcement was weak. This 
provides suggestive evidence of a complementarity between the relative strength of the legal 
enforcement framework of the taxing regime and non-pecuniary determinants of compliance.  
The results have important policy implications. One obvious implication of this is that 
developing countries must strengthen their revenue generating capacity in order to better sustain 
their debt. This is particularly true for countries with relatively high levels of debt. The extent to 
which countries are able to boost revenues will depend on the severity of the revenue 
mobilization challenges they face. A big part of the problem in many developing countries is 
from low levels of tax compliance.  
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Improving compliance will require the appropriate mix of enforcement and non-
pecuniary or ‘softer’ interventions. Notably however, our findings caution the adoption of a 
softer approach to tax administration that attempt to encourage compliance by leveraging tax 
moral factors in a context of major enforcement deficiencies - example weak legal framework 
and corruption. A strong(er) legal enforcement framework is required if non-pecuniary factors 
such as taxpayer service provision and appeals to reciprocity are to be effective in improving 
compliance. Further, these interventions should be targeted at segments of the taxpayer 
population who are more likely to respond. Use of fiscal intermediaries or alternative compliance 
mechanisms such as industry oversight bodies and the imposition of tax compliance 
requirements to carry out primary economic activities, can serve as potential substitutes for 
provision of taxpayer services and personalized messaging strategies. Utilizing these 
‘compliance intermediaries’ could provide a low cost solution to the already resource strapped 
tax administrations across developing countries. 
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Appendix A: Appendix for Essay One 
Table A.1: List of Countries, Income Category 
High and Upper Middle Income Countries: 
Argentina, Belarus, Belize, Brazil Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica 
Dominican Republic, Fiji, Grenada, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea (South), Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, South 
Africa, Suriname, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela 
 
Low and Lower Middle Income Countries: 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Moldova, Morocco, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri 
Lank, Uganda, Ukraine 
 
 
Notes: Country classifications done using the World Bank Analytical Classification based on the World Bank Atlas 
Method. Low income countries have per capita GNI less than or equal to $1,025; Lower-middle income countries 
between $1,206 - $4,035, upper-middle income countries between $4,036 - $12,475 and high income countries 
above $12,476.   
 
Table A.2: Source and Description of Variables 
 
Notes: Table gives a description and data sources for the variables used in the analysis. 
 
Variable Description Source
Primary Balance Consolidated central government revenue less primary expenditure IMF. GFS
Fiscal Effort
Consolidated central government tax  revenue less primary 
expenditure 
IMF. GFS
Central Govt. Revenue Consolidated central government revenues IMF. GFS
Central Govt. Tax Revenue Consolidated central government tax revenues IMF. GFS
Central Govt. Primary Spending Consolidated government primary spending IMF. GFS
General Govt. Debt / GDP One period lag of general government debt-to-GDP ratio
IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, 
Historical Public Debt Data
Output Gap Output gap calculated as deviations from the Hedrick Prescott trend World Bank, WDI
Expenditure Gap
Expenditure gap calculated as deviations from the Hedrick Prescott 
trend 
IMF, WEO
Income Tax / Total Tax Revenue
Consolidated central government total income tax revenue as a share 
of total revenue
IMF. GFS
Inflation Rate Based on the GDP deflator World Bank, WDI
Openness Sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP World Bank, WDI
Net ODI  Share in GNI Official development assistance as a share of GNI World Bank, WDI
Institutional Democracy
This index ranges from -10 to +10 ten, with the boundaries
representing weakest and strongest democracy respectively. Polity IV Data Base
IMF or Fiscal Rule
Dummy variable equal 1 if country has a fiscal rule or party to an 
IMF agreement
IMF - History of Lending Data and 
Fiscal Rule Data Bases
Agriculture Share in GDP Agriculture value added as a share of GDP World Bank, WDI
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Table A. 3: Sensitivity Analysis Primary Balance, Full Sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the primary balance expressed as a share of GDP. Results are for difference GMM 
regressions using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with the lag dependent variable 
and the lag debt/GDP assumed to be potentially endogenous. To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, 
GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. 
AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag Dependent Variable 0.559*** 0.547*** 0.542*** 0.548***
(0.0723) (0.0684) (0.0657) (0.0681)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0337*** 0.0329*** 0.0328*** 0.0318***
(0.0102) (0.00988) (0.00967) (0.00965)
Output Gap 0.0598** 0.0618** 0.0627** 0.0614**
(0.0233) (0.0247) (0.0257) (0.0257)
Expenditure Gap -0.0206 -0.0187 -0.0183 -0.0160
(0.0190) (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0197)
Inflation 0.000656** 0.000741*** 0.000799*** 0.000813***
(0.000303) (0.000278) (0.000295) (0.000299)
Trade Openness 0.00446 0.00354 0.00379 0.00761
(0.00881) (0.00881) (0.00873) (0.0101)
Share of Agriculture in GDP 0.0241 0.0260 0.0311 0.0338
(0.0455) (0.0446) (0.0440) (0.0424)
Share - Income Tax -0.0142 -0.0120 -0.0125 -0.0107
(0.0154) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0154)
Polity IV -0.000951*** -0.000927*** -0.000940*** -0.000925***
(0.000317) (0.000308) (0.000300) (0.000302)
Net ODI/GNI 0.116* 0.113* 0.111**
(0.0617) (0.0579) (0.0549)
Fiscal Rule/IMF 0.00207 0.00229
(0.00412) (0.00412)
IMF Program 0.00196
(0.00218)
Observations 588 588 588 567
Number of Countries 43 43 43 41
AR(2) (p-value) 0.261 0.245 0.243 0.136
Hansen J (p-value) 0.994 0.993 0.995 0.998
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Primary Balance
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Table A.4 Sensitivity Analysis Fiscal Effort, Full Sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the fiscal effort expressed as a share of GDP. Results are for difference GMM 
regressions using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with the lag dependent variable 
and the lag debt/GDP assumed to be potentially endogenous. To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, 
GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. 
AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag Dependent Variable 0.545*** 0.547*** 0.548*** 0.547***
(0.148) (0.148) (0.147) (0.151)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0226** 0.0234** 0.0229** 0.0223**
(0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0108) (0.0109)
Output Gap 0.0610** 0.0602** 0.0612** 0.0585**
(0.0296) (0.0289) (0.0277) (0.0268)
Expenditure Gap -0.0258 -0.0266* -0.0263* -0.0228
(0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0155)
Inflation -0.00104*** -0.00108*** -0.000979** -0.000974**
(0.000390) (0.000406) (0.000420) (0.000443)
Trade Openness 0.00493 0.00551 0.00598 0.00776
(0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0118)
Share of Agriculture in GDP 0.0774 0.0757 0.0851 0.0912
(0.0564) (0.0561) (0.0566) (0.0558)
Share - Income Tax 0.0490 0.0475 0.0464 0.0519
(0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0311) (0.0338)
Polity IV -0.000574* -0.000594* -0.000607** -0.000576*
(0.000299) (0.000306) (0.000296) (0.000297)
Net ODI/GNI -0.0707 -0.0750 -0.0765
(0.0609) (0.0584) (0.0598)
Fiscal Rule/IMF 0.00393 0.00407
(0.00427) (0.00435)
IMF Program 0.00236
(0.00241)
Observations 588 588 588 567
Number of Countries 43 43 43 41
AR(2) (p-value) 0.234 0.230 0.241 0.173
Hansen J (p-value) 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Fiscal Effort
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Table A.5: Sensitivity Analysis General Revenue, Full Sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is general revenues expressed as a share of GDP. Results are for difference GMM 
regressions using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with the lag dependent variable 
and the lag debt/GDP assumed to be potentially endogenous. To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, 
GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. 
AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag Dependent Variable 0.479*** 0.468*** 0.457*** 0.467***
(0.163) (0.159) (0.165) (0.162)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0272** 0.0247** 0.0257** 0.0229*
(0.0131) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0124)
Output Gap 0.0296 0.0277 0.0268 0.0311
(0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0339) (0.0342)
Expenditure Gap 0.0143 0.0180 0.0190 0.0153
(0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0197)
Inflation 0.000568 0.000669 0.000604 0.000640
(0.000642) (0.000626) (0.000617) (0.000599)
Trade Openness 0.0190 0.0175 0.0174 0.0223*
(0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0129)
Share of Agriculture in GDP -0.0654 -0.0553 -0.0610 -0.0577
(0.0632) (0.0608) (0.0614) (0.0600)
Share - Income Tax -0.0415 -0.0380 -0.0374 -0.0397
(0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0337) (0.0344)
Polity IV -0.000589 -0.000559 -0.000565 -0.000596
(0.000473) (0.000470) (0.000480) (0.000472)
Net ODI/GNI 0.177* 0.178* 0.163
(0.102) (0.105) (0.106)
Fiscal Rule/IMF -0.00292 -0.00223
(0.00549) (0.00561)
IMF Program 0.00239
(0.00247)
Observations 612 612 612 585
Number of Countries 43 43 43 41
AR(2) (p-value) 0.518 0.479 0.402 0.444
Hansen J (p-value) 0.980 0.999 0.999 1
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
General Revenue
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Table A.6: Sensitivity Analysis Tax Revenues, Full Sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is tax revenue expressed as a share of GDP. Results are for difference GMM regressions 
using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with the lag dependent variable and the lag 
debt/GDP assumed to be potentially endogenous. To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, GMM 
instruments are constructed using only the second lag of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. AR (2) 
diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag Dependent Variable 0.554*** 0.557*** 0.556*** 0.556***
(0.0967) (0.0964) (0.0970) (0.0878)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0143** 0.0144** 0.0145** 0.0115**
(0.00602) (0.00576) (0.00594) (0.00531)
Output Gap 0.0232 0.0230 0.0229 0.0229
(0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0217)
Expenditure Gap 0.0139 0.0135 0.0135 0.0108
(0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0186)
Inflation -0.00117** -0.00117** -0.00118** -0.00117**
(0.000485) (0.000486) (0.000494) (0.000485)
Trade Openness 0.0155** 0.0156** 0.0156** 0.0187**
(0.00761) (0.00763) (0.00757) (0.00868)
Share of Agriculture in GDP 0.00293 0.00198 0.00151 0.00740
(0.0337) (0.0352) (0.0367) (0.0349)
Share - Income Tax 0.0217 0.0212 0.0213 0.0224
(0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0166)
Polity IV -0.000136 -0.000140 -0.000140 -0.000150
(0.000324) (0.000323) (0.000324) (0.000321)
Net ODI/GNI -0.0202 -0.0201 -0.0260
(0.0628) (0.0629) (0.0613)
Fiscal Rule/IMF -0.000340 0.000111
(0.00307) (0.00309)
IMF Program 0.00200
(0.00169)
Observations 611 611 611 584
Number of Countries 43 43 43 41
AR(2) (p-value) 0.664 0.673 0.674 0.749
Hansen J (p-value) 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Tax Revenue
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Table A.7: Sensitivity Analysis Primary Spending, Full Sample 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is primary spending expressed as a share of GDP. Results are for difference GMM 
regressions using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with the lag dependent variable 
and the lag debt/GDP assumed to be potentially endogenous. To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, 
GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. 
AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lag Dependent Variable 0.596*** 0.594*** 0.588*** 0.546***
(0.105) (0.106) (0.112) (0.117)
Lag Debt/GDP -0.0163* -0.0178* -0.0172** -0.0168*
(0.00857) (0.00917) (0.00875) (0.00978)
Output Gap -0.0339 -0.0339 -0.0358 -0.0356
(0.0304) (0.0302) (0.0292) (0.0306)
Expenditure Gap 0.0286* 0.0291* 0.0289* 0.0272
(0.0166) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0170)
Inflation -6.54e-05 -1.80e-05 -0.000130 -0.000152
(0.000425) (0.000425) (0.000444) (0.000430)
Trade Openness 0.0102 0.00967 0.00927 0.0116
(0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0123)
Share of Agriculture in GDP -0.0770* -0.0749* -0.0858** -0.0918**
(0.0459) (0.0448) (0.0417) (0.0445)
Share - Income Tax -0.0265 -0.0249 -0.0237 -0.0274
(0.0282) (0.0286) (0.0280) (0.0303)
Polity IV 0.000444 0.000471 0.000489 0.000461
(0.000387) (0.000394) (0.000397) (0.000426)
Net ODI/GNI 0.0843 0.0895 0.0834
(0.0701) (0.0700) (0.0751)
Fiscal Rule/IMF -0.00435 -0.00468
(0.00454) (0.00489)
IMF Program -0.000142
(0.00195)
Observations 588 588 588 567
Number of Countries 43 43 43 41
AR(2) (p-value) 0.927 0.932 0.979 0.982
Hansen J (p-value) 1 1 1 1
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Primary Spending
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Table A.8: Response of the Primary Balance and Fiscal Effort for Sub-periods 
 
Notes: Table presents results for the primary balance and fiscal effort, expressed as a share of GDP, for the full 
sample period (1990-2011) and two sub periods 1990-2008 and 1990-2000. Results are for difference GMM 
regressions using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with the lag dependent variable 
and the lag debt/GDP assumed to be potentially endogenous. To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, 
GMM instruments are constructed using only the second lag of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. 
AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
1990-2011 1990-2008 1990-2000 1990-2011 1990-2008 1990-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.559*** 0.598*** 0.618*** 0.545*** 0.555*** 0.670***
(0.0723) (0.0712) (0.128) (0.148) (0.191) (0.168)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0337*** 0.0362*** 0.0519*** 0.0226** 0.0258** 0.0426***
(0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0131) (0.0109) (0.0122) (0.0118)
Output Gap 0.0598** 0.0465* 0.0751* 0.0610** 0.0458 0.112**
(0.0233) (0.0240) (0.0422) (0.0296) (0.0326) (0.0465)
Expenditure Gap -0.0206 -0.00672 -0.0272 -0.0258 -0.0136 -0.0264
(0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0212) (0.0160) (0.0178) (0.0220)
Inflation 0.000656** 0.000694** 0.00104*** -0.00104*** -0.00104** -0.000581
(0.000303) (0.000322) (0.000368) (0.000390) (0.000478) (0.000440)
Trade Openness 0.00446 0.00530 -0.00257 0.00493 0.00969 -0.00581
(0.00881) (0.0109) (0.0167) (0.0113) (0.0128) (0.0208)
Share of Agriculture in GDP 0.0241 0.0209 0.0735 0.0774 0.0721 0.134
(0.0455) (0.0432) (0.0784) (0.0564) (0.0559) (0.0935)
Share - Income Tax -0.0142 -0.0267 -0.0389** 0.0490 0.0388 -0.0122
(0.0154) (0.0195) (0.0165) (0.0309) (0.0338) (0.0172)
Polity IV -0.000951***-0.000857***-0.00133*** -0.000574* -0.000530* -0.00100**
(0.000317) (0.000326) (0.000471) (0.000299) (0.000308) (0.000457)
Observations 588 489 225 588 489 225
No. Countries 43 43 33 43 43 33
AR(2) (p-value) 0.261 0.668 0.127 0.234 0.700 0.390
Hansen J (p-value) 0.994 0.938 0.307 0.999 0.985 0.530
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Primary Balance Fiscal Effort
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Table A.9: Response of Total Revenue, Tax Revenue and Primary Spending for Sub-periods 
 
Notes: Table presents results for general revenues, tax revenue and primary spending, all as a share of GDP, for the full sample period (1990-2011) and two sub 
periods 1990-2008 and 1990-2000. Results are for difference GMM regressions using forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) (Arellano and Bover, 1995) with the 
lag dependent variable and the lag debt/GDP assumed to be potentially endogenous. To minimize the problem of instrument proliferation, GMM instruments are 
constructed using only the second lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. AR (2) diagnostic tests suggest no second order serial correlation in the errors. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM DGMM
1990-2011 1990-2008 1990-2000 1990-2011 1990-2008 1990-2000 1990-2011 1990-2008 1990-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Lag Dependent Variable 0.479*** 0.447** 0.630*** 0.554*** 0.607*** 0.608*** 0.685*** 0.728*** 0.751***
(0.163) (0.210) (0.208) (0.0967) (0.116) (0.193) (0.0753) (0.0810) (0.0864)
Lag Debt/GDP 0.0272** 0.0286* 0.0439** 0.0143** 0.0146** 0.0313*** -0.0127* -0.0201** -0.0215**
(0.0131) (0.0163) (0.0222) (0.00602) (0.00598) (0.00806) (0.00698) (0.00813) (0.00892)
Output Gap 0.0296 0.0415 0.0367 0.0232 0.0332 0.0671** -0.0215 0.00163 -0.0254
(0.0343) (0.0399) (0.0358) (0.0216) (0.0226) (0.0338) (0.0274) (0.0285) (0.0391)
Expenditure Gap 0.0143 0.0203 0.0194 0.0139 0.0137 0.0271 0.0291* 0.0112 0.0282
(0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0221) (0.0181) (0.0197) (0.0261) (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0250)
Inflation 0.000568 0.000705 0.000717 -0.00117** -0.00110** -0.000902** -1.79e-06 1.31e-05 -0.000136
(0.000642) (0.000694) (0.000738) (0.000485) (0.000543) (0.000401) (0.000457) (0.000503) (0.000638)
Trade Openness 0.0190 0.0161 0.0171 0.0155** 0.0144 0.00792 0.00830 0.00538 0.0205
(0.0121) (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.00761) (0.00911) (0.0130) (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0157)
Share of Agriculture in GDP -0.0654 -0.0447 -0.00407 0.00293 0.0192 0.0842 -0.0784* -0.0602 -0.0909
(0.0632) (0.0691) (0.0613) (0.0337) (0.0335) (0.0613) (0.0407) (0.0400) (0.0958)
Share - Income Tax -0.0415 -0.0467 -0.0412* 0.0217 0.0116 -0.00669 -0.0269 -0.0306 -0.00537
(0.0337) (0.0353) (0.0213) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0179) (0.0272) (0.0297) (0.0205)
Polity IV -0.000589 -0.000617 -0.000260 -0.000136 -0.000182 4.25e-05 0.000407 0.000278 0.00104***
(0.000473) (0.000496) (0.000355) (0.000324) (0.000317) (0.000328) (0.000333) (0.000351) (0.000375)
Observations 612 513 242 611 512 241 588 489 225
No. Countries 43 43 36 43 43 36 43 43 33
AR(2) (p-value) 0.518 0.386 0.332 0.664 0.505 0.467 0.892 0.257 0.202
Hansen J (p-value) 0.980 0.761 0.336 0.998 0..973 0.687 1 0.988 0.364
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Total Revenue Tax Revenue Primary Spending
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Figure A.1: Scatter of Fiscal Outcomes against Lagged debt-to-GDP, Full Sample 
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Figure A.2: Scatter of Fiscal Outcomes against Lagged debt-to-GDP for Low / Lower-middle 
Income Countries 
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Figure A.3: Scatter of Fiscal Outcomes against Lagged debt-to-GDP, High / Upper-middle 
Income Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
0 1 2 3
lgengovdebt_gdp
centgovfiscalresp1_gdpFitted values
Primary Balance
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
0 1 2 3
lgengovdebt_gdp
centgovfiscalresp2_gdpFitted values
Fiscal Effort
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
0 1 2 3
lgengovdebt_gdp
rev_gdp Fitted values
Revenue
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
0 1 2 3
lgengovdebt_gdp
tax_gdp Fitted values
Tax Revenue
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
0 1 2 3
lgengovdebt_gdp
primaryexp_gdp Fitted values
Primary Spending
114 
 
Appendix B: Appendix for Essay Two 
Table B.1: Filing Compliance for All Taxpayers, Gross Receipts J$1 million – J$1 billion 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates for filing compliance for taxpayers with reported gross receipts between J$100 
million and J$1 billion and includes taxpayers who report both positive and zero tax liability. Columns 1–2 present 
results for the CIT and columns 3-4 present results for the GCT. Results are for the optimal bandwidth (IK). 
Regressions adopt a linear specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
 
Table B.2: Filing and Payment Compliance for Taxpayers who filed or paid both CIT and GCT 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates of filing and payment compliance for taxpayers who filed and paid both CIT 
and GCT for tax years 2009 – 2012. The columns show the outcome variables: probability of filing late, number of 
days filed late, probability of paying late, number of days paid late, amount paid on time and share of reported taxes 
paid on time. All estimates are based on their respective optimal bandwidths (IK). Regressions adopt a linear 
specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
Prob Late Days Late Prob Late Days Late
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LTO 0.472 5.904 0.509 8.343
(1.719) (71.33) (0.486) (17.91)
Bandwidth (J$ millions) 229 398 101 246
Observations 1,564 4,546 7,666 21,844
Year Dummy no no no no
Controls no no no no
CIT GCT
No of Days No of Days Amount Share
Filed Late Filed Late Paid Late Paid Late Paid on Time Paod on Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - CIT Compliance
LTO -2.882 -489.0 -2.010 -1,585 -3.287 1.543
(9.585) (773.0) (2.639) (1,990) (12.92) (2.093)
IK Optimal Bandwidth (J$ Million) 240 283 295 306 480 303
749 930 726 766 1,395 756
no no no no no no
no no no no no no
Panel B - GCT Compliance
Panel B
LTO -0.255*** -3.124*** -0.231*** 307.3*** 3.845*** 0.257***
(0.0588) (1.120) (0.0636) (73.23) (0.995) (0.0726)
IK Optimal Bandwidth (J$ Million) 130 320 152 196 122 196
4,389 13,602 5,236 6,935 4,046 6,918
no no no no no no
no no no no no no
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Table B.3: GCT Filing and Payment Compliance for Financial and Non-Financial Sector 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates of filing and payment compliance for ‘financial’ and ‘non-financial’ sector 
taxpayers. Taxpayers are linked to the financial and non-financial sectors using industry codes from the tax returns. 
All results presented are for the optimal bandwidth proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). Regressions 
adopt a linear specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 
Table B.4: GCT Filing and Payment Compliance for Importers and Non-Importers 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates of filing and payment compliance for ‘importers’ and ‘non-importers’. We 
classify taxpayers as importers if their import / output ratio is greater than or equal to 20 percent receipts and 
taxpayer with a ratio less than 20 percent as non-importers. All results presented are for the optimal bandwidth 
proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). Regressions adopt a linear specification. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Filed Late Days File Late Paid Late Days Paid Late Amount Paid OT Share Paid OT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Sector Taxpayers
LTO 0.0699 42.06 0.0761 -136.8 -53.57 -1.100
(0.0670) (122.8) (0.105) (200.3) (61.00) (1.047)
Observations 712 1,176 814 1,888 1,014 835
Year Dummy no no no no no no
Controls no no no no no no
Non Finacial Taxpayers
LTO -0.172** -15.34*** -0.145* -258.1*** 2.398*** 0.157*
(0.0694) (5.748) (0.0758) (51.48) (0.545) (0.0908)
Observations 5,314 11,614 6,877 23,805 9336 7,246
Year Dummy no no no no no no
Controls no no no no no no
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 125 235 156 361 207 166
Filed Late Days File Late Paid Late Days Paid Late Amount Paid OT Share Paid OT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Importers
LTO -0.227 -0.732 -0.102 106.4 3.897 -1.730
(0.790) (1.535) (0.600) (99.82) (4.629) (4.162)
Observations 1,049 2,250 1,341 4,143 1,799 1,408
Year Dummy no no no no no no
Controls no no no no no no
Non-Importers
LTO -0.228** -14.50** -0.208*** -274.7*** 4.343*** 0.312**
(0.0900) (5.775) (0.0718) (52.14) (0.806) (0.134)
Observations 4,977 10,540 6,347 21,550 8,551 6,673
Year Dummy no no no no no no
Controls no no no no no no
Bandwidth (J$ Millions) 125 235 156 361 207 166
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Figure B.1: Annual Estimated Penalty and Interest for Unpaid Tax Liability for CIT and GCT 
 
Notes: Figure shows estimated penalty and interest (y axis) for unpaid and unfiled taxes (x axis) for the CIT and 
GCT, for a 12 month period. Estimates are based on the statutory penalty and interest rates for the respective taxes. 
Estimates do not include surcharges or any additional charge that taxpayers may incur and thus represents a lower 
bound estimate  
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Figure B.2: Filing and Payment Compliance Patterns for Large Taxpayers 
Panel A: CIT and GCT Filing and Payment Coplaince Rates  
  
Notes: Figure shows filing and payment compliance for taxpayers with reported gross receipts between J$500 
million and J$1 billion who filed or paid both CIT and GCT for tax years 2009 – 2012. Column (1) shows the rate of 
late filing and payment for the CIT and GCT. Column (2) shows the number of days late that CIT and GCT is filed 
and paid.  
Panel B: CIT and GCT Payments 
 
Notes: Figure shows payment compliance for taxpayers with reported gross receipts between J$500 million and J$1 
billion who filed or paid both CIT and GCT for tax years 2009 – 2012. Column (1) shows the amount of CIT and 
GCT paid on time and column (2) shows the share of reported CIT and GCT paid on time.  
 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
CIT GCT
Late Filing and Payment Rates
Filed Late Paid Late
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
CIT GCT
No. Days Late, Large Taxpayers
Days Filed Late Days Paid Late
118 
 
 
Figure B.3: Density Plots for CIT and GCT 
 
 
Figure B.4: McCrary’s Test of Density Manipulation around the Threshold for the CIT and GCT 
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Figure B.5: Test for Discontinuity in Treatment Probability Placebo Thresholds  
 
Notes: The placebo thresholds of J$100 million and J$1 billion were chosen to match TAJ’s classification schedule 
for ‘small’ and ‘large’ taxpayers. TAJ classifies taxpayers with gross receipts less than or equal to J$100 million as 
small and those with gross receipts of J$1 billion or more as ‘large’.  
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Figure B.6: Treatment Probability for Key Economic Sector for the CIT 
 
Notes: RD plots done using integrated mean squared-error (IMSE) – equally spaced (ES) method with spacing 
estimators (Calonico et al., 2014a). The approach fits a local linear regression that approximates the conditional 
mean of the outcome variable (firm characteristics) to the left and right of the cut off.  
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Figure B.7: Tests for Discontinuity in Taxpayer Characteristics for the GCT 
 
Notes: RD plots done using integrated mean squared-error (IMSE) – evenly spaced (ES) method with spacing 
estimators (Calonico et al.; 2014a). The approach fits a local linear regression that approximates the conditional 
mean of the outcome variable (firm characteristics) to the left and right of the cut off. 
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Appendix C: Appendix for Essay Three 
Table C.1: Experimental Timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 18 - 23, 2016 Data collection & sample selection
Collected data on all registered self employed taxpayers from TAJ
Randomized the sample in treatment control groups for the two experiment in phase one
August 3 - 5, 2016 Send letters for sub-experiment one
Letters for sub-experiment one were generated, printed and mailed off to randomly selected
taxpayers. All letters are expected to be delivered to taxpayers by the latest August 12, 2016
August 12 - 19, 2016 Send letters for sub-experiment two
Letters for sub-experiment two were generated, printed and mailed off to randomly selected
taxpayers. All letters are expected to be delivered to taxpayers by the latest August 26, 2016
September 30, 2016 Collect data to examine effects  for the third quarter
Third quarter payments are due on September 15
Examine effects on the payment of tax arrears, approximately one month after receiving the
treatments in sub-experiment 2.
December 31, 2016 Collect data to examine effects for the fourth quarter
Fourth quarter payments are due on December 15
Examine effects on the payment of tax arrears, approximately 4 months after receiving the
treatments in sub-experiment 2.
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Table C.2: Estimated Cost of Sub-experiment Two 
 
Notes: Estimates are for sub-experiment two. Costs estimates are based on costing information provided by the tax 
administration. We have no data on items marked with * and the associated cost estimates are best guess upper 
bounds. 
 
 
Table C.3: Estimated Cost and Benefit by Treatment for Sub-experiment Two 
 
Notes: Estimates are for sub-experiment two. Table breaks out the estimated costs and revenue gains for each 
treatment. 
 
 
 
 
Item Unit Cost (J$) Total Cost (J$)
Cost of Materials
Envelopes 44.00 252,516.00
Paper 10.00 57,390.00
Toner * 30.00 172,170.00
Ink * 30.00 172,170.00
Glue * 10.00 57,390.00
Stamp 60.00 344,340.00
Total Material Cost 184.00 1,055,976.00
Cost of Labour
Labour Cost 20.77 119,200.00
Total Cost 204.77 1,175,176.00
Treatment No of Taxpayers Marginal Cost Marginal Revenue Total Cost Revenue Gains
PG_stnd 2883 204.77 2590 590,352.40 7,466,970.00
PG_augm 2856 204.77 2166 584,823.60 6,186,096.00
5739 1,175,176.00 13,653,066.00
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Figure C.1: Envelope in which Letters were sent 
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Figure C.2: Sample Letter sent in Sub-experiment One, Standard Public Goods Treatment 
 
Mr. John Doe 
33 Stillwater Avenue 
Kinston 5 
Jamaica 
February 20, 2016 
Re: Taxes finance important public services provided by the Government 
Dear Mr. John Doe 
Paying your taxes provide the funding necessary to pay for important public services such as 
health care, education, national security and other important services. If all self-employed 
individuals pay their income tax liabilities in full, this could provide funding to significantly 
increase spending in these important areas. 
You are reminded that quarterly payments of your estimated income tax liability for 2016 are 
due on March 15, June 15, September 15 and December 15 of the current year. Final payment of 
all outstanding income tax liabilities for 2016 must be made on or before March 15, 2017. The 
deadline for filing your final income tax return for 2016 is March 15, 2017. This may be done on 
line via the TAJ website at www.jamaicatax.gov.jm or at any tax office. 
We encourage you to file and pay your taxes on time and in full. You can call our Customer Care 
Centre at 1-888-Tax-Help (829-4357) or email us at taxhelp@taj.gov.jm if you have any 
questions, comments or suggestions about how we can better serve you. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Commissioner General  
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Figure C.3: Sample Letter sent in Sub-experiment Two, Standard Public Goods Treatment 
 
Mr. John Doe 
33 Stillwater Avenue 
Kinston 5 
Jamaica 
February 20, 2016 
Re: Taxes finance important public services provided by the Government 
Dear Mr. John Doe 
You are among a group of taxpayers identified as having outstanding income tax liabilities. 
Paying your taxes provide the funding necessary to pay for important public services such as 
health care, education, national security and other important services. If all self-employed 
individuals pay their income tax liabilities in full, this could provide funding to significantly 
increase spending in these important areas. 
If you have not already paid your outstanding income tax liability, please do so now.  
We encourage you to file and pay your taxes on time and in full. This may be done on line via 
the TAJ website at www.jamaicatax.gov.jm or at any tax office. You can call our Customer Care 
Centre at 1-888-Tax-Help (829-4357) or email us at taxhelp@taj.gov.jm if you have any 
questions, comments or suggestions about how we can better serve you. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Commissioner General  
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Figure C.4: Sample Letter sent in Sub-experiment Two, Augmented Public Goods Treatment 
 
Mr. John Doe 
33 Stillwater Avenue 
Kinston 5 
Jamaica 
February 20, 2016 
Re: Taxes finance important public services provided by the Government 
Dear Mr. John Doe 
You are among a group of taxpayers identified as having outstanding income tax liabilities. 
Paying your taxes provide the funding necessary to pay for important public services such as 
health care, education, national security and other important services. Last year the Government 
spent approximately J$54 billion on health, J$90 billion on education and J$57 billion on 
national security.  If all self-employed individuals pay their income tax liabilities in full, this 
could provide funding to significantly increase spending in these important areas. 
If you have not already paid your outstanding income tax liability, please do so now.  
We encourage you to file and pay your taxes on time and in full. This may be done on line via 
the TAJ website at www.jamaicatax.gov.jm or at any tax office. You can call our Customer Care 
Centre at 1-888-Tax-Help (829-4357) or email us at taxhelp@taj.gov.jm if you have any 
questions, comments or suggestions about how we can better serve you. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
 
 
………………………………………………….. 
Commissioner General 
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